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THESIS

**NORMATIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL INFLUENCES: A
STUDY OF COHESION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
AND THEIR EFFECT ON SOCIETY**

by

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June 2007

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>Current Afghanistan operations demonstrate the ability for terrorist organizations to flourish without clear structure. Such organizations likely adopt missionary and/or adhocracy structures, which are underdeveloped theoretically and empirically with organizational theorizing, particularly military command and control concepts. However, terrorist organizations are groups and thus subject to norm processes. From an open systems view of organizations, processes develop according to the operating conditions of the group. As conditions change, internally and externally, groups must adopt norming strategies within the constraints of the group's environment. If a group is unable to maintain a norming structure facilitating group cohesion and clear understanding of the group's mission, then that group will likely fail to meet its objectives or cease to exist.</p> <p>Thus the ability of a terrorist organization to achieve its objectives is partially dependent upon its ability to influence, directly or indirectly, the society in which it operates. Terrorist organizations must entice people to willingly join a group that assumingly does not value less radical societal norms. This work studies norming processes within terrorist organizations. It begins with a review of the norming literature and thus applies reviewed concepts to terrorist organizations. It provides a foundation from which future researchers can test hypotheses related to terrorist groups and their environments from a normative perspective of command and control.</p>				
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COHESION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON
SOCIETY**

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ABSTRACT

Terrorist organizations are groups and therefore subject to norm processes in order to operate. These norms form a core component of the organizations' command and control environment. Unique group norm processes develop according to the needs and conditions under which a group operates. As conditions change, both internally and externally, groups adopt norming strategies, whether cognizant of them or not, to fit the constraints of the group's environment. If a group is unable to maintain a type of norming structure that facilitates group cohesion and a clear understanding of the group's mission, then that group will likely fail to meet its objective or eventually cease to exist.

Coalition operations in Afghanistan following September 11, 2001, demonstrated the ability for terrorist organizations to continue to flourish without a clear structure. The availability of current technology also aids groups without well-defined structure. Organizations with these constraints are likely to adopt a missionary and/or adhocracy structure. Under these conditions, terrorist organizations are increasingly difficult to categorize and study in terms of their structure.

The ability of a terrorist organization to continue its existence and successful operations is partially dependent upon its ability to influence, either directly or indirectly, the society in which it operates so that the group's network and operations may be maintained. Terrorist organizations that span several years or those that exist

for specific operations continue to entice people to willingly join a group that assumingly does not value the same norms as those of society.

For these brief reasons, this study offers a framework of how such organizations affect societies. The intent is to develop hypotheses that will potentially enable future agents of peace to disrupt the norming process of these groups.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

Terrorist organizations are groups and therefore subject to norm processes in order to operate. These norms form a core component of the organizations' command and control environment. Unique group norm processes develop according to the needs and conditions under which a group operates. As conditions change, both internally and externally, groups adopt norming strategies, whether cognizant of them or not, to fit the constraints of the group's environment. If a group is unable to maintain a type of norming structure that facilitates group cohesion and a clear understanding of the group's mission, then that group will likely fail to meet its objective or eventually cease to exist.

Coalition operations in Afghanistan following September 11, 2001, demonstrated the ability for terrorist organizations to continue to flourish without a clear structure. The availability of current technology also aids groups without well-defined structure. Organizations with these constraints are likely to adopt a missionary and/or adhocracy structure. Under these conditions, terrorist organizations are increasingly difficult to categorize and study in terms of their structure.

The ability of a terrorist organization to continue its existence and successful operations is partially dependent upon its ability to influence, either directly or indirectly, the society in which it operates so that the group's network and operations may be maintained. Terrorist

organizations that span several years or those that exist for specific operations continue to entice people to willingly join a group that assumingly does not value the same norms as those of society.

For these brief reasons, this study offers a framework of how such organizations affect societies. The intent is to develop hypotheses that will potentially enable future agents of peace to disrupt the norming process of these groups.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION(S)

Richard Scott contends that command and control activities within organizations can be categorized as regulatory (written rules, procedures and policies), normative (collective meaning systems applied to actions and symbols), and cultural-cognitive (processes that reinforce collective cultural mores and bounded cognition) in nature.¹ The literature on terrorist organizations, however, has yet to benefit from this conceptual framework. Current terrorism studies focus upon societal-level factors instead of organizational-level factors. These studies postulate frameworks for understanding the conditions allowing the formation and continuation of terrorist organizations. Organizational-level factors examine how organizations themselves or their members create processes and sustain these organizations. In particular, given the ideological impetus cited by many terrorist recruits as a reason for joining, the paucity of theoretical and empirical work for

¹ W. Richard Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*, 5th ed., (Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2003.), 15.

exploring the normative command and control processes that create and sustain terrorist organizations needs further work.²

Societal norms affect the conditions under which terrorist organizations come into existence, operate and become reflected with the terrorist organization's normative command and control processes. However, assuming that such influences are uni-directional is premature; from an open systems perspective, societal norms both influence and are influenced by terrorist groups. Abundant theories exist and explain the conditions suitable for the formation of terrorist organizations. Now that these organizations exist, studies need to explore how these organizations influence the societies in which they operate through normative influences. In this vein, this thesis explores the normative command and control processes of terrorist organizations. It begins with a review of the group norming literature, and then specifically applies these theoretical concepts to terrorist organizations. Its aim is to identify how terrorist organizations, which are situated within a broader society, use normative command and control processes to create and sustain themselves via an open systems framework. Thus the following research questions are particularly relevant to this endeavor:

(1) How do terrorist organizations use normative command and control to actively seek and influence possible recruits from the general public?

² Scott, 15.

(2) How do terrorist organizations use normative command and control to maintain cohesion among current members within their organizational structure?

Normative command and control, however, does not exist within a vacuum. Terrorist groups use other means, such as sharing information or indoctrination techniques, in order to create, exchange, and sustain their normative command and control processes. This thesis, thus, also explores how normative command and control structures within terrorist organizations vary with the information sharing and communication structures of these groups.

(3) What methods of command and control influence are used by terrorist organizations to maintain group cohesion that society also accepts or does not actively persecute?

Since terrorist groups are contextually situated, this thesis recognizes that the objective, location, and acceptance level of the local society will necessitate the need for different types of command and control systems from an open systems perspective.³ How these groups use norming processes to interact with society, however, is somewhat fragmented in the literature. This thesis begins to synthesize these processes through exploring:

(4) Do terrorist groups actively seek to establish group norms congruent with the norms of societies in which they operate in order to bolster support and recruit future members?

³ Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," in *Terrorism in Context*. (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 8.

Using historical vignettes, this thesis highlights the process by which organizations institute norm forming from an empirical basis. This thesis demonstrates that members embedded within the structure of an organization adapt to the norms of the organization rather than society because of the strong cohesive forces within an organization that replace the norms of society.

(5) How do the norms of terrorist organizations relate to those norms of the societies in which they operate?

(6) Is there a relationship between peer, perceived, and societal norms of the terrorist organizations as they relate those of society?

By discussing the various types of audiences a terrorist organization seeks to influence, different norms and how they relate to the norms of the terrorist organization are discussed. These audiences largely fall into three groups: uncommitted, sympathetic, or active members. Each set of people must be treated and approached differently.

C. BACKGROUND

In order to study terrorism and its components, basic definitions must be accepted. For the purpose of this thesis, the following definitions are used:

1. Definitions

A group is a collection of individuals, to include numbers of two or more, who have interactions with one another making the individuals interdependent to some degree. A group is not defined by similar characteristics

amongst its parts but by its dynamic characteristics based on the interactions between its members. Interaction is further defined by behavior of one person that directly affects the behavior of another.⁴

Group norms are the sets of informal rules that groups adopt to regulate and regularize group members' behavior. These norms are not necessarily written but each member of the group is aware of them. Norms establish the behavior that ought to occur. Norms differ from values which are the beliefs of an individual or collection of individuals who share a common view of what is considered desirable.⁵ A belief can belong to an individual or group, but a norm only belongs to a group. Beliefs do not regularize behavior as do norms. Members of the same group may hold different beliefs but adhere to a common set of norms.⁶

Ideology is defined as a "common and broadly agreed set of rules to which an individual subscribes which help to regulate and determine behavior."⁷ A religious fundamentalist for the purpose of this thesis then is one who has consistency not only in the religion's ideology but

⁴ Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Groups and Group Membership: Introduction," in *Group Dynamics*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 46.

⁵ Richard T. Morris, "A Typology of Norms," *American Sociological Review* 21, no. 5 (1956), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed October 2006).

⁶ Daniel C. Feldman, "The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms" *The Academy of Management Review* 9, no. 1 (1984), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed October 2006).

⁷ John Horgan and Max Taylor, "The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 12, no. 4 (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 55.

in its prescribed behavior. The particular ideology adhered to depends upon which sect of a religion an individual believes.⁸

The term terrorism was initially used to describe the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety used to control and direct the actions of a civilian population during the mass uprisings of the French Revolution. Terrorism then described the challenges state leadership incurred due to revolutionaries trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French Revolution.⁹ For the purpose of this thesis, the Department of Defense (DOD) definition of terrorism will be used: "The unlawful use of-or threatened use of-force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."¹⁰ This definition amongst others is chosen because it includes a cultural context and is the entity for which this thesis is written.

2. Causes of Terrorism

a. Situational Variables

This thesis does not attempt to explain the causes of terrorism but a brief overview of various theories is presented in order to provide a context for how these organizations develop. The way in which an organization

⁸ Horgan and Taylor, 37.

⁹ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981), 380. <http://www.jstor.org>. (accessed October 2006).

¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman, "Defining Terrorism," in *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 38.

develops often indicates its operations. Terrorism and the formation of terrorist groups are not spontaneous. Organizations with long-term goals grow from a set of preconditions which set the stage for violent actions. These preconditions include permissive factors of society that provide opportunity for action and situations that inspire terrorist campaigns. For these reasons, tightly policed states, such as Iraq before the removal of Saddam Hussein or Cuba under Fidel Castro, generally do not experience terrorist attacks. Opportunities to take action against the government do not exist because the state takes action against the people before they have time to organize. Conversely, states which are more open, while allowing their citizens more freedoms, also allow opportunity for the people to express their grievances against the state. As people gather around a specific issue without fear of immediate state retribution, organized violence is more likely to occur.¹¹

Terrorism scholar, Martha Crenshaw, states that, "Terrorism occurs when governments use unexpected force in response to protest."¹² Once a previously open and tolerant state attempts to tighten security and takes action against protestors, acts of terrorism are more likely in retaliation to the freedoms recently taken away. Crenshaw states, "Terrorism occurs where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide."¹³ Organizations in these situations will coalesce around specific grievances to

¹¹ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 381.

¹² Ibid., 384.

¹³ Ibid., 384.

incite the population to action. This explanation is a factor of the social movement theory.

Terrorism itself is more achievable due to the urbanization beginning in the late nineteenth century resulting in more densely populated areas. Dense areas of civilian populations increase the number of interactions and subsequently mean that fear caused by violent attacks will travel further and faster.¹⁴ Attacks are conducted to incite fear and to force state leadership to change its policies, laws, or conduct. A single, unpredictable violent attack may have more effect than drawn out military campaigns. Along with urbanization, modernization introduced complexity to society affording people the opportunity to focus on objectives other than providing for basic necessities. As modernization creates complexity, physical opportunities and vulnerabilities for potential attacks emerge.¹⁵ Command and control systems, increasingly mechanized since the time of Napoleon, introduce new vulnerabilities for attack. Spying can now be accomplished from a distance, using technology instead of physically needing to send scouts ahead of a marching army. Information flows faster, allowing terrorists to organize and exchange information knowledge more quickly and in secret. Modernization resulted in mass transportation, but mass transportation enabled terrorists to quickly and covertly move from one region to another.¹⁶ Additionally,

¹⁴ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 381.

¹⁵ Ibid., 381.

¹⁶ Leonard Weinberg, "Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (1991): 424. <http://www.jstor.org>. (accessed October 2006).

the modern mass media provides an outlet for terrorists to communicate their message to other populations.¹⁷ This avenue of communication provides opportunity for terrorists to communicate and pass information among each other as well as potentially recruiting future terrorists. Media coverage of successful terrorist attacks also decreases the people's confidence in their governments.

b. Strategy

The strategy of a terrorist organization varies depending on the mission of the organization. The strategies employed by organizations though, rest on the idea that terrorism involves a group of actors, generally utilizing a small core of personnel who have intimate relationships. Since the violent nature of terrorism presupposes that the norms adopted by these groups oppose those of society, the interactions between group members may be more important to understanding normative command and control relationships and the ability of organizations to flourish under adverse circumstances versus the psychological predispositions of individual members.¹⁸ Once a terrorist organization exists though, leaders may be reluctant to achieve the group's objectives and end the purpose for the group's existence. Terrorist organizations are likely to "seek incremental gains sufficient to sustain group morale but not to end members' dependence on the organization."¹⁹ For this reason, a group's goal may expand

¹⁷ Weinberg, 424.

¹⁸ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 393.

¹⁹ David C. Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), 22.

over time in order to necessitate continued support. For example, al Qaeda initially sought to remove infidels from traditionally Muslim lands, but overtime, the objective expanded to include spreading their sect of Islam to secular Muslim states and beyond.

c. Terrorist Psychology

In the past, psychological problems were thought to play a part in members of society who resort to violent means. While some members of organizations may display psychological problems, this occurrence is not a main factor in documented terrorism. Instead, the path to terrorism is usually more gradual such that indoctrination replaces the norms of society and the person involved in terrorism is a rational actor. One model of terrorism by Kent Layne Oots and Thomas C. Wiegler explains that an individual who commits a terrorist act must have an attitude accepting of violence. More importantly, "the potential terrorist need only see that terrorism has worked for others in order to become aggressively aroused."²⁰ This paper is not focused on psychology, but one component of counter-terrorism studies is that of the psychological aspects of terrorism which are concerned with "their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups, their personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorist[s]."²¹ In order for a group to commit an act of terrorism, the members of the group must reach "collective decisions based on commonly

²⁰ Rex A. Hudson et al., *Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government Report on Profiling Terrorists* (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2002), 27.

²¹ Ibid., 28.

held beliefs, although the level of individual commitment to the group and its beliefs varies."²² This thesis looks at these topics in order to understand the cohesiveness of the group as it possibly relates to the normative command and control aspects of an organization.

D. PROBLEM STATEMENT

This thesis studies the internal processes of terrorism inside an organization to develop a framework for terrorism's effects on society. This study is relevant as demonstrated by coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq following September 11, 2001. After initial coalition operations, al Qaeda displayed a capability to continue operating despite lacking a formal, recognizable structure. The Global War on Terrorism faces challenges as terrorist organization members demonstrate a willingness to inflict mass casualties against members of their own society as well as others. This thesis uses a variety of historical terrorist groups to study the internal processes of cohesion and normative command and control but recognizes that the current Global War on Terrorism is focusing on fundamentalist groups. Different types of terrorism will be discussed, but in developing the problem statement for this thesis, concern is given to fundamentalist groups because unlike politically motivated terrorist groups, fundamentalist groups are not constrained by the fear that excessive violence will offend a constituency. For this reason, understanding the internal processes of terrorist organizations becomes more imperative to understanding what

²² Hudson, 25.

causes these groups to continue operating and attracting additional members. For these groups, persuasion is not an objective because religious fundamentalists find justification for their actions based on their specific interpretation of religious works.²³

As the international community has generally taken more active stances against terrorism, terrorist organizations have become less structured than before September 11, 2001. The current insurgency in Iraq demonstrates the ability of persons not belonging to specific organizations to commit acts of terror. Furthermore, the "diffusion of lethal technologies, the erosion of taboos against the use of weapons of mass destruction, the absence of restraint in amateur terrorists who, having no organization or sponsor to protect, see no reason to limit extreme violence that might generate backlash, and the continuing need of terrorists to find new ways to attract attention are reasons this topic must be studied."²⁴

E. JUSTIFICATION FOR APPROACH

Following coalition operations in Afghanistan, many noted the ability of terrorist groups to adapt to new organizational structures. Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 occurred, the U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in April 2000, noted in *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*,

²³ David Tucker, "What is New about the New Terrorism and How Dangerous is It?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 3.

²⁴ Ibid., 2.

U.S. counterterrorist policies are tailored to combat what experts believe to be the shifting trends in terrorism. One trend is the shift from well-organized, localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists. Such a network supported the failed attempt to smuggle explosives material and detonating devices into Seattle in December. With the decrease of state funding, these loosely networked individuals and groups have turned increasingly to other sources of funding, including private sponsorship, narcotrafficking, crime, and illegal trade.²⁵

Command and control of an organization is largely responsible for shaping the norms of a group. This thesis asserts that understanding the mechanisms of norm influence through aspects of cohesion will enable strategists and policy makers to develop a framework for identifying key command and control concepts either to employ or defend against.

This thesis rests on the idea that terrorist organizations, regardless of their structural characteristics, are groups and therefore subject to group dynamics. One component of group dynamics is cohesion and how group norms affect that cohesion. Assuming that "social norms are learned, they can be modified over time; and if they are truly a causal link to behavior and interaction patterns, then normative modifications may account for certain social changes. Along this line, normative conflict and normative ambiguity also may lead to social changes such

²⁵ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "What Next for Networks and Netwars?" in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 343, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

as a breakdown in the social order."²⁶ While policy advocates may search for causal links to group behavior, this thesis maintains that no single component of group dynamics can be truly causal. By understanding the dynamics of the group, including its shared ideological commitment and group identity, analysts can isolate the means of ending terrorist attacks. The focus of this thesis is thus on the dynamic relationships between members as a way of gaining insight into the vulnerability of the group's organizational structure, the group's ideology and the worldview, which may lead to a framework for more effectively combating asymmetrical terrorism threats.²⁷

F. ASSUMPTIONS

First, this thesis assumes that terrorist organizations are groups and subject to the norm processes of groups. As groups, this thesis does not study terrorism as composed of individuals or in terms of the leading personalities in terrorist organizations.

Second, in order to study terrorist organizations and to develop a framework for their command and control processes overseeing cohesion-building forces, they must be analyzed as rational actors. This is based on the assumption that terrorist organizations possess internally consistent sets of values, beliefs, and norms. In this

²⁶ Robert Hagedorn and Sanford Labovitz, "Measuring Social Norms" *The Pacific Sociological Review* 16, no. 3 (1973), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed October 2006).

²⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 12.

respect, terrorism is a means to an end. Making this assumption allows analysts to study the decision-making processes.²⁸

Third, this thesis does not attempt to profile terrorists. Trends have existed depending on the type of organization concerning individual characteristics (age, gender, education, income), but these trends have changed over time. Often, data collected about individual terrorists is not representative of the organization as a whole because studies tend to talk to terrorists who are detained. These individuals are more likely to be leaders of groups, who authorities have a greater interest in, and since they are being detained, may not always have responses representative of the rest of the organization.

Fourth, this thesis looks at the behavior of the group and the processes by which command and control is carried out to a degree that individuals no longer feel they are acting against the norms of society. For this reason, this thesis assumes that terrorism is not individual aberrant behavior, but rather as the "product of the beliefs, mindsets, traditions, and operational code of a group."²⁹ Using this assumption, an individual's behavior is understandable within the context of the organization.

²⁸ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 385.

²⁹ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Knowing our Enemy," in *Unconquerable Nation* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006), 57. <http://www.rand.org>. (accessed February 2007).

G. METHODOLOGY

First, this thesis reviews current literature concerning the process of group norms. This focuses on methods employed to create group norms and the types of group norms established to maintain a group's existence. Norms of influence will be the key component of this literature review. Second, this thesis incorporates organizational structure theory as a means of assessing the types of norms a terrorist group operating in adverse conditions needs to continue its existence. This portion of the research focuses on the characteristics of various types of possible terrorist organizations in support of the working assumption that terrorist organizations are increasingly utilizing missionary/adhocracy structures. Third, this thesis focuses on different influencing methods that terrorist organizations used in the past and currently employ to foster an environment conducive to the continued existence of these organizations. This portion of the research is enriched by cited examples of terrorist organizations' use of these methods in the past. Finally, my thesis will summarize these findings in a concise framework with hypotheses as to how terrorist organizations influence societies as a product.

Quantifiable analysis of the internal dynamics led by a group's command and control processes is neither cost nor time effective in this brief analysis. As such, primary and secondary resources will be used as techniques for measurement. These resources will be approached under the categories of (1) questioning people as other researchers have questioned them in interviews, (2) inferring norms from

behavior, (3) postulated effects—that is, measuring the implication of hypothetical norms (largely covered in the literature review), and (4) written documents from group members to include electronic communications.³⁰

H. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Since no original empirical data is collected for this thesis, the following problems with the methodology may arise from secondary data: the purpose of each study is slightly different, and therefore, the questions asked of detained terrorists may be worded to evoke different answers. A researcher is less likely to publish findings incongruent to the thesis statement of the research which may skew the published results. The respondents themselves have potential biases. Some respondents may lie or have incomplete recollections of events or people. Detained terrorists may not have been top leaders and therefore do not have the answers. Also, persons interviewed may provide the responses they think the researcher wants to hear in order to win favor and to improve their personal situation. Written documents from terrorists and scholars alike must be viewed with caution. Since a time delay exists between the time of writing and dissemination of scholarly works, the conclusions drawn from a set of documents may be outdated for the current time period.³¹

When attempting to develop a framework describing the norms an organization uses to maintain internal cohesion as well as to influence members of society, research must avoid

³⁰ Hagedorn and Labovitz, (accessed October 2006).

³¹ Ibid.

drawing general conclusions from specific examples. For this reason, single case studies will not be used in this thesis. Instead, short examples drawn from terrorist organizations with varied origins will be used to illustrate command and control principles using cohesion to affect society. The norms discovered through research may not actually be norms of the organization being studied but caused by other factors. If norms are correctly identified, other influences for an organizations behavior should not be ruled out because the norm that one example cites might be generally overshadowed by another group norm.³²

³² Hagedorn and Labovitz, (accessed October 2006).

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW OF GROUP NORMS

This section describes the formation of groups, some of the processes through which groups establish and facilitate norms, and how these norms contribute to group cohesion, particularly for missionary organizations such as terrorist groups.

A. THEORY OF NORM FORMATION

1. Planned Groups

Groups form for a variety of reasons. Only those with relevancy to this thesis will be shortly described. One or more persons may form a group to accomplish a specific objective: work, problem-solving, social-action, mediating, legislative, and client groups. Work groups use coordination of behavior and resources from a collection of people in order to perform a task more efficiently. Terrorist groups fit this category through their need to coordinate behavior in an efficient manner to complete an operation. Problem-solving groups are those which strategize to deliver solutions. Terrorist group leadership may fit this category. Social-action groups "desire to influence the course of events in society."³³ These groups press state leadership or business leadership for more rights, freedoms, or power. Social-action groups fit terrorist groups which seek to influence the actions of states. Mediating groups apply to today's evolving organizational structure of terrorist groups because these

³³ Cartwright and Zander, 54.

groups coordinate activities and resources across other groups. Al Qaeda has its own mission but also works with other groups to maintain open channels of communication as well as potential future conduits for resources. Legislative groups formulate rules and regulations. Since terrorist organizations are often not the authority figures in the state, this type of group does not apply to this study. Note though, the Taliban did play this role. Client groups want to improve members' lives by being a part of the group. These groups are akin to the various group-help programs, such as Alcoholics Anonymous. Since terrorist groups will sacrifice members or punish group members for not adhering to their norms, terrorist groups do not fit this category either.³⁴

2. Spontaneous Groups

Groups may also form spontaneously. The formation of the Hamburg cell may be an example of this group formation. Formation of the group is based on each member's that other possible members share the same values. Members must have sufficient contact with one another for this formation, but with the advent of the Internet, chat rooms, and email, this contact does not have to be in physical proximity. Finally, this type of group formation occurs when potential members perceive others as wanting to relieve their internal conflicts using the same methods, in this case, violence.³⁵

³⁴ Cartwright and Zander, 54.

³⁵ Ibid.

3. Attraction to Groups

An individual's attraction to a group will depend upon his assessment of the desirable and undesirable consequences attendant upon membership: "Each participant will continue his participation in an organization only so long as the inducements offered him are as great or greater [measured in terms of his values and in terms of the alternatives open to him] than the contribution he is asked to make."³⁶ A person's attraction to a group is not simply determined by the characteristics of the group but also by his view of how these characteristics relate to his own personal needs and values.

Four factors of attraction to a group include: 1) motive-based, 2) incentives, 3) expectancy, and 4) comparison level. Motive-based attraction includes the need to belong, recognition, security, money, or other values a person feels a group potentially provides.³⁷ These are exchange-based motives. Incentive-based attraction consists of an alignment between the goal of the group and the individual to include types of activities undertaken by the group, or prestige connected to membership with the group. Expectancy-based attraction is the thought that group membership will have beneficial consequences for the individual. Comparison level-based attraction occurs when an individual feels that membership to a particular group will have greater benefits than membership to a second group. This feeling may be based on past or theoretical

³⁶ Dorwin Cartwright, "The Nature of Group Cohesiveness," in *Group Dynamics*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 95.

³⁷ Ibid, 96.

experiences. This concept should be implemented when fighting in an unstable area where the population is undecided as to which side to support. Individuals attracted to a group may be enticed when the group lures members into the group promising certain benefits. Following membership, the group may then proceed to influence the needs and interests of the member to those more desirable for the group.³⁸

Types of Groups	Group Formation	Brief Description	Terrorist group example
Social Action	Planned	Influence events in society	Geographically dispersed persons meet over Internet
Mediating	Planned	Coordinate behavior and resources across other groups	
Legislative	Planned	Formulate rules and regulations	
Client-based	Planned	Act on behalf of others	
Spontaneous	Not planned	Form quickly to take action	

Table 1. **Types of Groups and Relationship to Terrorist Organizations**

B. GROUP NORMS

Group norms are the sets of informal rules that groups adopt to regulate and regularize group members' behavior based on collective systems. These norms are generally not

³⁸ Cartwright, 96.

written but each member of the group is aware of them. Norms define the boundaries of acceptable behavior. Norms differ from values which are the beliefs of an individual or collection of individuals who share a common view of what is considered desirable.³⁹ Thus norms focus on behaviors, while beliefs focus on worldview or ideology. Norms are formed and enforced only with respect to the behaviors that are important for the group and can diverge widely from the written rules, regulations, and policies of the group or organization. For example, a group may have a rule against smoking, but if enough of the members ignore this rule or do not care about it, then the no smoking policy will not be enforced and will not exist as a group norm.

Norms develop over time after being reinforced through "explicit statements by supervisors or co-workers, critical events in the group's history, primacy, or carry-over behaviors from past situations."⁴⁰ The degree and methods used to create and sustain group cohesion are a subset of the group's norms. A belief can belong to an individual or group, but a norm only belongs to a group. Moreover, beliefs do not regularize behavior as do norms, particularly in a group context. Members of the same group may hold different beliefs but adhere to a common set of norms.⁴¹

Groups are likely to enforce only those norms which increase the group's likelihood of survival, increase group member predictability, avoid embarrassing situations for the group, or directly support central beliefs of the group.

³⁹ Morris, (accessed October 2006).

⁴⁰ Feldman, 47.

⁴¹ Ibid.

For some groups, the norms of the group may seem to conflict with those of society. Contracultural norms occur when an individual understands, and at some level, accepts the standards of society but recognizes a personal inability to meet them. Instead, the individual represses his sense of identity with society and seeks out others who feel the same. By forming a group with others with the same set of norms, the result is a group which welcomes and encourages the suppression of society's norms. This concept is applicable to the formation of locally formed terrorist groups or those cells that form from within a state.⁴²

1. Normative Conflict

a. Moral Versus Behavioral Norms

Difficulties in profiling terrorists arise partially due to the moral versus behavior norm conflict. Moral norms refer to ideal forms of behavior whereas behavior norms refer to the real conduct that actually occurs regardless of what ought to take place. Members of a terrorist group may be involved family and community members whose moral norms are congruous to those of society, but the behavioral norms of the terrorist group member deviate from the moral norms of his broader social network. If these individuals see others whose behavior norms are not aligned with society's moral norms, then the individual is more

⁴² Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Pressures to Uniformity in Groups: Introduction," in *Group Dynamics*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 144.

likely to see his own behavioral norms as aligning more closely with those of society.⁴³

b. Absolute Versus Conditional Norms

The difference between absolute and conditional norms and the varying degree of their application can cause confusion and disintegration of group cohesion. Absolute norms are known and supported by all members of the group. These norms apply to everyone under all conditions. Deviances from these norms result in harsh sanctions. Conditional norms have a more limited application and sporadic enforcement.⁴⁴ These norms may only be enforced during times of great stress for the group. The difference in these two norms could be leveraged to design counter-terrorism strategies if the inner-workings of an organization's internal dynamics are understood. Forcing command and control situations which call for the terrorist organization to enforce conditional norms may cause support for the group to erode.

c. Laws of Society Versus Social Norms

Laws of society are much more likely to be enforced if the social norms of that society are congruent to those laws. Social norms are enforced in order to ensure satisfaction of group members and to prevent as much interpersonal discomfort as possible. Counter-terrorism strategies need to be mindful of social norms in order to

⁴³ M.D. Buffalo and Joseph W. Rodgers, "Behavioral Norms, Moral Norms, and Attachment: Problems of Deviance and Conformity," *Social Problems* 19, no. 1(1971), <http://www.jstor.org>. (accessed October 2006).

⁴⁴ Morris, (accessed October 2006).

stifle support from sympathetic audiences of the terrorist groups and to avoid one-solution-fits-all policies.

2. Group Polarization

Once a group is formed and its norms are established, the individual members of the group may not notice that their own views shift to meet those of the group. When the views of the group shift toward greater risk-taking compared with the common view of the group before discussions and membership, this is known as group polarization. Even though it is the group that becomes more risky in its decisions, individuals tend to adopt the more risky views as well, shifting toward greater risk-taking decisions after the group shifts. Conversely, individuals who are not part of the decision-making and discussion process do not exhibit a shift in their personal views.⁴⁵ This dichotomy could potentially be used to exploit terrorist group members on the fringe of the organization by encouraging fringe members to forego highly risky behavior with which they disagree. Amnesty programs for terrorist groups, for example, are posited to work on this principle. They provide an incentive for individuals with lesser commitment to the group, such as fringe members, to remove themselves from the ideology and behavior of the more hardened core membership.

3. Norm Erosion

In order to combat terrorist organization operations at the deepest level, erosion of the group's norms must take

⁴⁵ Daryl J. Bem, Nathan Kogan, and Michael A. Wallach, "Group Influence on Individual Risk-Taking," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwn Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 442.

place. A person who follows the required rules and routine of a group but no longer subscribes to the ethical and moral content of the group displays compliance. This is a first step in luring a group member away from a terrorist organization by encouraging the member away from the rules and routine of the group. Emancipation and complete norm erosion occur when an individual no longer even complies with the regulations of a group because they no longer fit his own moral code. Few people though, less than five percent of those interviewed are fully emancipated.⁴⁶ This phenomenon helps to explain why terrorists interviewed in prison still display feelings of support and respect for their respective terrorist organizations. If norms cannot be eroded, then they can be neutralized. If an individual is aware that his behavioral and moral norms do not match those of society, then this person is likely to take steps to avoid being singled out for deviance. For this reason, terrorists in a cellular organization structure may be more difficult to detect because they might recognize that their norms deviate from those of society. In order to protect themselves, they will try to blend as much as possible. For example, the perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks tried to appear as if their behavior and moral norms matched those of society. They were seen out at bars before undertaking their mission.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Bem, Kogan, and Wallach, 448.

⁴⁷ Buffalo and Rodgers, (accessed October 2006).

Characteristics of Group Norms	Types of Normative Conflict
Serve as informal rules for group members	Contra cultural
Develop and shift over time	Moral vs. Behavioral
Increase group survival	Absolute vs. Conditional
Avoid embarrassment	Social norms vs. Laws
Support group beliefs	Norm erosion
Increase predictability of group member actions	

Table 2. **Characteristics of Group Norms and Conflicting Norms**

C. NORMS OF GROUP COHESION

The following chart summarizes the forces of cohesion as they relate to group dynamics.⁴⁸




Figure 1. **Forces of Cohesion Related to Group Dynamics.**
(After: Daryl J. Bem, Nathan Kogan, and Michael A. Wallach, "Group Influence on Individual Risk-Taking," in *Group Dynamics*, 92.)

⁴⁸ Cartwright, 92.

Group cohesiveness describes the extent to which members of a group desire to remain in the group and how willing they are to rely on one another. The degree of cohesion in a terrorist organization is important to study because members of a more cohesive group should more readily accept the group's goals, decisions, and assignment to tasks and roles.⁴⁹ Cohesiveness is not always increased by homogeneity. Evidence suggests, however, that some dissimilarity enhances cohesion. Differences among group members lead to a varied pool of resources and experiences. If various members possess different skills, then the group will need to retain these members in order to have access to their skills and resources. This concept is another reason why profiling terrorist personalities is difficult, especially on an international level and across network organizations that require the use of varied skills and resources.

1. Co-action and Facilitation

The degree of interaction between members is another factor of cohesion. Members of close-knit groups will indirectly encourage one another to participate in cooperative behavior acceptable to the group. In an international network, this component of cohesion may not exist to the degree it does in a traditional hierarchy. Close cooperation may exist within each cell of the network, but unless leaders of the cells have a clear overview of the organization's ideology, developing strong group cohesion will rely on factors other than interaction. Interactions

⁴⁹ Cartwright, 104.

aiding group cohesion include the types of relationships between members of the group such as kinship, marriage, former comrades, schooling, and training. Interactions also include the degree and type of communications achieved through technology, through email, chat rooms, newsgroups, blogs, and websites.⁵⁰

2. Presence of Others

The presence of others in a group environment increases cohesion. Due to co-action, individuals perform the dominant task (according the group norm) better when in front of the group. Individuals naturally begin to compete for resources, position, recognition, and power in a group setting. If a group has norms of violence, then individuals of that group will be more likely to perform these violent acts immediately following group celebrations.⁵¹ Social facilitation is a permissive factor of violence. This concept refers to social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable. Social facilitation incorporates the idea of contra cultural norms and the presence of others to allow individuals to commit acts of violence and to feel as if they are acting in accordance with desired norms.⁵²

⁵⁰ Amitai Etzioni, "Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History" *Law & Society Review* 34, no. 1 (2000), <http://www.jstor.org> (accessed October 16, 2006).

⁵¹ Robert B. Zajonc, "Social Facilitation," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 65.

⁵² Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 382.

a. *The Presence of Others Induces Psychological Effects*

The presence of other group members has physiological effects which may lead to action more quickly than an individual acting alone. The endocrine system and adrenal cortex are highly sensitive to changes in emotional arousal. Experiments show that organisms such as mice, in crowded areas display increased amphetamine toxicity—in other words, the mice have a heightened response to the effects of amphetamines. This experiment parallels reports of Islamic jihadists being sent to the front lines in the Afghan war and the current Iraq insurgency while taking amphetamine supplements. If people also have the same physiological result in large groups, heightened sensitivity to amphetamines, then large groups are more easily excited to action. Individuals on the fringe of a group may also imitate the actions of the core group, trying to blend in with the group. In the process, the individuals actually begin to take on the emotions and beliefs of the group. Training camps for this reason are highly effective in indoctrinating individuals.⁵³

3. *Group Identity*

a. *External Danger*

Most individuals belong to more than one group. Identity with a particular group, however, can be increased when one group is exposed to an external danger. External danger provides motivation to retain affiliation with a

⁵³ Zajonc, 70-72.

group and individuals will consciously avoid actions which deviate from the group's norms. This phenomenon was witnessed following the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the attack of September 11, 2001. Americans from diverse backgrounds, including government, displayed increased solidarity in the face of external danger. In combat, soldiers put themselves at risk in order to maintain group integrity.⁵⁴ For this reason, counter-terrorism strategies must be careful to avoid attacking entire segments of a population or classifying all citizens of an area or background as part of one homogenous group. Doing so increases group cohesion.

b. Transference Reactions

Individuals who are isolated from society will look to increase their ties to the group. This action is known as a transference reaction which occurs when an idealized leader takes the place of a surrogate-like parent and provides the main forum for sharing common ideals and norms. Osama bin Laden takes this role in al Qaeda as supporters and even sympathizers of terrorist organizations look to him as more of an entity than a person who provides them with praise, acceptance, and an over-arching ideology. This phenomenon especially holds true for individuals educated and trained far from their families in places such

⁵⁴ Irving L. Janis, "Group Identification Under Conditions of External Danger," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 80.

as mosques or madrassas. Isolation from society increases this transference reaction as other societal influences are farther removed.⁵⁵

c. Reassurance Needs

Once a terrorist group exists, convincing its members that other options exist is difficult because of the reassurance that groups provide to its members. For example, it is possible that locals recruited in Iraq to join the insurgency do not trust the new Iraqi leadership and are not ready to transfer their allegiance. Likewise, convincing current insurgent members to leave their current groups and lay down their arms is difficult. As insurgents, they have the means to protect themselves. If they surrender, they have no guarantee of protection. For groups already organized, breaking the bonds of cohesion is more difficult because individuals in a group feel that they share the same concerns, desires, sufferings, and remaining in the group provides a support system for these shared feelings. Members of the group reassure individuals who express concern. This peer pressure relieves the individual's concerns, and instead, encourages the person to continuing conforming to the group's norms. The group also reassures the individual's feeling of personal danger by exposing the person to moderate danger in moderate degrees. This way, fears are discussed within the group and the individual is better equipped to handle the stress once called to action and real danger.⁵⁶ This reassurance need

⁵⁵ Janis, 82.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 84.

of the group is facilitated in hierarchical terrorist organizations with physical bases of operation and high levels of physical interaction. In networks though, individuals may not receive this same level of reassurance and rely on strong values, ideology, and ties of friendship and kinship within each cell to achieve the same effect.

4. Shared Grievances

Shared grievances increase cohesion in a group. The chart on the following pages outlines the various types of grievances a person may experience that lead to increased cohesion in a group. In a world of rising prosperity and material possessions, the likelihood of rebellion and revolution actually increase as people have more material wealth. Their expectations rise faster and they compare their position in life to others and feel they are deprived. The theory of Relative Deprivation states that terrorism may arise when people, especially young people, "feel they have no voice, no hope, and no possibilities for a brighter future."⁵⁷ As people compare their position in life to that of others, they will remain in their current group if and only if their comparison groups do not offer better options. Combating terrorist groups that advocate eternal life in paradise increases the difficulty in providing a better comparison group. These grievances range from economics, discrimination to legal and political depravities. In countries where the wealth is not evenly spread, frustration increases furthermore because individuals have access to

⁵⁷ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy*. (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 23.

telecommunications to see others in the world experiencing the material wealth they desire. They see their states hoarding resources and distributing them unevenly, leading to feelings of hostility.




Figure 2. Grievances Leading to Group Cohesion. (After: Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research*, 325.)

A collection of individuals who belong to a group establish their own set of norms. If this group is a subset of a national or state entity, the norms of the group may or may not support those of the nation-state group, especially if the subgroup has grievances against the nation-state group. In this case, the smaller group, especially with leadership advocating opposing values, may develop norms that do not align with those of the nation-state norms. In this case, the members of the group will begin to take on

the norms and roles of the subgroup because this is the group with which they have more interaction and stronger bonds of cohesion. When the leadership advocates deviating standards of behavior from those of society, the members of the group are more likely adapt these deviant norms. This informal code of opposing the nation-state norms will eventually become a solid part of the group's norms during the storming, norming, forming and performing stages of group formation. If a group feels they have no avenue for addressing their grievances with the nation-state leadership or the group feels that the nation-state does not have the means to detect deviant behavior, then the deviant behavior is reinforced.⁵⁸

5. Internalization of Group Norms

The process by which an individual personally adopts a normative system is internalization. Following internalization of a set of norms, an individual is likely to suffer guilt when failing to meet the established norms, regardless of whether others notice the failure or not.⁵⁹ This process is lengthy, usually beginning with external group reinforcement and culminating with internalization. Slowly indoctrinating recruits from their local areas and teaching them initially in madrassas or mosques is the first step of external reinforcement for Islamic terrorist organizations. When the recruit is taken to a training camp and then takes on his own missions and pledges himself personally to a cause, he internalizes those norms.

⁵⁸ Janis, 89.

⁵⁹ Etzioni, (accessed October 2006).

Recognizing the two different stages provides insight in to how groups approach potential members of society and their overall aims for society. For example, Islamic fundamentalists hope one day to have a Pan-Islamic state. By openly expressing this overarching desire and teaching it in schools, these groups are slowly planting the seeds of future internalization of group norms. Once members of society internalize these norms, these members will seek out the extremist groups to further their commitment. This strategy of internalization by extremist groups serves two purposes: creates a more sympathetic audience to operate within as a base of operations and provides the group with potential future members.

Norms of Group Cohesion
Co-action and facilitation
Presence of others
Psychological effects
External danger
Transference reactions
Reassurance needs
Shared grievances
Internalization

Table 3. **Norms of Group Cohesion**

D. NORMS OF INFLUENCE TO MAINTAIN COHESION

Influence occurs when a person's attitude, beliefs, or behavior are changed by the indirect or direct actions by another entity. Social network analysis studies show that

influence does not require face-to-face interaction; indeed, the only precondition for social influence is information (which allows social comparison) about the attitudes or behaviors of other actors. Influence does not require deliberate or conscious attempts to modify actors' behaviors. It encompasses behavioral contagion involving 'the spontaneous pickup or imitation by other...[actors] of a behavior initiated by one member of the group where the initiator did not display any intention of getting the others to do what he did' as well as direct influence 'in which the actor initiates behavior which has the manifest objective of affecting the behavior of another member of the group.'⁶⁰

1. Initiation and Reference Groups

Initiation into a group or organization is one of the first steps of creating and maintaining cohesion by accepting norms of the group. When the initiation is public or involves personal sacrifice, an individual tends to reduce internal conflicts against demands of the group by focusing on potential benefits of group membership.⁶¹

One reason already discussed for joining a group involves referencing another group and comparing benefits of each group membership. For some groups, one method of maintaining cohesion is to continuously reference a secondary group to which the current group members aspire to join. In order to join this second group, an individual

⁶⁰ Noah E. Friedkin and Peter V. Mardsen, "Network Studies of Social Influence," in *Advances in Social Network Analysis: Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, ed. Joseph Galaskiewicz and Stanley Wasserman (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994), 4.

⁶¹ Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills, "Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 120.

benefits by maintaining membership in the original group. For example, certain sects of Islam preach that martyrs for Islam will obtain paradise and seventy-two virgins. This promise of paradise is the reference group to which some Islamic fundamentalist terrorists aspire. In order to meet the qualifications for this paradise group, membership within a terrorist organization is favorable.⁶²

2. Persuasion

Techniques of persuasion are employed on group members in order to maintain cohesion and induce internalization of norms. It is involved in religious conversions, people joining social movements, cult membership, mass hysteria, mob rule, propaganda, and coercive leadership. Persuasion is not always positive and is often negatively reinforced through guilt and shame. Guilt is internal and occurs when a person accepts a group's norms but does not behave accordingly. This individual will seek to change his behavior to match the norms of the group. Shame occurs when a person fails to meet a group norm and does not accept the norm. Shame is externally derived from others and causes the person to either evade the norm or to change it. A group desiring to convert its members or recruits to its own ideology and to develop strong bonds of cohesion should focus on fostering a sense of guilt within members rather than shame. Education and peer groups should be used versus punishment which may induce feelings of shame. Members who have already committed themselves to a group may be punished

⁶²Alberta Engvall Siegel and Sidney Siegel, "Reference Groups, Membership Groups, and Attitude Change," in *Group Dynamics*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), 74.

for violating norm standards, but this often happens when a group is already experiencing difficulties maintaining cohesion. Counter-terrorist strategies should focus on creating a sense of shame about one's commitment to the greater society instead of commitment to a group.⁶³

3. Historical Traditions

Historical traditions influence norms maintaining cohesion. As traditions pass from one generation to the next, norms stretching across generations develop based on those traditions. Authority accompanies the norm as it passes to future generations rather than a norm developing from intense deliberation and constant reinforcement. A tradition of celebrating victories over other societies or religions is one way of passing along these norms. Though these traditions may not have a direct connection to extremist groups, they serve as a mechanism of future sympathy and subsequently internalization of more extreme norms. These traditions coalesce regions around basic principles that provide a common baseline in future conflicts.

4. Contagion of Norm Deviance

a. Four Factors of Deviant Behavior

A group or organization opposed to the norms of its surrounding greater society establishes a set of norms that replace those of society for members of the group. Sigmund Freud explains that the group is the entity

⁶³ Etzioni, (accessed October 2006).

which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears, and for whose sake he (a group members') has submitted to so many inhibitions. It is clearly perilous for him to put himself in opposition to it (the group) and it will be sager to follow the example of those around him and perhaps even to 'hunt with the pack.' In obedience to the new authority he put his former 'conscience' out of action, and so surrenders to the attraction of the increased pleasure that is certainly obtained from the removal of inhibitions.⁶⁴

In this context, pleasure depends on the objectives of the group. Pleasure may involve sacrifice in order to obtain a higher goal. In order for other members of the group to violate the norms of society and replace them with those of the group, an individual must begin initiating this act without display of anxiety of repercussion from society. A perception of fearlessness and guiltlessness will persuade others to also engage in delinquent societal behavior conforming to the group.⁶⁵ External praise for this type of behavior increases the likelihood of it continuing. This concept can be utilized in combating terrorist groups. Those organizations operating as networks might not experience this same contagion of delinquent behavior and subsequent praise if their cells are small (two to three people) or interactions are infrequent.

b. Guilt

Potential feelings of guilt may be shared in group settings. Frequent interactions in a group allow numerous situations to arise where members may speak candidly and

⁶⁴ Janis, 86.

nonchalantly about the immoral (according to society) acts in which they have participated. These small confessions lighten their own internal struggle and encourage others who share doubt. For those questioning certain norms of the group, hearing these stories instills a sense of the moral correctness of the group since others are willingly participating. Simultaneously, the fear of punishment by society is diminished upon hearing others' tales. If a set of people collectively violates a norm of society in favor of a group norm, that set of people may encourage each other to rationalize their acts. Stories of their physical acts can be tailored to fit both the norms of the group and society. When each person involved in the act accepts an explanation for the act, this unanimity fosters authenticity of the rationale behind the group's norms.⁶⁶

c. Effects of Reference Groups

Finally, individuals may recognize that society calls for different standards of behavior, but because the individual belongs to a group advocating opposition to these standards, this person experiences others who also fail to meet the norms of society. This environment engenders behavioral norms that differ from moral norms. In this way, an individual does not feel that his norms are deviant but more aligned with those of the people around him, also known as the technique of neutralization.⁶⁷ This technique uses reference groups, but in a different way than as previously defined. In this instance, the reference group is still the

⁶⁵ Ibid., 87.

⁶⁶ Janis, 88.

⁶⁷ Buffalo and Rodgers, (accessed October 2006).

group a person seeks to gain status with, but this group is also a group which requires deviant social behavior. In order to maintain membership, a person must continue to violate the norms of society in order to conform to those of the group. Once a part of this group, membership criteria continues obligating a person to violate society's norms. A person will do so in order to avoid rejection by the group and a lowering of self-esteem due to being unable to meet the group standards. For this reason, defections from terrorist organizations are difficult to fully achieve because of the desire to conform and be accepted by the group.⁶⁸

5. Punishing Delinquent Behavior

Once delinquent behavior from the greater society is understood, delinquency within the group must be understood as a means of maintaining cohesion. Delinquent behavior within the group is punished in order to remind others of the range of acceptable behavior and to demonstrate the authority of the group. Widespread deviant behavior within a group is problematic. Harsh punishment of all delinquents often exposes deep seated problems within the group and may alienate members if they feel the leadership no longer has the same ideology as the majority of the group. At this point, the group may seek to redefine group practices and what is acceptable behavior that will later develop into established and tolerated norms. In some cases, this deviant behavior already is the behavioral norm for the

⁶⁸ William Maley, "Messianism and Political Action Some Contextual Characteristics," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 77.

group but not yet the moral norm. An example of this would be when women initially began wearing pants. At first, any woman wearing pants was considered deviant, but over time, such a large proportion of women were behaving in a way inconsistent with the moral norms of western society that moral norms eventually changed to accept women in pants. Gradually the definition of unacceptable pants narrowed further and further.

A group which is meeting its objectives is more likely to overlook small norm infractions since the mission is still being achieved. When a group is not being operationally successful, leadership looks for potential problems with the group and norm infractions are more likely punished. Counterterrorist strategies should make note of these concepts when studying the life cycle of organizations. Groups that tend to purge their members are likely experiencing internal strife and may be taken as a positive sign of their eventual collapse, or the group may begin leaning in a more extreme direction after purging its non-conforming members.⁶⁹

6. Greater Threat

When examining terrorist organizations, an important norm of influence maintaining cohesion is that of a greater threat. Individuals' attraction to one another is likely to increase when "their common threat stems from an external source (not their own lack of skill), when there exists the possibility that cooperative behavior may reduce or eliminate the threat, and when single individuals cannot

⁶⁹ Feldman, 50.

escape from either the group or the threat."⁷⁰ In relation to combat operations and terrorist organizations, norms of cohesion increase under circumstances of shared adversity creating a sense of fraternity based on common experiences.⁷¹

7. Competition

Competition between groups for resources evokes similar reactions as those of a greater threat. Inter-group competition heightens members' awareness of the group's objectives leading to greater cooperation and increased commitment and cohesion. Greater cooperation improves interpersonal relations within the group, leading to a greater confidence in the abilities of the group and a decrease in anxiety about acting counter to society.⁷² Network organizations leverage this factor when different cells compete to display which cell has the greatest commitment to the larger organization. Violence in terrorist groups may increase too, as groups compete with one another for publicity, praise, and resources.⁷³ Counterterrorist strategies should leverage the increased violent activity as a means of penetrating organizations and subgroups which take large risks and result in counterproductive reactions from the greater organization and the general public.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Cartwright, 100.

⁷¹ Maley, 76.

⁷² Cartwright, 104.

⁷³ Feldman, 24.

⁷⁴ Rapoport, 53.

8. Cyclical Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness itself increases cohesiveness. Members feel comfortable with their group and are willing to share more of themselves with the group. As this occurs, members are more active participants, allowing group leadership to slowly increase demands of members and to allow internalization to occur.⁷⁵ Group leadership may use rewards as one method for praising increased acts of commitment and increasing cohesion. As group members willing participate in activities, praise and esteem serve as rewards. Material rewards often aid in reducing members' lingering hesitance to conform to group standards.⁷⁶

9. Rewards

Rewards may be collective or exchange based. A group is more likely to increase its cohesion when members are more interested in the collective benefits to being an active member of the group and seeing the group succeed.⁷⁷ Collective rewards may be more useful in network situations where physical interactions between members are fewer and ideology is the overwhelming norm enforcement. Exchange based rewards are beneficial for luring potential recruits to the group but this method is difficult to continue and threatens the group's resources. A traditional hierarchy may rely more on exchange rewards to increase conformance to norms and cohesion so that members recognize where the

⁷⁵ Cartwright, 105.

⁷⁶ Cartwright and Zander, "Pressures to Uniformity," 144.

⁷⁷ Christine Horne, "Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement," *Social Forces* 82, no. 3 (2004): 1038.

rewards originate. This type of reward increases the allegiance of members to the group's leadership instead of the cause. A group that only relies on this method is subject to norm erosion when better comparison or reference groups appear with exchange based rewards as well. The methods of command and control must balance competing rewards needs with available resources.

Norms of Influence to Maintain Cohesion	
Initiation	Contagion of Norm Deviance
Reference Groups	Punishment of Delinquent Behavior
Persuasion -Guilt -Shame	Greater Threat
	Competition
	Existing Cohesion
Historical Traditions	Rewards

Table 4. **Norms of Influence to Maintain Group Cohesion**

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has discussed how groups form, establish, and use these norms to facilitate group cohesion. Group cohesion is an important characteristic for creating and sustaining illicit groups such as terrorist organizations. Indeed, group cohesion forms a core characteristic of the normative command and control mechanisms used by terrorist groups. Counterterrorism specialists, if seeking to reduce the productive output of terrorist groups, should consider degrading the normative command and control processes used by terrorist groups. As missionary organizations, terrorist organizations could prove particularly susceptible to efforts that reduce group cohesion through attacks on the groups' normative command and control technical. Given the theoretical and empirical findings outlined above,

counterterrorism specialists have a range of options for reducing group cohesion, such as:

- Limiting the degree of interaction between members so that cohesion processes of co-action and facilitation are less likely to occur
- Limiting the audience for actions of terrorist group membership, so the influence of the presence of others on group cohesion is reduced
- Avoiding actions that would contribute to stronger group identity by 1) reducing the external danger facing group members with lesser commitment than others, 2) reducing societal isolation of group members, 3) frustrating groups efforts to convince group members that the group provides a sufficient social, ideological and financial resources, and 4) negating the ability of group members to develop a shared grievance, and
- Interdicting the recruitment process so that internalization processes are stymied.

While these recommendations are of a general nature, specific examples of how the normative command and control processes of terrorist organizations are vulnerable to counterterrorism intervention follow in the next chapter.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

This section discusses organizational structures in use by contemporary terrorist organizations: hierarchy, network, adhocracy and leaderless resistance. It posits advantages and disadvantages of each organizational form relative to norm creation and sustainment, as well as group cohesion.

A. TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES USED BY CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST GROUPS

Terrorist organizations evolve and change their structure depending on the environmental factors, goals of the group, and capabilities of the group. Three dominant structures are hierarchies, networks, and adhocracies. Each has been implemented in terrorist organizations successfully and not so successfully. The location and operating area of an organization also determines what type of structure is best for the organization. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was initially organized as a military unit with battalions and brigades. This large, hierarchical structure was successful so long as the PIRA operated and controlled areas of support or sympathy. In this situation, PIRA was able to operate openly. As pressures mounted from authorities though, this level of openness could not be upheld and this structure was eventually replaced by a compartmented, cellular organization discussed later.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Brian A. Jackson, "Provisional Irish Republican Army," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2 Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 96.

1. Hierarchies

States combating terrorist organizations are the most comfortable with hierarchies. An organization structured around a central authority gives enemies a central point of gravity to target. Hierarchies have a clear chain of command and information flow.

a. Relationship to Group Cohesion

Members of terrorist organizations must live in a certain degree of secrecy even if they live embedded with society but most of their affiliations are with the terrorist organization. This secrecy leads to eventual isolation from others who do not share the same views. If a group's members are located in the same geographical area, then "isolation and the perception of a hostile environment intensify shared beliefs and commitments, making faith in the cause imperative."⁷⁹ Hierarchical organizations focused in a physical location may have increased cohesion because of the real threat of danger from operating in a clandestine unit. Closeness in a hierarchy draws on the reassurance needs of the group caused by high levels of interaction. Bruce Hoffman explains that terrorist organizations which are tightly organized around an authoritative center and also secret are "likely to be the least tolerant of dissent. For ideological or redemptive organizations, dissent may equal heresy."⁸⁰ Isolation of a group also helps to account for the reason why organizations can adhere to a set of norms vastly different than those of society.

⁷⁹ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 393.

⁸⁰ Rapoport, 23.

b. Disadvantages of Hierarchies

Clandestine, hierarchical organizations rely on their leadership for ideological and operational guidance. The group is highly dependent on its leadership for decision-making. Therefore, in hierarchies, the removal of a leader is detrimental to the group even when a clear succession plan exists. The United Red Army (URA) in Japan experienced problems during an operation when the leader was killed by an accidental explosion from the grenade she was carrying. The other members of the operation were confused and did not know how to proceed with their mission without her leadership.⁸¹

Conversely, hierarchical organizations struggle to survive when the leadership makes all of the decisions without listening to advice from lower echelons. In a hierarchy, the group's leader can lead the group astray. Aum Shinrikyo's organizational structure centered around such a leader, Shoko Asahara, in a tightly controlled hierarchy. The danger of this structure was that members were unable to counteract the unproductive decisions by Asahara that led to the group's demise. The group's learning process was constrained, allowing for no experimentation of methods.⁸² Though the group did have excellent operational security because of the nature of a small, hierarchical organization, but without experimentation, this type of group can become stagnant. In

⁸¹ Ovid Demaris, *Brothers in Blood*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), 34-35.

⁸² John Parachini, "Aum Shinrikyo," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2 Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 17, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

Aum Shinrikyo, the core leadership utilized the group's own talents but never sought outside expertise. As a result, the group was not effective at unconventional warfare methods because only a small group put the time and effort into reading manuals and practicing instead of seeking help from others in the terrorist world who were already successful.⁸³

The closed nature of hierarchies inhibits their ability to gain new membership without actively recruiting. Whereas looser organizations with high levels of interaction with society act like tentacles reaching out to new resources, hierarchies must maintain themselves. The structure of a hierarchy inhibits the flow of information as different superiors feel that their subordinates do not need access to certain operational or strategic decisions. Innovation is hindered in small hierarchies despite strong bonds of cohesion from close proximity to the group as members.

c. Advantages in Hierarchies

The flow of communications and information down the chain of command in a hierarchy is tightly controlled resulting in excellent operational security by preventing leaks to authorities. This command and control style of communications though is slower and removing one link in the chain of command can inhibit the entire structure. Furthermore, if all of the information in the organization flows either up or down, leadership may be inundated with copious amounts of information that is not useful. For

⁸³ Parachini, 19.

example, the central planning staff in al Qaeda could become overwhelmed with communications from lower levels, hindering adaptability and flexibility of the organization. Thus, in a hierarchy organization, the command and control process is less able to handle unexpected situations because the high tasking level of senior leadership. Micromanagement is a likely and negative effect of hierarchical organizations.⁸⁴ Additionally, the bi-directional flow of information in a terrorist organization utilizing compartmentalization of information to maintain secrecy and only sharing information on a need to know basis leads to slower communications. Each level in the hierarchy must wait to gain access to information and it must travel up and down different chains of command in order for two lower level persons working in different areas to have access to one another. While this prevents information leaks, the command and control decision-making process is slowed because of a slower OODA loop. New information takes too much time to be processed by the various compartments in order to act effectively. The group leadership with an overall strategy and view of the organization can easily make decisions, but risks alienating the remainder of the hierarchy who will eventually feel that they are not contributing. These individuals may seek extreme groups in which they can have a more active role.

⁸⁴ Marc Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 165.

2. Networks

a. Structure

Networked organizations by their nature are more open-structured. A network is "an informal community of individuals who share common norms or values."⁸⁵ A network is a structure consisting of both physical and nonphysical aspects. Physical qualities of networks include the people and equipment used to operate the network. The nonphysical attributes are the relationships and interactions between the nodes that maintain the network. A node in a network is a cluster of individuals in closer proximity to one another, a subset of the organization.⁸⁶ Social network analysts view a network as a systemic whole that is greater and different than its parts. An essential aim is to show how the networked interactions, and how a network itself functions to create opportunities or constraints for the individual. Once these aspects are understood, then understanding the different types of command and control systems available to the group will be more possible.⁸⁷

Martha Crenshaw advocates that social networks play an important role in terrorist organizations by explaining that terrorists do not necessarily seek a sense of belonging or personal integration through ideological commitment. The ideological commitment itself may be enough

⁸⁵ Tucker, 9.

⁸⁶ Robert G. Spulak, Jr. and Jessica Glicklen Turnley, "Theoretical Perspectives of Terrorist Enemies as Networks," (Paper presented at the Center for Special Operations plan development conference, Tampa, Florida, September 2005), 1.

⁸⁷ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 317.

to sustain ideological terrorists, but once on the path of terrorism, due to its clandestine nature, these individuals need the structure of an organization and the reinforced idea of the cause to continue their activity. This is one reason why committed terrorists need some kind of affiliation with a group, and the loose, open structure of a network organization is sufficient to meet this need. These individuals do not need the group for the sake of hierarchal decision-making and resource allocation; rather, they turn to their network for ideological reinforcement.⁸⁸

In the tentacle-like structure of a network, the building of nodes is not evenly balanced. A larger node, because it has more people who have more connections to other possible supporters, will attract more new nodes to it than nodes with fewer connections. Most likely, the structure will center itself around a few central hubs that disseminate the ideology for the group.⁸⁹ The growth of a network may be exponential because dispersed members have the ability to admit more members to distant nodes unlike hierarchies requiring recruits to join through the same entry point.

b. Size

Terrorist networks can be large or small organizations consisting of numerous organizations inside the greater network. These sub-organizations can even be hierarchical in nature and work together with other groups without a common hierarchical structure or central command

⁸⁸ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 393.

⁸⁹ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 142.

and control. The absence of an absolute authority is the key component allowing innovation and recruiting of outside expertise and resources leading to success.⁹⁰ Without a central command and control structure though, members of a network must isolate the norms of the group from those of society in order to maintain a clear view of the group's mission. Ideological isolation and network consensus of the overarching aim explain how terrorist networks adopt norm structures different from those of society without immediate physical interactions. Ideas about how to achieve the mission may differ but internal cohesion concerning the objective of the mission itself must be consistent across the network in order to maintain the network's structural integrity.⁹¹

c. Communications

Communications in a network differ from those in a hierarchy. The information revolution of the twentieth century lowered the cost of communications, allowing organizations to stray from tightly structured hierarchical command and control processes. Due to the flattened nature of the network, the components of the organization are able to be geographically dispersed. Command and control is maintained through communication systems such as satellite radio, the internet, and a common ideology.⁹²

⁹⁰ Tucker, 2.

⁹¹ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 393.

⁹² Tucker, 1.

d. Advantages

The physical structure of a network is more flexible, adaptive, and resilient because each of its components acts in loose association with one another. Networks consisting of a small number of highly connected, larger nodes, called hubs are resilient to systemic shock unless a key hub is disrupted or destroyed.⁹³ The network allows for multiple learning and innovation opportunities in different locations. The removal of the network's leader is less damaging to the organization than in a hierarchy since nodes are accustomed to operating autonomously with less oversight. An example is the ability of al Qaeda to continue operations despite no physical contact and limited communications with Osama bin Laden. Command and control is dispersed and loosely controlled allowing for innovation but also requiring greater coordination to control assets and make timely decisions because each node may also have other organizations to report to.⁹⁴

A cellular structured network also has the capacity to carry out more ruthless attacks without fear of retribution by authorities because of a lack of central authority to attack. Cells in a network may also feel that guilt can be transferred and spread to other cells instead of focused on a specific component within a hierarchy.⁹⁵

⁹³ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 323.

⁹⁴ Tucker, 2.

⁹⁵ Hudson, 59.

e. *Types of Networks*

Depending on the type of mission, the type of network may also vary its structure. Three types of networks are the chain, hub, and all-channel networks.

In a chain network, information flows along a line of separated contacts. End-to-end communication must travel through intermediate nodes. This type of network is based on a who-you-know concept and used in smuggling operations.

In a hub, distant nodes are tied to a central point of communication. This is not a hierarchy, but in order for different, unconnected nodes to communicate, they must do so through the central node. This type of network has a way of controlling the flow of information and a tighter command and control process than a chain or all-channel network. The hub of the network is characterized by dense communications. The members of the core are often highly cohesive and reinforce their ties through friendship or kinship as well as ethnicity and common experience. Innovation, flexibility, and survivability are achieved through the more distant nodes which are less likely to be damaged in the event of a hub being removed. Some networks insulate the core nodes or hubs from the most distant nodes for protection and operational security. This is a good strategy if the core nodes do not partake in tactical operations. Then the authorities have a more difficult time pinpointing the group's leadership and persecuting individuals for terrorist actions. Distant nodes often

operate from within communities of support, further concealing and protecting their activities.⁹⁶

An all-channel network resembles a matrix organization because each node has direct connections to all other nodes. This type of network is used in militant, decentralized groups. This type of network is the most difficult to organize and sustain because it requires heavy communications. Ideally, an all-channel network organization has no central authority to target. Decision-making is decentralized, operating on a common ideology. An all-channel network organization may have a slower OODA loop because of a lack of central planning authority. At least a hub network has a central point of balance and reference point for ideology and overarching strategy. An all-channel network also imposes security risks for the organization because each person has access to more information that can be leaked to outside authorities.⁹⁷

3. The Hybrid Model; Intersection of Networks and Hierarchy

Some social network analysts theorize that networks are not really an alternative to hierarchical structures because general ideas must originate from some component of the organization. Networks are frequently overlaid on top of hierarchical structures. The U.S. government following September 11, 2001, restructured its intelligence community

⁹⁶ Spulak and Turnley, 22-25.

⁹⁷ Phil Williams, "Transnational Criminal Networks," in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 79, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

to more closely resemble a network overlaid on a hierarchy to allow the cross-flow and coordination of information.⁹⁸

4. Adhocracies

An adhocracy, at least as observed in the terrorism domain, more closely resembles a network because of its reliance on an overarching ideology. These terrorist groups are sometimes composed of amateurs with little training who come together with like-minded others to conduct a terrorist attack and then immediately disband following the attack. No formal support system exists for these groups. They rely on a network of supporters and sympathizers for resources but learn largely from written publications, the Internet, or former terrorist group members or demobilized soldiers with tactical knowledge. Without a formal structure, these groups are difficult to identify and target. Their membership often consists of kin or close friends and only for brief periods of time.⁹⁹ These groups may not be an official part of the larger, more formalized organization but still aid the cause of the larger organization. When these smaller groups attack, the large organizations may point to their acts as evidence of growing support for the cause of the larger organization or they may take credit for the attacks themselves. Adhocracies may signify an early stage in the life cycle of a terrorist organization. As members of similar ideologies gain experience and develop a need for increased weapons and technology, the world may see fewer adhocracies and more formal organizations.

⁹⁸ Tucker, 9.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2.

5. Disadvantages of Networks and Adhocracies

a. Command and Control

While networks are burgeoning in a world of increased communications systems, they do have their disadvantages. Command and control is diminished in network organizations which can increase the difficulty in completing complex tasks requiring vast coordination from a distance. Looser command and control also opens the door for interpretation of the organizations ideology and interpretation of group norms. This varied interpretation if not monitored increases the likelihood for wide experimentation that may invigorate an organization but also possibly undermine the organization's goals. For example, the Front for the Liberation of Quebec (FLQ) suffered a serious setback in 1970, when one of its independent cells kidnapped and murdered Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Labor. The organization was not prepared for this type of action or publicity and had to quickly alter its tactics to again establish dominant power over the independently operating cell and to maintain its desired image in the public. Divisions resulting from the loose structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) have also caused setbacks in the peace process as one division or cell decides that the main thrust of the organization is settling and not adhering to the right principles. Without a tight command and control structure, these autonomous cells have more power by being able to disrupt tenuous negotiations with a single unauthorized attack.

The PIRA has also experienced difficulties because of a cellular structure and loose command and control. A coherent strategy is difficult to make acceptable to all units of a network, but agreeing on tactics is even more arduous. For example, at times, when the overall leadership of PIRA was involved in negotiations or other political activity aimed at advancing the group's agenda by means other than violence, individual cells carried out attacks, effectively ending the leadership's efforts. These sectarian actions undermined the group's attempt to be viewed as a legitimate military organization. Terrorist organizations also leverage this feature of their structure by refusing to claim responsibility for the actions of cellular units in public but secretly supporting them.¹⁰⁰

As a subset of command and control, the control of communications in a network is diminished as leadership has less control over what kinds of interactions occur. Increased interactions provide access points for counter-terrorist activities. For example, Ramzi Yousef, organizer of the World Trade Center bombing was undone by a new component of his terrorist network that turned him in to authorities. Looser command and control processes, like those of bin Laden's operations in Africa in 1998, at U.S. embassies allowed outsiders the opportunity to gather information about the attacks and pinpoint who ordered them.¹⁰¹

Dismantling the command and control structure of a network is a lengthy process because of the resiliency of

¹⁰⁰ Tucker, 10.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 10-11.

the nodes. Yet, if the key nodes can be targeted and damaged enough at once, then the command and control process may be severed and the organization will temporarily struggle to re-establish itself. Immediately following the coalition campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, allied forces "dispersed the leadership, eliminated the training camps, and greatly reduced the means of communication among members, their leaders and the central office, which handled logistical support for local operations."¹⁰² These operations were an example of a terrorist organization exhibiting vulnerability at its main hubs. Isolating the hubs results in non-communicating nodes and a lack of coordination. The initial campaign in Afghanistan seemed successful because the global jihad suddenly lacked a central command and control structure necessary to coordinate large attacks. Instead, attacks following the dismantling of the Taliban and al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan have been relegated to attacks conducted by singletons or adhoc groups.¹⁰³ The subsequent increase in terrorist activity though is a demonstration of the survivability of a network. In order to break the resiliency of a network, the hubs must be targeted because most communications pass through them. These attacks must be simultaneous to prevent new hubs from emerging and restoring the network's capabilities.

An example of a less robust network hub is the Jemaah Islamiyah which proved vulnerable to removal of its

¹⁰² Marc Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 52.

¹⁰³ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 140.

leadership. Local cells not used to autonomous operations without specific orders from organizational leadership are unable to continue large-scale, coordinated operations. The arrests in 2002-2003, of the group's leadership, including its emir, Baasyir hindered future operations. As of late 2003, only central technical bomb experts remain at large, and so far, unable to rebuild the network. Academic analyst Marc Sageman predicts the ultimate demise of Jemaah Islamiyah as of 2003, but his views should also be taken in context of the year and noted for an optimistic tendency.¹⁰⁴ Other plots hampered after the dismantling of the central command and control center for al Qaeda include a plot in 2002, to strike a U.S. or British naval vessel in the Straits of Gibraltar. The plot was discovered before implementation as it was unraveling because disconnects between the field commander and central control authorities. Their decision-making and implementation cycle, or OODA loop was slower than their enemies (allies) allowing detection of the plot. Due to these command, control, and communications (C3) difficulties, most targets during the period immediately following the invasion of Afghanistan were soft targets and initiated locally.¹⁰⁵

b. Amateurs and Lack of Formal Support Structures

Amateurs have the advantage of being difficult to identify by counter-terrorist forces, but they also lack the training and expertise of structured organizations' members. They are liable to make costly mistakes which can tarnish

¹⁰⁴ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 142.

¹⁰⁵ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 52.

the image of the greater network, like Ramzi Yousef's group responsible for the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. A lack of formal support structure, especially in adhocracies can be a deterrent to organizing larger attacks. For example, Ramzi Yousef claimed he was not able to use a chemical agent in his attack on the World Trade Center because he did not have enough money to buy the required amount of cyanide.¹⁰⁶

c. Personal Loyalty

The basic components of cohesion are more difficult to recreate in network organizations which do not meet physically with one another. Creating a sense of personal loyalty to the group is difficult without formal indoctrination. Large networks can become informal to the individual members.¹⁰⁷ Networks rely on the fact that the individual nodes in a network are often smaller and exhibit the norm influences of cohesion found in most groups. Difficulties arise in coordinating and ensuring a similar interpretation of ideology across a large network consisting of hundreds or thousands of small nodes.¹⁰⁸

6. Leaderless Resistance

Leaderless resistance is "a system of organization that is based upon the cell organization, but does not have any central control or direction...[A]ll individuals and groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a

¹⁰⁶ Tucker, 11.

¹⁰⁷ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 342.

¹⁰⁸ Moghaddam, 30.

central headquarters or single leader for direction or instruction."¹⁰⁹ No single personality or leader stands out from the group. Instead, decisions are consensus-based. Most major terrorist organizations require a high degree of cooperation, coordination, and support structure necessitating a need for trust that is difficult to establish using the Internet.¹¹⁰ For this reason, this thesis defines this type of organizational structure and provides an example of its use but does not focus on it. These organizations focus on ideology rather than action, lowering the threat level of these types of organizations. Note, though, organizations, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) once established as a group possesses the potential to elevate their aims to those of action instead of simply spreading their ideology. The ELF is radical environmental group of unclear origins but consists of cells lacking a chain of command or record of membership. This organization is held together by a shared ideology and philosophy.¹¹¹ A relatively small number of the members are actual activists. Most are sympathizers willing to donate financial resources for campaigns and transportation to stage protests. Evidence suggests little communication

¹⁰⁹ Tucker, 2.

¹¹⁰ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Chapter 8: The New Age of Terrorism," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. David Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 123, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

¹¹¹ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 238.

between the cells that do take active measures. Most acts are carried out autonomously with no guidance from other members.¹¹²

Types of Organizational Structures				
	Hierarchy	Network	Adhocracy	Leaderless Resistance
Advantages	High levels of formalization	Exponential Growth Rate	Difficult to detect	Difficult to detect
		High Resiliency		
	Meets Reassurance Needs of members	Geographical Dispersion is common	Little logistics	Little logistics
	Reduced Isolation	Highly Adaptive	Local operatives are area experts	Local operatives are area experts
		Fosters Creative Learning		
	Enhanced Operational Security	Less fear of Retribution		
Disadvantages	Removal of leadership can impact organization's activities	Operational Security	Amateurs with little or no training	No C2 structure
	Leadership can become Overburdened			
	Low level of participation in decision-making	Decreased controls over group member activities	Decreased controls over group member activities	Difficult to maintain ideology

¹¹² Horacio R. Trujillo, "The Radical Environmentalist Movement," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2 Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 152, www.RAND.org (accessed February 2007).

		Personal loyalty	Personal loyalty	Personal loyalty
	Constrained learning environment	Soft target selection	Intricate operations difficult to coordinate	Intricate operations difficult
	Slower flow of information	Greater Reliance on Technology opens opportunity for infiltration of communication systems	Greater Reliance on Technology opens opportunity for infiltration of communication systems	No defined leadership
	Micromanaged controls over group member activities			

Table 5. **Advantages and Disadvantages to Different Types of Organizational Structures**

B. DISSEMINATION OF NORMS

Terrorist organizations use for main channels for disseminating its norms externally to society. These channels expose society to the shared social, cultural and historical norms of the group.

1. External

a. Media Coverage

The type of organization employed by terrorist organizations affects their methods of norm dissemination. Organizational leadership and members, scholars, journalists, and enemy leadership each implement different forms of command and control to communicate, educate, or expose shared social, cultural, and historical norms through four main channels. Terrorist organization leadership and the mass media's focus on successful terrorist attacks reinforce the perception that the risks of committing

terrorist acts are relatively small. Witnessing the success of one group inspires another to also take action. These successes increase cohesion to the overarching organization and ideology. The media's coverage of attacks allows groups to project a feeling of collective grievance and perseverance. Leadership can capitalize on this collective feeling to recreate events of the past by conducting attacks on the anniversaries of significant events in the group's history. This action further increases cohesion within the group by providing continuity which the media will knowingly discuss.¹¹³

b. International Travel

International travel allows individuals who formerly felt disconnected from an organization to meet with others with the same feelings and values. International travel spreads a group's norms when meeting with potential recruits while simultaneously creating new potential resource pools.

2. Internal

a. Education

Education is used to decide doctrinal debates, prevent factions and defections, mitigate fear, and dissuade growing resistance to leaders' demands and political agendas.

¹¹³ Jeffrey Ian Ross, "Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 3 (1993), <http://www.jstor.org>. (accessed on October 2006).

b. *Dissemination of Intellectual Knowledge*

Dissemination of intellectual knowledge spreads group norms. By carefully controlling the information which group members have access to, leadership can expose members and potential members to information that will incite violent action by justifying the group's grievances. Just as attacks committed on significant anniversaries will be publicized to the general media, these anniversary attacks provide opportunity for leadership to educate the group and sympathetic audiences on the justification for the group's actions. Similarly, "naming terrorist cells after leaders who have died or people who rebelled under similar circumstances in the past" is another opportunity to spread intellectual knowledge about the group's past activities, providing continuity and increasing group cohesion.¹¹⁴

C. TECHNOLOGY ENABLING DISPERSED COHESION

The increasing availability of technology and improvements in secure networking technology are enabling terrorist organizations to maintain cohesion despite the physical dispersion of their organizations. The term, netwar, is used to describe the developing trend of command, control, and communications in terrorist operations. Netwar enables smaller groups to communicate with one another, to coordinate operations, and to maintain ideology without the input of a central command authority.¹¹⁵ New technologies

¹¹⁴ Ross, (accessed on October 2006).

¹¹⁵ Sean J.A. Edwards and Michele Zanini, "The Networking of Terror in the Information Age," in *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 31, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 12, 2007).

save organizations both time and money. Reduced transmission time allows communications to travel greater distances in less time so that numerous nodes may be informed at once. Increasing availability and the increased compatibility between different types of technology allow the organization to focus resources elsewhere other than on communications. Communications are becoming robust through technology as graphics, voice communications, and streaming video are easily passed through secure Internet connections. Robust communications allow for a decentralized command and control system suited to a network organization because information sharing is possible across almost all nodes. These communications allow for more detailed and explicit cooperation and verification of operational planning.¹¹⁶

1. Internet Technology

Terrorist networks are increasingly relying on technology for administrative tasks, coordination of operations, publicity, recruitment, and communication. Before the September 11 2001, attacks, al Qaeda members used Yahoo email to communicate. Mohammad Atta, the alleged leader of the operational cell made hotel and airline reservations online. Research on chemical-dispersing powers of crop dusters was accomplished online by cell members.¹¹⁷ The Internet is available in most regions of the world and online programs can assist with language translation if necessary. Internet cafes allow terrorists to move and use

¹¹⁶ Edwards and Zanini, 35-36.

¹¹⁷ Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 47.

different IP addresses in order to avoid detection. These factors contribute to the geographical expansion of terrorist organizations and their range of operations despite tighter travel restrictions in most countries. Ramzi Yousef as early as 1995, was using computers to store information such as contact lists, potential targets, and casing information on the simultaneous hijacking of eleven commercial airliners. Communication through simple email enabled the synchronized attacks on the U.S. embassies in 1998, and New York and the Pentagon in 2001.¹¹⁸

Al Qaeda uses the Internet to disseminate knowledge about the organization to its members and potential sympathizers. The training manual, nicknamed the *Encyclopedia of Jihad*, details how to organize and maintain a cell as well as guidelines for executing operations. The organization maintains websites that offer practical advice and allow members to connect with one another despite distance.¹¹⁹ Manuals with specific guidance are important to a network organization's ability to maintain cohesion and a sense of group identity. This manual is similar to handbooks that U.S. military members receive throughout their training to provide a reference and a reminder of the culture of beliefs within the organization.

The website, al Neda, is another conduit of information propaganda and means of communication for al Qaeda. Three basic themes are emphasized on the website: The West is implacably hostile to Islam, the only way to address this threat and the only language that the West understands is

¹¹⁸ Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 47.

¹¹⁹ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 38.

the logic of violence, and jihad is the only option.¹²⁰ The website provides detailed justifications for the September 11, 2001, attacks including video clips and messages praising the operation. Besides purely ideological and emotional justifications, the website cites specific Islamic legal documents to support the organization's acts and killing of civilians. Poetry is posted on the websites, praising the organization's martyrs and the importance of continuing the fight against supposed enemies of Islam. These varied written and visual forms of communication appeal to a wide range of audiences.¹²¹

In addition to justifying the violence of the organization, the website encourages current members of the organization by highlighting the group's successes. The website draws conclusions between the group's attacks and subsequent setbacks to the organization's enemies, claiming responsibility for those setbacks. These connections include the setback to the American economy following the attacks as evidenced by the weakening U.S. dollar, the downturn of the stock market, and the strain between America and her traditional allies. Additionally, comparisons are made between historical successes of jihad seekers and the current campaign. The Islamic mujahedin in the 1980's were invigorated after their defeat of one of the world's superpowers, Russia. The website strengthens morale by drawing parallels between the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union after entering war against the mujahedin and

¹²⁰ Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: an Assessment," Study for RAND Corporation. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 10. www.RAND.org (accessed February 2007).

¹²¹ Ibid., 11.

the unwillingness of the American public and government to remain in a state of war.¹²²

Besides maintaining internal cohesion, increasing morale, and distributing vital information and allowing coordination, the Internet decreases the reliance of terrorist organizations on the media for press coverage of attacks. The Internet allows streaming video of attacks to be aired immediately and in raw form to group members and public websites posting personal videos. These videos enforce ideology, demonstrate the commitment of others in the organization, increase morale when operations are successful, and provide examples of effective methods of attack. No longer do terrorists need to wait for the media to be alerted to an operation by an onlooker or place the call themselves to a local media station. Groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, Israel's Kahane Chai, the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Kurdistan Worker's Party, and Peru's Shining Path maintain user-friendly official or unofficial websites, and almost all are accessible in English. Maintaining these websites allows messages of ideology and long-term goals to be disseminated to any part of the world with access to the internet. This access does not need to be permanent and can be accomplished in most coffee internet shops. Command and control is accomplished by disseminating information to large numbers of individuals and hoping that ideology is strong enough to keep the group heading in the same direction. This is a looser form of command and control but in a network organization is an efficient means of communication. This method would also

¹²² Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: an Assessment," 11.

allow members to write back and communicate up the chain of command for clarification or support in organizing operations.¹²³

Websites with posted of videos and messages provide organizations with a way to communicate their ideology and ultimate desires without being filtered or staged by the media.¹²⁴ This allows the groups to focus on their ideology and own justifications for violence rather than only focusing on the violent actions taken to achieve the group's goals. Email was routine among the members of the Hamburg clique and helped them sustain emotional closeness and common beliefs despite physical separation by communicating shared meanings, past events, and internal jokes.¹²⁵ The LTTE website highlights attacks by the Sri Lankan army on Tamil civilians but does not show images of the LTTE suicide bombings.¹²⁶ The LTTE uses the Internet to such an extent that Sri Lankan Tamils around the world have access to Eelam newspapers, radio, and propaganda in the form of electronic messages filled with maps, flags, and other symbols of the group. Internet sites supported by the LTTE even include an online yellow pages for contact information about other Eelam Tamils. Online chat rooms, discussion forums, and blogs now provide further avenues for diaspora to connect and to discuss their common issues and desires.¹²⁷ The Internet is proving to be more useful than just a forum for

¹²³ Cronin, "Behind the Curve," 48.

¹²⁴ Jenkins, "Chapter 8: The New Age of Terrorism," 125.

¹²⁵ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 159.

¹²⁶ Shyam Tekwani, "The LTTE's Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security," (Working paper for the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, no. 104, January 2006), 9.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 12.

discussion. Its uses are being incorporated into procedures used to plan, execute, and review attacks. The LTTE, reportedly carries out specific after-action reviews of operational successes and failures to strengthen their group. These after-action reviews can then be transformed into knowledge shared when publications and training manuals are also incorporated.¹²⁸

The LTTE is not the only organization effectively utilizing the Internet. As al Qaeda has been forced to decentralize its leadership and training facilities, the Internet has increasingly filled the void left by the destruction of the organization's physical command and control center of operations. The May 16, 2003, attacks in Casablanca are a testament to the ability of a network using technology, specifically the internet to continue learning and to disseminate information. Members of the operating cell took part in training conducted in nearby caves one weekend shortly before the operation. As a result of the hasty training, the cell experienced difficulty manufacturing bombs of the correct weight and reliability. The operation was postponed, and in an effort to save the operation, the Internet was used to research a lighter and more reliable formula for the construction of the bombs. Using the dispersion of technology information, the bombs were quickly built the day before the operation took place. This scenario highlights both advantages and disadvantages to network organizations. Formal training is difficult to

¹²⁸ John C. Baker et al., "The Need to Learn in Order to Change Effectively," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 1 Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 23, www.RAND.org. (accessed October 2006).

achieve and may result in shoddy operations. On the other hand, the use of the Internet and subsequent technology enables a quick preparation for an operation increasing the difficulty of locating and preventing an operation.

2. Other than Internet Technology

The Internet is not the only means of technology enabling organizations to maintain cohesion through dispersion. Al Qaeda is known to use cellular telephones, text messages, instant messaging online, encrypted websites, blog discussions, email, and chat rooms. These types of technologies are more difficult to discover and to trace in a timely manner if well-encrypted. Administrative tasks, research, information sharing, coordination, and ideological reinforcement are possible through these means of communication. Cells that are geographically isolated have methods of daily communication with central leadership or other cells in order to maintain a sense of group identity. Jemaah Islamiyah uses the Internet and text messages with code words to pass instructions. For example, the "suspected suicide bomber in the attack on the J.W. Marriot Hotel in 2003, a JI operative known as Asmal, reportedly sent a coded email message expressing an intention to 'marry as soon as possible,' which Indonesian police interpreted to mean he was ready to launch the suicide attack."¹²⁹

¹²⁹ John C. Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2 Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 76, www.RAND.org.

Between September 11, 2001 and April 2006, Osama bin Laden issued at least twenty-four known statements.¹³⁰ These statements to the public and the organization were possible through technology. With basic knowledge of satellite communication systems, Osama bin Laden "allegedly uses satellite phone terminals to coordinate the activities of the group's dispersed operative and has even devised countermeasures to ensure his safety while using such communications systems." One physical countermeasure devised is to have the satellite phones travel in separate convoys from bin Laden and to operate them from varying locations in order to prevent the tracking of the signal and discovery of Osama bin Laden's location.¹³¹

3. Disadvantages of Relying on Technology

Relying too much on technology does have its disadvantages for terrorist organizations. Regardless of the quality of technical communications, the element of personal interaction is still missing when all communications are handled through the Internet or other means of technology. Spoken conversations are difficult to capture or prove, but technology, regardless of how well encrypted it is, leaves a trail of information. For example, the computer captured in Manila in January 1995, belonged to Abdul Basit Karim and provided the outline of the Bojinka plot. Discarded computers, damaged computers, or captured computers, even if information is thought to have been protected and encrypted still exists on the

¹³⁰ Jenkins, "Knowing our Enemy," 62.

¹³¹ Edwards and Zanini, 35-36.

computers' hard drive. The organizational structure and links between nodes of the global salafi jihad led by al Qaeda is understood greatly in part to data collected from the hard drives of captured computers in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.¹³² By relying on technology for all command and control objectives in a dispersed organization, the organization is committing itself to continually upgrading its technology resources which may divert too many of the organization's overall resources to continue effective operations in the field.¹³³

If an organization does not continually upgrade its technology, the group's command and control systems will become vulnerable to outside attack. As both sides of the War on Terrorism improve their means of surveillance and code-breaking, if a terrorist organization loses the resources to continue upgrades, interception and monitoring of communications is likely. Already, anti-terrorist entities have been able to use intercepted cell phone calls to track and capture leaders of the global jihad. Anti-terrorist organizations must be careful not to allow notification of terrorist organizations that their communications are being intercepted. For example, when Osama bin Laden discovered his satellite communications were being intercepted, he abruptly stopped utilizing this form of communication. While scholar Marc Sageman suggests that bin Laden's forced hiding and reluctance to use satellite communications is hindering his ability as a leader, this thesis proposes that a robust organization will eventually

¹³² Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 159.

¹³³ Edwards and Zanini, 46.

find other means of communication utilizing technology upgrades.¹³⁴ The important take away from this example is the necessity of state governments fighting terrorists such as Osama bin Laden to be able to conduct their operations without the media reporting their successes or failures to the public and subsequently the terrorists themselves.

Other examples of anti-terrorist successes include the FBI's use of the program, Carnivore, to track email correspondence at least twenty-five times reported by "Newsweek." This tracking of email is allegedly responsible for thwarting various attacks. Now that the terrorists know which program was being used though, they may be able to find other means around the program's capabilities.¹³⁵ If an organization's resources can be depleted or the focus shifted to other items besides maintaining secure command and control systems, then anti-terrorist organizations may be able to continue tracking their messages. Already, the increasing difficulty in the use of satellite phones due to monitoring may be causing a gradual breakdown in direct communications between al Qaeda's leadership and smaller nodes. This breakdown of communications may result in a splintering of the organization and increases in attacks as nodes undertake their own operations without guidance from the Central Staff.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 159-160.

¹³⁵ Edwards and Zanini, 39.

¹³⁶ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 160.

D. SUMMARY

A final note addressing the specific components leading to different types of terrorist organizational structures and command and control schemes is the idea that command and control functions within organizations are evolving structures. They change according to the task at hand, making categorizing and generalization of terrorist groups more difficult. The style of command and control that works for one hierarchy may not work for another hierarchical group and likewise for network organizations. The mechanisms used to maintain cohesion in each type of organizational structure also vary. Hierarchies maintain cohesion through exchange-based relationships. Punishments and rewards reinforce group norms. Networks maintain cohesion through personal ties of kin and friendship to overcome physical separation. Networks cannot use exchange-based mechanisms to maintain cohesion, and instead, rely on strong ideological foundations. Adhocracies and leaderless resistance groups are similar to networks but lack a formal command and control architecture to disseminate a common ideology. Cohesion is ideologically-based for these groups but is more likely to have a shorter life-span. Instead of counter-terrorism studies focusing on developing a formula for the life cycle of a terrorist group, the focus should include the cultural context of each potential terrorist organization.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ Edwards and Zanini, 31.

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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: HISTORICAL NETWORKS

This section of the thesis examines historical network organizations. The emphasis rests on networks, as these are the emergent types of organizations in today's world. These organizations are studied in order to provide examples of their structure and mechanisms for creating cohesion. The final chapter of this thesis discusses how these terrorist groups use their influence on society.

A. PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA)

1. Pre-1977

The Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) activities were mostly conducted out without direct intervention or control by the General Headquarters' leadership. Individual PIRA units had significant operational freedom even before the group reorganized into a cell-based structure in the 1970's, although the reorganization further strengthened that independence.¹³⁸ Until 1977, the PIRA was organized similarly to a traditional military organization with brigades, battalions, and companies. Despite a clear hierarchy, maintaining internal security was difficult because information was not compartmentalized enough. The flow of information was not inhibited at any point. This fact is a reflection of the organization's leadership and social context because other military organizations implement "need-to-know" policies. Inside informers had too much access to information

¹³⁸ Jackson, 134.

resulting in authorities often hampering their operations with arrests. This lack of internal security is mentioned in the 1977 reorganization document. Until reorganization, the PIRAs attempted to establish control over their units using intimidation tactics or even dressing up as the police.¹³⁹ According to the norm influences of cohesion, a group using punishment to keep its members in line with its norms is a sign of internal division. Furthermore, too much violence against one's own group members can result in disillusionment with the group's cause and result in further internal problems. Reorganization loomed imminent as security forces became more skillful at leveraging internal weaknesses in the organization and its communications processes. As this penetration threatened the success and validity of the organization, reorganization was implemented. Instead of conducting meetings in the open and using well-known methods of communication, the group was forced to become more decentralized, minimizing the level of communications in order to prevent authorities from pre-empting operations.¹⁴⁰

2. Post-1977 Reorganization

Following the reorganization of 1977, PIRA was based on a cellular network structure. These cells were built around individual service units comprised of four or five Volunteers establishing a family-like group. Each cell contained a quartermaster responsible for weapons and explosives, an intelligence officer, and at least two

¹³⁹ Joanne Wright, "The Sympathetic Audience," in *Terrorist Propaganda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 130.

¹⁴⁰ Jackson, 134.

operators responsible for conducting shootings and bombings. Communication between cells was minimal as it was with the leadership, based on a need-to-know basis.¹⁴¹ The leadership of PIRA recognized it could no longer attempt strong oversight of the individual conduct of its members. The leadership took the opposite approach after the reorganization and seldom criticized actions by individual cells. They were now aware that too much negative reinforcement leads to dissent. This is an example of deviant group behavior leading to a narrowing and refocusing of the group's norms as a whole."¹⁴²

This network organization was largely successful though it did highlight some challenges to network organizations. One year after reorganization in 1978, there were 465 fewer charges against the group than in 1977. One explanation for this might be that the reorganization cut the core membership to about three hundred activists. While this reduction increased operational and internal security, it diminished some of the group's capabilities. Command and control structure is a balance that must evolve according to the group's needs. In this instance, the organization reduced its capabilities in order to survive.¹⁴³

B. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is an umbrella group for various factions that compete and cooperate with one another at different times. Factional

¹⁴¹ Jackson, 129.

¹⁴² Ibid., 134.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 130.

fighting characterizes the Palestinian resistance movement as Fatah, the dominant group does not have a monopoly of power. As many as twenty-one smaller factions comprise the PLO and alternate between competition and cooperation. Even though the victims of each competing group's violence are indiscernible, the idea is to influence other groups within the movement. The PLO is an example of competition between groups leading to increased cohesion for the larger organization and within each smaller faction.¹⁴⁴

1. Cooperation

The PLO does not reserve its resources only for the factions within the PLO. The PLO in the 1980's actively participated in the training of at least forty different terrorist groups. These groups were located in Asia, Africa, North America, Europe, and the Middle-East. Training took place in the PLO's camps located in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Yemen. The PLO assisted these groups with training, weapons supply, and logistical support in exchange for their members' services in the future. The advantage of this type of cooperation between terrorist groups is the combining of assets and creation of ties of loyalty. The disadvantage, though, is potentially arming a group's next adversary. As groups compete for power and resources including the support of the people, alliances between groups that previously aided one another can become muddled.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Tucker, 4.

¹⁴⁵ Bruce Hoffman, "The Internationalization of Terrorism," in *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 84.

2. Competition

The rise of terrorist attacks abroad began in 1968 as the PFLP challenged the power of the Fatah. These attacks included hijackings and airport attacks which received a large amount of publicity. The attacks had to be large to call for attention and change. Until this point, no serious contenders existed within the PLO. Few opportunities existed for individuals or factions to distinguish themselves. Once a spree of terrorism began, even the smallest factions were able to capitalize by claiming responsibility or plotting an attack of their own. An apparent lack of risk and a high level of publicity encouraged the attacks to continue as factions competed for power within the PLO. Even the Fatah at times, was compelled to participate in this struggle for power. Examples include the Black September Group led by Salah Khalaf and operations of Group 17 responsible for murders in Barcelona and Cyprus in September and October of 1985.¹⁴⁶

3. Media Coverage

The factional fighting was successful because of media coverage. Without this coverage, the utility of the attack is largely wasted. The attack impacts the direct victims but the wider audience is largely left uninformed. In order for a terrorist group to impose change in society, the masses must be influenced to pressure their leadership for change. Without media coverage of terrorist attacks, the terrorist groups lose their ability to influence large audiences. Limiting the media's coverage of terrorist

¹⁴⁶ Rapoport, 97.

attacks seems like an easy solution to combating terrorists, but in free societies, media coverage is a component of that freedom.¹⁴⁷

4. Structure

The PLO provides an example of a long-term terrorist organization structured in a hub network configuration. Each major faction comprises a different hub with its respective supporters forming more distant nodes. The PLO is also an example of inter-group competition leading to increased cohesion within a group as each faction wants to prove its commitment to the overarching cause and that its particular tactics are the best. The PLO is successful because of its network structure overlaid a hierarchy of common principles. Furthermore, the PLO is at times directly and others indirectly supported by neighboring Arab states. While state supported terrorist organizations have more resources, backing by more than one competing state may eventually cause problems for the PLO if these supporting states disagree about the use of the organization. Not having its own territory and relying on state support hinders the group's flexibility and could even redirect the group's goals at times depending on political situations of the neighboring Arab states. The various factions within the PLO and varying support from other states hamper peace process attempts with Israel.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion," in *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 132.

¹⁴⁸ Rapoport, 53.

C. HEZBOLLAH

The Hezbollah is another umbrella terrorist organization. Created by Ayatollah Khomeini, Hezbollah's organization evolved from a series of favors between Khomeini and others such as Hafez al-Assad who was considered a secular Muslim. Khomeini supported Assad by having Moussa Sadr proclaim Assad's sect of Islam part of the Shi'ite faith. This support helped stabilize Assad's dictatorship in Syria. Conversely, Khomeini called on Assad for favors such as receiving help training terrorists in Lebanon and by giving Khomeini's friends and allies Syrian passports to avoid surveillance or capture by the Iranian intelligence service. Khomeini also collaborated with other terrorists like Arafat and the PFLP. These collaborations began a network of favors that would eventually converge into a more formal organization.¹⁴⁹

1. Structure

Hezbollah's structure evolved according to its needs. It is governed by a seventeen-member Supreme Shura Council with both a political and a military wing. The military wing is referred to as Islamic Resistance, controlled by regional commanders.¹⁵⁰ The group is segmented according to skill, stemming from the organization's early structure of

¹⁴⁹ Michael Arthur Ledeen, *The War Against The Terror Masters: Why it Happened. Where We Are Now. How We'll Win.* (New York: Truman Talley Books St. Martin's Press, 2002), 15.

¹⁵⁰ Kim Cragin, "Hezbollah, Party of God," in *Aptitude for Destruction, Vol. 2 Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*, ed. John C. Baker et al., (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 38, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

loosely networked militias. These segments consist of fifty-man units organized along lines of geography and skill-task.¹⁵¹

Hezbollah is an example of a network maintaining strong cohesion without rigid structure. The command and control structure of Hezbollah is a network with an integrated hierarchy overlaid on it. Though not institutionalized until later, the "small, clique-like nature of Hezbollah's core of skilled operatives is also the likely explanation for the highly effective command and control of the group evidenced even in the early 1980's."¹⁵² Fighting clerics are assigned to each unit. These clerics receive their authority from the Shura Council and to an extent, Iran. They do not hold political positions within the organization. Instead, they are trained in guerilla-warfare tactics and serve as the horizontal cross-unit links as well as reporting up the chain of command to the Shura Council. This structure resembles a matrix network combined with the integrated hierarchy and network structure. This mixture allows the smaller units to quickly translate strategic decisions into tactical operations.¹⁵³

2. Security

Despite its network structure with many horizontal links between units, Hezbollah implements a tighter command and control structure over its components than the PLO. Security in a matrix organization is a potential hazard, but

¹⁵¹ Cragin, 38-43.

¹⁵² Ibid., 44

¹⁵³ Ibid.

the tighter command and control structure help prevent opportunity for security leaks. Operational security is maintained because leaders do not disseminate plans until operationally necessary.¹⁵⁴ The command and control system is layered enough that the organization does not rely on the top level leadership to provide the strategic initiative for the group in the event of the loss of that leadership. In 1992, then leader of Hezbollah, Abbas al-Musawi, was killed, yet the organization maintained its campaign against Israel.¹⁵⁵

D. MARXIST REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

Other organizations that are examples of historical networks include Marxist revolutionary groups. Marxist revolutionary groups advocated the rise of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. This type of mass uprising necessitates widespread and fast flow of information. The Red Army Faction, for example, was part of a larger organizational network, receiving support from Warsaw Pact members and training from Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Marxist revolutionary groups cooperated with one another because they had a common cause. The links between each of these smaller groups, like the RAF, designate the existence of a larger network structure. Marxist revolutionary groups ultimately did not succeed because each group had a slightly differing ideology than the next group. Splintering of ideology led to structural complexity as the network had to

¹⁵⁴Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, "Terrorist Groups as Dynamic Entities," in *The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 69.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 70.

evolve according to which groups ventured too far from the main groups' focus. As a result, cohesion between the groups eventually decreased. This example demonstrates the need for large network organizations comprised of smaller groups to maintain a strong, overarching ideology.¹⁵⁶

E. LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE)

1. Supportive Population

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demonstrates two principles of cohesion. First, a network can succeed when based amongst a supportive population based on family ties. Second, a dispersed population of supporters in the form of a diaspora can increase resources and capabilities for an organization. The LTTE, located in Sri Lanka, is held together by the bonds of cohesion between family members and those between castes in Sri Lankan society. A terrorist organization based out of a community where most members have family and friends creates a community of protection for the organization. For example, the Vvt Township have connections between the town's smugglers, fishermen, and tradesmen. Local law enforcement connected to the criminals have links to the criminals either through kin or close friends, and therefore, tolerance is given to many of their activities. Likewise, the criminals respectfully do not hassle the law enforcement personnel.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Tucker, 4.

¹⁵⁷ G.H. Peiris, "Secessionist War and Terrorism in Sri Lanka: Transnational Impulses," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 89.

2. Diaspora Constituency

The second principle that the LTTE demonstrates is a network drawing support from a diaspora constituency. The LTTE's external organizational support originates from migrant communities in Europe, North America, and Australia. This diaspora allows the LTTE to expand its network globally by opening offices and subsequent cells around the world. These widespread offices operate deep sea-going ships used for drug trafficking and weapons procurement. Migrant communities provide an opportunity for these organizations to gain resources because migrants often move to countries or regions of more affluence such as Europe and North America.¹⁵⁸ Widespread diaspora also provide an opportunity for potential recruits or supporters. The LTTE used its diaspora effectively and had offices and cells in at least fifty-four countries by 1998.¹⁵⁹

F. SHINING PATH (SENDEROSO LUMINOSO, SL)

A Latin America terrorist organization, the Shining Path (SL) is composed of loose, autonomous cells in the countryside. This group demonstrates the ability for a strong leader to maintain a group's cohesion. A second principle the SL demonstrates is the weakness a network exhibits when the group is focused more on the leadership instead of ideology. This group was primarily located in the countryside and gained strength from its isolation. A

¹⁵⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, "Asia Pacific Organised Crime & International Terrorist Networks," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 248.

¹⁵⁹ Peiris, 85.

group with little to no outside resources is more likely to accept the ideology of a leader when no competing influences exist. This group coalesced around Abimael Guzman for guidance and ideology. With Guzman's guidance, SL enjoyed success due to his detailed writings and ideologies.¹⁶⁰

1. Structure

The SL was organized as a network overlaid on a hierarchy. The hierarchy was composed of a National Directorate and a Central Committee. Guzman derived his authority from these two entities which oversee the organization's operations. Rank and file members of the organization executed operations as autonomous units after receiving operational orders from the two central decision-making units. Recruitment and target selection is handled in a centralized manner by regional commands, National Directorate, and Central Committee.¹⁶¹ This was a more tightly controlled command and control structure for the strategic operations of the organization than the PLO, PIRA, Hezbollah, or Marxist organizations. The benefits of target selection handled by centralized command include the ability of a central authority to prevent autonomous cells from choosing targets that may hurt the image or cause of the organization. One disadvantage of this style of command and control is the central decision-making entities can become overburdened with target selection and do not have access to current, in-the-field information.

¹⁶⁰ Rapoport, 6.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 111.

2. Local Support

The SL carried out numerous campaigns to increase local support. The SL, at times, used brutal tactics that may have alienated potential support instead of increasing it. In order to reach the local masses, the SL rounded up and executed local landowners before distributing the lands to the peasantry.¹⁶² In a more direct tactic, the SL seized schools, holding the officials at gunpoint while members of the SL lectured students on the aims of the revolution.¹⁶³

3. Cohesion

In the 1980's, the group suffered after some of Guzman's top advisers were arrested by authorities, but cohesion was maintained within the group. This strong cohesion was maintained because of Guzman's requirement of absolute commitment to the organization in order to become a member. Another factor of the group's cohesion is that members of the group do not have competing influences for their loyalties. Since the group operated in isolation and Guzman largely avoided contact with the media, the SL was able to operate according to its own standards. This isolation, though, proved to decrease the group's membership over the long-run because of the group's rigid standards. Since the group refused to affiliate itself with any other group, its influence was restricted only to its own members and the immediate victims of its attacks.

¹⁶² Rapoport, 113.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 116.

4. Isolation

Problems of isolation will be highlighted later when discussing the role of the media and removal of the group's leadership.¹⁶⁴ Before the capture or death of Guzman, terrorism scholars hypothesized that the group's solid commitment to its principles would enable the group to maintain its operations after the removal of Guzman. Scholars theorized his removal would create a legend or martyr for his followers to use as ideological guidance. When Guzman was later captured by authorities and displayed to the public as a man struggling to stay alive, the group actually lost much of its momentum because the public no longer feared the organization, making its operations ineffective. The isolation of the group also proved to be ultimately detrimental to the group's survival because members had begun to worship Guzman instead of his actual ideology. As a result, the organization began to crumble.¹⁶⁵

G. LE FRONT DE LIBERATION DU QUEBEC (FLQ)

Le Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) operating out of Canada is historically organized in a network fashion. Cells within the network are comprised of five to seven members. These units operate largely independently under the ideological banner of creating a separate Quebec. Various cells competed for power throughout the lifecycle of the organization. At times, when a dominant cell existed, the organization seemed to have a more central command style. As Canadian authorities tracked these cells and

¹⁶⁴ Rapoport, 119-121.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 124.

forced them to remain underground in hiding, other cells were provided the opportunity to compete for power. This competition for power created conflict between different cells about the best tactics to use to reach a common goal. This conflict is highlighted by the kidnapping and death of La Pierre. Compartmentalization of cells was not enforced but determined by the various initiatives undertaken by different cells. The looseness of the organization allowed for the group to reorganize itself quickly but also led to problems of which particular cell other units should follow during times of crisis.¹⁶⁶

H. ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)

1. Structure

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorist organization operates in the Philippines. This organization is a network overlaid on a hierarchy. The organization lacks a clearly defined ideological or religious motivation. The stated goal of the group is to establish an independent, theocratic Islamic state within the Philippines. The ASG relies on loose affiliation with other like-minded individuals or groups such as al Qaeda.¹⁶⁷ For example, Osama bin Laden dedicated resources to working with the ASG. He sent mujahideen to the Philippines to train selected ASG members. Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa,

¹⁶⁶ Rapoport, 59.

¹⁶⁷ Alfredo Filler, "The Abu Sayyaf Group: A Growing Menace to Civil Society," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 139.

established training networks in the Philippines through Islamic charities. Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani was the group's initial leader. Under his guidance, the group was organized in a hierarchical fashion. The organization had an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) comprised of fifteen leaders of different branches within the organization. Two special committees existed under the IEC; "first committee was the Jamiatul Al-Islamia Revolutionary Tabligh Group, in charge of fund-raising and Islamic education, and the second was the Al-Misuaratt Khutbah Committee, in charge of agitation and propaganda."¹⁶⁸ The military component of the ASG was comprised of three different branches: the Demolition Team, the Mobile Force Team, and the Campaign Propaganda Team. The Demolition Team was responsible for building weapons and actual mission implementation. The Mobile Force Team was responsible for command and control aspects of military operations, such as planning, communication, and coordination. The Campaign Propaganda Team was responsible for gathering information necessary to the mujahideen and educating others about the mission of the group. This organizational structure succeeded under the leadership of Janjalani, but after his death in 1998, the group suffered severe setbacks.

2. Operations

Following the loss of Janjalani, the group's IEC no longer functioned and the group became highly factional. The two main factions now operate out of Basilan and Sulu.

¹⁶⁸ Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Abu Sayyaf Threat," *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2005/autumn/art4-a05.htm>. (accessed April 2007).

After the organization's disintegration of the cohesion, the group's tactics changed. No longer did the group focus on intricate operations. Instead, the organization resorted to kidnappings and piracy in the region. Operations are carried out by smaller units and not necessarily approved beforehand by a central authority. The cooperation of the government of the Philippines in the War on terrorism has resulted in a further lockdown of the group's activities and a decrease in the amount of support it receives from other organizations such as al Qaeda and the MNLF.¹⁶⁹

I. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI)

1. Structure

The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a terrorist organization based in Indonesia and is a combination of a hierarchy with cellular components. The JI has four different regional branches that consist of several branches known as mantiqis and wakalahs (districts and sub-districts). These branches contain operational units of four or five members per unit. The organization is similar to that of al Qaeda in that it separates its operational cells from its planning, intelligence, and surveillance cells.¹⁷⁰

2. Cooperation

This organization works with other terrorist organizations to acquire training and resources. These groups include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

¹⁶⁹ Cragin, 80.

¹⁷⁰ Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," 63-73.

which JI worked with from 1996 to 2000 in a Mindanao training camp. At the camp, recruits were provided with weapons training and sharp-shooting skills and worked with other regional terrorist organizations.¹⁷¹

3. Cohesion

In order to maintain cohesion in a large network, the leadership of the organization relies on close ties of family and friends. This organization does not rely solely on a strong ideology to create cohesion, but "by an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seems like a giant extended family. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure."¹⁷² Though, in an organization this large, dissent is visible. Internal differences are rising due to disagreement over the selection of targets, such as the Marriot Hotel bombing on August 5, 2003, which killed numerous Indonesian workers. Other disagreements about the type of jihad to pursue may also lead to a deterioration of the organization without a clear central command and control system.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous," *Asia Report N°63*(August 2003), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1452>. (accessed April 2007).

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

J. BEGINNINGS OF MODERN ISLAMIC TERRORIST GROUPS: EGYPT

1. Structure

In the late 1970's and early 1980's, small, clandestine groups in Egypt were beginning to emerge. These groups in Cairo were "autonomous, but their leaders met regularly to [detail] a general strategy."¹⁷⁴ The origin of Tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt was based on these loose associations of local groups from Cairo and Upper Egypt. They did not necessarily agree on tactics but on strategy.

Operating in the context of their environment, we see that current terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda organized as networks are not new phenomenon, but an extension of their original structure. The members of these first networked groups in the 1970's and 1980's later became mujahideen in the Soviet Union-Afghanistan War of the 1980's, and then some stayed to become the next generation of jihad trainers in al Qaeda.

2. Operations

The tanzim al-Jihad in Egypt demonstrates the advantages and disadvantages of network organizations in terrorist groups. The assassination of Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat was a target of opportunity and chosen out of revenge for the death of a blood relative. This assassination highlights the ability of networks to act quickly and to negate the need for rigid command and control. Leaders of the various groups met on September 26, 1981, to discuss the possibility of assassinating the

¹⁷⁴ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 30.

president. The operation was carried out on October 6, 1981. The four members of the commando unit met for the first time shortly before the operation.¹⁷⁵

The aftermath of the assassination highlights potential difficulties that networked organizations may face after an operation not unanimously supported by leaders or not instigated by a hierarchy's top leadership. Members of Tanzim al-Jihad sentenced to jail experienced cleavages. The Cairo branch under al-Zumur advocated a violent coup whereas the Saidi group desired mobilization of the masses to overthrow the government.¹⁷⁶ Regardless of cleavages about the specific tactics involved, the members of the group were largely united in their overarching mission. After being released from prison, most went to Afghanistan to continue the jihad against the Soviets. This demonstrates both the strength and weaknesses of a hierarchy. Cohesion was maintained amongst these members even in prison and despite factional differences about how to fight.

K. SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL NETWORKS

Terrorist organizations now face difficulty in establishing a central command and control center. The countries these organizations historically operate from are increasingly coming under international pressure to better police their own territories. As a result, organizations are finding training opportunities more difficult. In turn, the structure of these groups is evolving to meet the

¹⁷⁵ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 32.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 33.

changing environments from which they are operating. As security measures increase against these groups, terrorist organizations across the board display a capability to evolve into flattened organizations operating as networks. Often, these organizations began as loose networks, evolved into groups with central command and authority, and are now evolving again into network-like structures, utilizing technology in order to maintain a command and control system.

Terrorist Organizations: Structure, Strengths, and Weaknesses					
		Structure	Strengths	Weaknesses	Mechanism of Cohesion
<u>PIRA</u>	<u>Pre-1977</u>	-Military Organization; hierarchy	-Creative learning environment -Local support	-Information not compartmentalized -Inside informants -Punishment to maintain cohesion	-Punishment enforced group norms
	<u>Post-1977</u>	-Cellular Network	-Compartmented information -Minimum communications to avoid detection -Closed meetings	-Decreased capabilities -Fewer people have access to information *Generally networks have increased information	-Encouragement
<u>PLO</u>		-Hub network -Umbrella organization	-Capitalize on media coverage -State support	-No territory, at state supporters' mercy -Factional fighting	-Greater Threat/Common enemy -Competition and Cooperation
<u>Hezbollah</u>		-Hierarchy of councils on top of network of favors -Umbrella	-Layered C2 for longevity -Cross-horizontal links	-Lower levels execute leadership guidance; room for interpretation	-Ideology -Ties of friendship

	organization			
<u>Marxist Groups</u>	-Network	-Open learning environment	-Factionalized; led to splintering	-Cooperation based on common cause
<u>LTTE</u>	-Network	-Diaspora provide resources -Local operatives are area experts	-Difficult to spread message outside Diaspora	-Ties of friends and family
<u>Shining Path</u>	-Network of operations on top of hierarchy of governing councils	-Isolation led to strong commitment -Centralized target selection; no confusion	-Isolation; difficult to recruit -Focused on leadership instead of ideology	-Strong leadership (lead to group's demise)
<u>FLQ</u>	-Network of autonomous cells	-Difficult to detect -Capture of one cell led to other cells emerging	-Lack of cooperation and coordination between cells -No clear C2 structure	-Belief in common cause
<u>Abu Sayyaf Group</u>	-Network of operations on top of hierarchy of councils	-Difficult to prevent soft target attacks	-Lack clear ideology -Independent operations without approval	-Strong leadership (removal disintegrated cohesion)
<u>Jemaah Islamiyah</u>	-Hierarchy with cellular operations	-Strong loyalty -Strong ideology	-Dissent within group based on different types of jihad	-Ties of friends and family
<u>Tanzim al-Jihad</u>	-Network of affiliates	-Targets of opportunity difficult to prevent -Ideology maintained group even in prison	-No C2 structure led to confusion after large operations	-Strong ideology

Table 6. **Summary of Terrorist Organizations: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Mechanism of Cohesion.**

Note that groups relying on strong leadership encounter difficulties maintaining cohesion after leadership changes. Organizations with strong, cohesiveness are able to continue relying on their ideological commitment after regulatory or societal change.

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V. CURRENT TERRORIST NETWORKS: AL QAEDA

A. AL QAEDA AS AN EVOLVING ORGANIZATION

Following the U.S. led coalition operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the organizational structure of al Qaeda was forced to change. Academic scholar, Marc Sageman, argues that al Qaeda since September 2001, has more closely resembled a "global jihad movement."¹⁷⁷ The term movement and comparing al Qaeda to a social movement is not fully accepted by the entire academic community, but Marc Sageman's concept of an evolving organization is widely agreed upon. Without looking at the origins of al Qaeda, scholars discuss the change of structure from a highly centralized, hierarchical organization to a flatter, more loosely connected network. This current network is possible through technology using the internet to connect units and to develop a command and control system. By looking at the origins of this organization, another network is discovered. The first al Qaeda network relied upon personal relationships cemented through marriages and past combat experience.

B. POST-SOVIET UNION-AFGHANISTAN WAR

1. Structure

The end of the Cold War resulted in states toning down their support for terrorist groups. Terrorist organizations were no longer able to depend on protection and aide from

¹⁷⁷ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 33.

state sponsors, and instead, restructured in order to learn how to operate independently.¹⁷⁸ Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, traditionalist jihadists returned home, not wanting to continue a jihad against traditionally Western-held lands nor secular Muslim lands. The mujahideen that remained in Afghanistan were the Salafists, the extremists who wanted to purge Muslim lands of non-believers and secular Muslims. In 1992, the militant Islamic movement was not formally organized.¹⁷⁹ Growing sentiments were expressed among smaller, local jihadist groups. Osama bin Laden, outraged by infidels protecting Islamic holy sites in his home country of Saudi Arabia, began to coalesce these smaller, local jihads under a new banner of al Qaeda. He provided these smaller groups with training, financial, and logistical support. Gradually, al Qaeda became a formal organization with a cluster of dedicated members centered around the leadership and the resources of Osama bin Laden. This organization supported the global Salafi jihad. While smaller jihad groups received resources from Osama bin Laden, he did not fully provide for these groups. He advocated a network structure during this time period by only giving these groups the necessary seed money to begin their operations. He then expected these groups to take on the responsibility of organizing and financing themselves with either their own money or through Muslim charity organizations.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Hudson, 9.

¹⁷⁹ The term militant Islamic movement used in this thesis loosely describes the surge in Islamic feeling at the time.

¹⁸⁰ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 38.

As training facilities became more focal to the resources provided by al Qaeda, the organization developed a more centralized structure. During the mid-1990's, high ranking members such as the chair of al Qaeda's military committee, the trainer of bin Laden's personal bodyguards, and his personal secretary had hands-on influence with day-to-day operations. This inner group developed into what is known as the Central Staff cluster. Owing to the close, personal relationships developed during the Soviet Union-Afghanistan war, the Central Staff organized finances, handled logistics, and surveyed potential targets without documented organizational rules and procedures.¹⁸¹ Personal handling of operations by the Central Staff ceased in 1998.

2. Far Jihad

On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda simultaneously bombed U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. This operation began a new phase in al Qaeda operations. First, these targets represented a far jihad versus a near jihad. They took place outside of Muslim lands, and the victims were mostly noncombatants. Osama bin Laden sent a clear message with this offensive operation. No longer would al Qaeda focus its energy on defending Muslim lands from infidel presence. The goal was to take the fight to the enemy.¹⁸²

3. Command and Control: Hierarchy

From a command and control perspective, these attacks are unique to al Qaeda's trend in operations. They were the

¹⁸¹ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 42.

¹⁸² Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 47-48.

last attacks planned by the full-time Central Staff. These two bombings followed bin Laden's 1998 declaration to the world of an intent to pursue offensive operations. Al Qaeda thus shifted its focus to a global presence, demanding more of its fringe members in order to complete the mission. From this point forward, the Central Staff would no longer have absolute control over target selection, except for the case of the 2001 attacks. Even in this event, the operational units operated for long periods of times (years), largely autonomous from the rest of the organization. Al Qaeda uses its Central Staff to plan large operations that have significant meaning for the group, such as switching from defensive to offensive operations, or attacks likely to elicit strong responses from victims such as September 11, 2001. Furthermore, this attack set a precedent for future al Qaeda cells. This attack was one of leadership by example. The group's leader issued a statement about the expectations of the organization followed by a clear example of those expectations. Outside of these large-scale operations though, following the 1998 bombings, al Qaeda shifted its command and control system to a looser, network style. This shift facilitates the organization's structural change following the 2001 invasion of its training camps in Afghanistan.

C. PROPOSED STRUCTURE IN 2004

Marc Sageman's idea of clustering within a network is used to describe a proposed current structure of al Qaeda. His concept also ties into the previously discussed idea of the growth of a network depending on the number of nodes in one location. Currently, al Qaeda is comprised of four

large regional cells that are further divided into operational cells. These cells are the Central Staff, the Maghreb cell in Europe, the Core Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa, and the Southeast Asian core. Clusters are largely independent of one another with few horizontal links. The Maghreb and Core Arab clusters intersect through their common Syrian members. The Core Arabs intersect with the Southeast Asian core through the bonds of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ridwan Isamuddin. The separation of clusters is important to the operational and informational security of the organization. The arrest of one member cannot bring down the entire organization but at the most one cluster.¹⁸³

Networks built upon personal relationships have more potential for growth at more populated nodes. Nodes that are completely isolated from society or contain members with few important relationships outside of the organization are less likely to expand as quickly as nodes with highly connected individuals. The most connected nodes in a network are referred to as the hubs of the organization. Within al Qaeda, Marc Sageman identifies the Central Staff, Core Arabs, Maghreb Arabs, and the Southeast Asian nodes as the key hubs.¹⁸⁴

Just as other organizations mentioned in this thesis, al Qaeda is a network overlaid on a hierarchy. The Central Staff is the central unit of authority connecting the other clusters. This core is formed and held together through a network of friendships initially formed during combat against the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden heads the

¹⁸³ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 49.

¹⁸⁴ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 137.

hierarchy and is supported by a shura council of about a dozen members, mostly Egyptian. The Central Staff also has four committees, divided into finances, military affairs, religious affairs, and public relations. These four committees demonstrate the values of the organization: resources, operational execution, cohesion through ideology, and influence on the public. Most large organizations would have other committees such as personnel, recruitment, intelligence, or logistics, but these items are handled at the local level of al Qaeda.¹⁸⁵

Within each cluster, a robust horizontal network of personal relationships exists. These horizontal links enable Osama bin Laden to tap local resources for operational support and recruits. Recruits sent to training camps then cement relationships with other individuals from varied regions. As recruits leave the training camps, they will be able to draw upon their contacts within the training camps for years to come. In short, the training facilities promote robust alumni organizations.¹⁸⁶

1. Command and Control: Network

From 1998 onward, al Qaeda began to evolve into a command and control system encouraged by a network. Until 2001, though, the physical structure of al Qaeda did not change. This order of change is counterintuitive as no external forces exerted pressure for this command and control style to occur. Operations following the twin U.S. embassy bombings were decentralized and locally controlled.

¹⁸⁵ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 171.

¹⁸⁶ Jenkins, "An Appreciation for the Situation," 13.

Al Qaeda's involvement focused on training, providing seed money, and logistical support. Exact targets and details of the operations were planned by local cells. Leadership within the Central Staff was made aware of the general outline of a plot but left out of the day-to-day planning.¹⁸⁷ Operational field commanders took charge of specific operations and reported to Central Staff lieutenants. Note though, that operational commanders were not necessarily underneath the staff lieutenant. The staff the lieutenants provided a cross-link between the hubs and the operational units. For example, in "the Los Angeles airport millennial plot, Ressay assumed the command of his operation when the appointed field commander Fodail was unable to come to Canada. He reported to Makhlulif, who facilitated logistic support and kept al Qaeda aware of new developments."¹⁸⁸ Ressay, an operational unit member was able to take the place of the operational field commander and report to the cross-link staff lieutenant, Makhlulif. The September 11, 2001, plot was organized similarly. The field commander, Atta, reported to bin al Shibh, who provided logistic support and kept al Qaeda leadership updated. A final example is the Bali operation. Abdul Aziz (Imam Samudra) acted as the operational commander. In this operation, two staff lieutenants worked with the operational unit. Isamuddin was the cross-link staff lieutenant who provided funding, and Ali Ghufuron was the staff lieutenant keeping the Central Staff aware of new developments.¹⁸⁹ In each of these instances, a horizontal cross-link member

¹⁸⁷ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 48-49.

¹⁸⁸ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 138.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 138.

provided the logistical and financial support to the group while separate members took operational leadership.

From a command and control perspective, this dividing of responsibility increases the difficulty of organizing operations and maintaining accountability. Likewise, from a cohesion perspective, with so many different players contributing who are not necessarily part of the operational unit, these more distant members may feel as if they are cogs in a wheel. Conversely, by staff lieutenants handling the logistical and financial support, operational members might actually feel more connected to the larger organization. Operational members within the smaller nodes might develop a sense of community because they feel that the operation is not theirs alone, but belongs to the entire organization. Now, added pressures occur as these members want to perform well for the sake of the organization. An added benefit of this loose command and control structure is the division of responsibility in the case of mission failure. In this instance, individuals will feel less shame because they can point to other pieces of the puzzle for which they had no responsibility.

2. Al Qaeda: Southeast Asian Node

As the ideological leader of al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden harnesses the strength of numerous terrorist organizations by allowing individuals dual membership in their local organizations and al Qaeda. As a result, al Qaeda's network varies by region. Due to the cultural backdrop of the area, the Southeast Asian hub is more hierarchical than the other hubs. For example, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir appear to have intentionally designed Jemaah Islamiyah along

hierarchical lines. The top level is formed by an amir and consultative council. Similar to al Qaeda, the organization has four main hubs according to region: Singapore and Malaysia; Indonesia; Sabah, Suluwesu, and the Southern Philippines; and Australia. These four divisions, known as mantiqis, have councils with staff units. One of these staff units is the operational unit, comprised of four to five people. Unlike al Qaeda, the initiative and detailed plans for operations in Jemaah Islamiyah, which has close connections with the Southeast Asian Core, originate with the organization's leadership. After the councils agree on operational plans, orders are passed down the chain of command to the operational units.¹⁹⁰

3. Changing Security

The Core Arabs and Maghreb Arab Core following September 11, 2001, were under international scrutiny. Western European countries and other allied nations tightened security measures against terrorist organizations, increasing the difficulty for communications and explicit orders within a chain of command. As a result of heightened security measures, attacks such as those in Bali, Istanbul, Madrid, and London were carried out by more locally formed units. These operational cells acted more independently and had more distant ties to al Qaeda's leadership.¹⁹¹ Even before the international arena focused on large-scale terrorist organizations, leadership within al Qaeda itself

¹⁹⁰ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 140.

¹⁹¹ Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, "Abu Masab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda," in *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 30 (2007): 2.

recognized the need for networked structures in a changing environmental atmosphere.

D. LEADERS' SUPPORT FOR NETWORK

A leader by the name Setmariam involved with the training of recruits in Afghanistan lectured about the need for al Qaeda to adopt a less hierarchical structure. He explained to his class in the summer of 2000,

We ask the Muslim youth to be a terrorist. Why do we ask for such individual terrorism? First, because secret hierarchical organizations failed to attract Muslims. The youth fear joining such an organization because if there is a mistake then the authorities will reach them. Second because we need to give the youth the change to play a role without being part of an organization. Some youth don't want to join an organization and don't know how to act on their beliefs. Third, due to pressure from the Jews, Crusaders, and lapse Muslim regimes.¹⁹²

This short excerpt from Setmariam's lectures to terrorist recruits in Afghanistan demonstrates the leadership's thinking about the direction of al Qaeda's organization. The leadership clearly wants to appeal to the largest number of Muslim youth possible. He understood strengths and weaknesses of various organizational structures to recognize that in hierarchies, blame is too easily assigned. Autonomous units provide protection not only to members of the operational units but also the central staff leadership of al Qaeda. Autonomous units are more difficult to trace back to the central leadership, but these units may also attempt their own methods and techniques without fear of

¹⁹² Cruickshank and Ali, 8.

ruining the entire organization. Experimentation and innovation are encouraged in this type of organizational structure.

Setmariam also understood enough social network analysis to illustrate to his classes that a cellular structure in times of intense scrutiny was desirable. He

drew a diagram indicating how easy it was to round up a cell structure in which many cells are traced back to a leader. 'In the new stage,' Setmariam told his [students], 'You should form a brigade and work directly. I advise your brigade doesn't exceed ten members. In case you are caught, they are all caught.'¹⁹³

In this quote, the cell structure he refers to is a compartmentalized yet hierarchical structure where each person understands their place in a direct chain of command leading to the Central Staff leadership. The students Setmariam instructed were future recruiters and field lieutenants for al Qaeda. By telling these future field lieutenants to work directly with their operational brigades, Setmariam is supporting the notion of a loose command and control structure that only provides ideological oversight to the operational units.

Setmariam's principles are being put to work as evidenced by the structure of the Madrid and London attacks. He advocated operational leaders being active individuals with the ability to influence others in a broad circle of contacts. Sarhane Fahket, a well-connected Tunisian immigrant, was a successful real estate agent. Moroccan immigrant, Jamal Zougam, managed a cellular telephone store.

¹⁹³ Cruickshank and Ali, 8.

These two individuals were in positions to meet numerous individuals and had the ability to influence a wide range of locals in association with the attacks in Madrid. The attacks in London were under the leadership of a primary school teacher, Mohammad Siddique Khan. As a schoolteacher, he automatically had the respect of his students, but he drew three into a special group that became the operational cell.¹⁹⁴ These two cells, though augmented with experts from other areas, were formed according to the principles of Setmariam: small, autonomous groups working largely on their own initiative.

E. SUMMARY OF AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda has global influence due in part to its fluid operational style. Since al Qaeda does not require each operational unit to operate under the same operational guidelines, individual units are able to use techniques best suited for their environment. Al Qaeda relies on an overarching ideology to hold the various sub-organizations within al Qaeda together. Each organization may pursue its own local initiatives so long as they do not interfere with those of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, in this respect, is really another umbrella organization like that of Hezbollah, providing funding and logistic support to regional organizations agreeing to cooperate with one another. Unlike Hezbollah though, al Qaeda has a more sound ideological base that allows other organizations to cooperate without vying for power. Al Qaeda has cooperated with organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

¹⁹⁴ Cruickshank and Ali, 10.

(MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ merged with al Qaeda in 2001), al-Ansar Mujahidin, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Abu Sayyaf, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, and Harakat ul-Mujahidin to name a few.¹⁹⁵

Scholar, Audrey Kurth Cronin, sees al Qaeda's increased reliance on connections to other groups as a sign of weakness; others see it as a worrisome indicator of growing strength, especially with groups that formerly focused on local issues and now display evidence of convergence on al Qaeda's Salafist, anti-U.S., anti-West agenda.¹⁹⁶ Even if the physical organization of al Qaeda was losing power, the ideas the organization disseminated across the globe are more potent since al Qaeda allowed each region to develop its own unique approach. The number of attacks occurring that are attributed to al Qaeda though indicate that al Qaeda is not losing its influence despite vast cooperation with other groups. Fewer personnel are seeking overseas training in al Qaeda-run training camps due to tightened counter-terrorism measures and the use of the internet as a training tool. Yet, the organization's ideology continues to circulate through thousands of websites on the internet and within radically controlled mosques. Potential terrorists, in addition to local insurgents, now may travel to Iraq to practice their attack methods. Al Qaeda as an

¹⁹⁵ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 33.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

organization may also be able to use Iraq as a new rallying point for Muslims without needing to establish new training facilities.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ Brian Michael Jenkins, "An Appreciation for the Situation," in *Unconquerable Nation* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2006), 35-36. <http://www.rand.org>. (accessed February 2007).

VI. COHESION IN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: LOOKING INTERNALLY

This section applies the principles of cohesion in group dynamics as discussed in the literature review to terrorist organizations. Individual influences of cohesion are the focus of this section. These influences include the factors of members' commitment, the effects of a greater threat, guilt, level of decision-making, and sacrifice and martyrdom.

A. MEMBERS' COMMITMENT

For a terrorist to completely commit himself to the organization, the individual must feel that the terrorist organization is a better comparison group than other viable options. Individuals belonging to ideological or religious terrorist organizations may base their comparisons off of the moral ideology espoused by society versus that of the organization. Surprisingly, terrorists, according to scholar Martha Crenshaw, usually show "acute concern for morality, especially for sexual purity, and believe that they act in terms of a higher good."¹⁹⁸ The belief that one is acting in on behalf of a higher calling allows the individual to overlook the laws and norms of society by justifying the end objectives of the terrorist organization. Justifications for violation of society's norms include emphasis on past grievances, the promise of a better future, and illegitimate and violent regimes to which acts of terrorism are the only viable action. Social interactions

¹⁹⁸ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 395.

reinforce norms, values, and beliefs. For example, Muslims attending private mosques, not supported by the secular state government, come to practice and believe in that mosque's particular brand of Islamic ideology. The mosques provide occasion for new acquaintances through which an ideological commitment to extremist thought can develop. This extremist thought can then lead, through further social interaction, to commitment to jihad and provide the members of the mosque with established links to the jihad.¹⁹⁹ This process may take time so that members of the mosque do not realize the depth of their commitment that is developing over time.

1. Fanatically Held Belief

Members' commitment to an organization increases when the members have a fanatically held belief that the organization is fighting not only for themselves as an organization but for an oppressed group of people. The terrorists feel justified in what they see as their self-sacrificing struggle against the oppressive state regimes. The concept of widespread, albeit secret, support by a population which is oppressed and unable to express its own views give terrorists the feeling that they will have a large base of support once they have gained enough influence. A fanatical belief in the greater cause of an organization elicits a feeling of being an elite member of an organization responsible for opening the eyes of the

¹⁹⁹ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 143.

common person who will be grateful for the for the revolutionary change brought by the terrorist organization.²⁰⁰

A fanatically held belief may be a concise concept or a broad idea. Al Qaeda successfully coalesces the support of numerous and varied terrorist organizations by harnessing the desire for a pan-Islamic state and a commonly portrayed dislike for Israel. Al-Zawahiri in 2001 expressed the idea that Muslims could be motivated by the call to jihad against Israel. He, as a leader of al Qaeda, understood that such a diverse organization needed a rallying point. Israel serves this purpose for al Qaeda. Al-Zawahiri stated in 2001, "The fact that must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past fifty years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all Arabs, be they believers or non-believers, good or evil."²⁰¹ Al-Zawahiri unites al Qaeda under a common ideology by embracing these concepts. This overarching ideology aides in providing cohesion and commitment to diverse extremist groups as well as providing guidance in their operations under a looser command and control structure.

2. Overarching Ideology

Osama bin Laden also embraces the concept of an overarching ideology uniting the various elements of al

²⁰⁰ Konrad Kellen, "On Terrorists and Terrorism," Study for RAND Corporation, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1982), 29, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 2007).

²⁰¹ Marc Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 21.

Qaeda and providing an additional reason for members' commitment to the organization. He continues to espouse the view that Muslims have a duty to rise against invasions by infidels, Americans now occupying Iraq and Afghanistan. He states

all ulema are unanimous that it is an individual duty to fight an invading enemy...[J]ihad has become [obligatory] upon each and every Muslim...The time has come when all the Muslims of the world, especially the youth, should unite and soar against the kufr and continue jihad till these forces are crushed to naught, all the anti-Islamic forces are wiped off the face of this earth and Islam takes over the whole world and all the other false religions.²⁰²

Osama bin Laden once before gained influence by calling attention and uniting Muslims against United States presence on holy land during the first Gulf War. Now, Osama bin Laden is once again calling on Muslims around the world to unite and examine their personal commitment to Islamic ideology by pointing out how easily infidels (Americans) were able to topple two governments, Afghanistan and Iraq, in the region.

3. Sense of Belonging

Belonging to any type of group provides the members of that group with a sense of belonging as discussed in the second section of this thesis. A terrorist organization provides this function to its members as well as providing the members with a feeling of self-importance. The

²⁰² Bruce Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: an Assessment," Study for RAND Corporation. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 15. www.RAND.org (accessed February 2007).

organization a member joins begins to replace the individual's old belief system with new beliefs that morph into norms that "define the terrorism act as morally acceptable to the group's goals..."²⁰³ The Egyptian terrorist organization, Sayyid Qutb, provides an example of a group providing an individual with a sense of belonging, identity, and norms that replace those of society. Followers of Sayyid Qutb shaped their group norms in such a way that they felt their norms were actually concurrent with the overarching norms and rules of Islam. They felt that the rest of Muslim society, especially Egypt, was in the wrong. Therefore, since these nominal Muslims were actually breaking the norms established by Mohammed the Prophet, Qutb followers were actually agreeing and abiding by the higher norms of Islamic rule. Since these nominal Muslims were breaking the traditional norms of Islamic society, Qutb rationalized that violence directed against these nominal Muslims was allowable because they were not fighting other Muslims, but "idolaters."²⁰⁴

4. Isolation

A follower of Qutb's ideas, Shukri Mustafa, advocated separating himself and other true believers from the corrupt persons of Egyptian society. He believed that withdrawal and isolation would protect the community from the impious society and allow it to grow strong enough to eventually conquer Egypt and establish a true Islamic society. In order to belong to Mustafa's sect, "one had to abandon one's

²⁰³ Hudson, 52.

²⁰⁴ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 14.

ties to society, including family, former friends, state employment, and what was considered useless education."²⁰⁵ As a means of increasing cohesion within the group, communal living in city apartments was also open to women, and Mustafa encouraged early marriage among his members.²⁰⁶

5. Family Ties

Marriages create bonds of cohesion between families and may put the organization member in contact with potential supporters or other members. Marriage to another family with links in a terrorist organization will increase the commitment the individual has to the principles of the organization as well as the family. In addition to Mustafa's sect of Sayyid Qutb, other organizations such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah also support the notion of marriages between families associated with the organization. Osama bin Laden personally created strong links by marrying his son to the daughter of his long-time aide and likely successor, Abu Hoffs al Masri, in January 2001.²⁰⁷ If an organization does not actively encourage marriage as a way of increasing commitment and cohesion amongst its members, the leadership may advocate members to completely cut ties with their former families. Aum Shinrikyo's highest ranking members cut ties with former family members as an act of demonstrating their commitment to the organization above all

²⁰⁵ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 14.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 15.

²⁰⁷ Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 342.

other commitments. In this sense, the individual is accepting the organization as a new family in place of a traditional family.²⁰⁸

6. Public Proclamation of Commitment

Another method that organizations and individuals alike use to increase commitment to a group is to establish a set of standards to measure a person's level of commitment. A visible level of commitment allows other members of the organization to see where on the totem pole of commitment they fall in relation to others. This environment creates competition and desire to be recognized as the most committed member of an organization. Members of Aum Shinrikyo displayed their commitment to the organization by donating different amounts of money in order to attend different levels of training. After paying different levels of membership dues, a person could wear a different color of robe signifying that person's level within the organization. This form of displaying each person's commitment and rank within the hierarchy encouraged others to participate just as much or more than others. This fueled the donation process to the organization.²⁰⁹

7. Oppressive Measures by the State

Actions by both the state government and the organization play a role in determining the level of commitment in potential terrorists and current organization members. A state which uses oppressive measures to quiet

²⁰⁸ Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," 61.

²⁰⁹ Parachini, 17.

dissent and does not give a voice to its citizens is likely to see an increase in clandestine, organized violence. The repression by some modern Muslim states, such as Iran in the late 1970's, convinced radical Muslims that political reforms or statements would not have enough power to change the government and establish an Islamic state. Lack of political voice led to violence. Likewise, terrorist organizations must enforce their own norms. At times, as previously mentioned, organizations need to punish members for deviant behavior. Punishment that alienates popular support may erode potential and current members' commitment.²¹⁰ Though often at cross-purposes, both the state and the organization must find their own balance of enticement and punishment to reach their own goals.

8. Oppressive Measures by the Group

A group, even if successful in operations, may use too harsh of measures against its own members and lose influence. Aum Shinrikyo's most devoted followers killed one of their own members who witnessed the accidental death of a recruit and wished to leave the group. The killing was justified as necessary to allow the group to flourish and fulfill its mission of salvation. The group did not achieve a balance between punishment for cohesion and adherence to norms and the ability to attract new members. The period following these killings witnessed a decline in new recruits joining the organization.²¹¹

²¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman, "The Post-colonial Era: Ethno-nationalist/Separatist Terrorism," in *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 62.

²¹¹ Parachini, 13.

9. Time in Prison

Rather counter intuitively, terrorists who spend time in jail tend to show an increase in their commitment to their particular organization. Prison focuses the identity of an individual on the aspect that led him to prison: association with a terrorist organization. The type of organization influenced the way prison affected person's commitment. The following numbers are taken from a collection of thirty-five incarcerated terrorists in an Israeli prison. Seventy-seven percent of the Islamic terrorists in this collection felt that their prison experience brought them closer to the group, they learned more about the group, and were more committed to the cause following their sentence. Conversely, only fifty-four percent of the secular terrorists interviewed felt this way. Eighty-four percent of the Islamic terrorists reported a desire to return to their organizations following their sentences versus sixty-two percent of the secular terrorists.²¹² Perhaps understandable while in custody of an Israeli prison, but the terrorists reported a sense of increased dislike toward Israel following their captivity. A higher level of increased commitment from the Islamic terrorists may be attributed to the ideological influences of their organizations versus desires for physical or material changes in secular organizations.

²¹² Laurita M. Denny, Jerrold M. Post, and Ehud Sprinzak, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 174-175.

B. SHARED FATE AGAINST A GREATER THREAT

Members of organizations acting against the norms of society understand they are taking risks and face punishment if apprehended. This shared fate from a greater threat increases the cohesion within the organization. Martha Crenshaw explains that "shared guilt and anxiety increase the group's interdependence and mutual commitment and may also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common ideology as sources of moral authority."²¹³ An increase in cohesion in adverse conditions leads to the development of a collective identity that continues to radicalize as the group identity takes the place of individual identity. At this point, groupthink influences the thoughts and actions of the group, even leading to illusions of the organization's omnipotence.²¹⁴

1. Organizational Level

People who do not necessarily share common views may come together and cooperate if faced with a greater common enemy than each other. This is the case with Arab states which fluctuate between competing with one another for regional power and supporting one another against Israel. Arab states often use the Palestinian cause as a method to unite Arab states against Israel. By focusing negative energy against Israel as the cause for refugee problems in the area, Arab states are able to create more support for unity as well as an increase in dislike for Israel. Terrorist organizations harness this same energy in uniting

²¹³ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 395.

²¹⁴ Hudson, 54.

various factions together against a common enemy. This method explains how Osama bin Laden was even at one point able to cooperate with the IRA.²¹⁵

Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, Setmariam challenged the absolute authoritative leadership of Osama bin Laden, urging him to a more radical stance against Saudi Arabia and to take the fight to the far enemy. After the attacks though, Setmariam recognized that the cause did not need further criticism from him and others but needed unity. After the attacks, he praised bin Laden and the attacks as "heroic and glorious."²¹⁶ Setmariam realized that the U.S. and other coalition partners were intensely focused on dismantling terrorist organizations. In order for the organization to survive, increased cohesion, especially among its leadership was paramount in the face of a greater threat.

A greater threat may explain why at the time, Sunni and Shiite Muslim insurgents are working in cooperation in Iraq. Al Qaeda has provided a greater threat in the form of western nations to the various Muslim factions as David Wurmser notes,

For Syria, the...network had the virtue of absorbing and channeling Sunni fundamentalist fervor. Energies that might have been turned against the regime were directed instead against American targets and into Saudi politics. Within the terror network, Shi'ite and Sunni—who otherwise would never have countenanced working together—could join forces, as could secular Palestinians and Islamic extremists. For Iraq, the network offered a way to defeat America. It

²¹⁵ Hoffman, "The Internationalization of Terrorism," 69.

²¹⁶ Cruickshank and Ali, 2.

would be a grave mistake to imagine that Saddam's animus against Saudi Arabia or his secular disposition would prevent him from working with the Wahhabi religious establishment...Sure enough...Saddam's regime has lately encouraged the rise, in Iraq's northern safe haven, of salafism, a puritanical sect tied to Wahhabism that hitherto had been alien to Iraq...one of these Salafi movements turns out to be a front for bin Laden.²¹⁷

Note that this was written in October 2001, before the capture of Saddam Hussein or the invasion of Iraq.

Other examples of unlikely cooperation abound. In December 2001, *The New York Times* reported on classified documents showing that there had been contacts between members of al Qaeda and Iranian intelligence officers in 1995 and 1996. This contact is significant because Iranians tend to support Shi'ite extremist groups whereas al Qaeda is largely comprised of Sunni leadership, indicating the cooperation of Shi'as and Sunnis.²¹⁸ In early 2002, Israeli Defense Forces transiting from Dubai, an operational base for Iran, intercepted a ship the KARINE A, ferrying explosives and weapons. Iranians again, are mostly Shi'ites whereas Palestinians are mainly Sunni. In this instance, cooperation exists between the two groups: the weapons were Iranian while the ship and its captain were both Sunni.²¹⁹

Recent operations are not the only times different Muslim factions have cooperated. The Soviet Union provided a greater threat during and following the Afghan war. Various factions of Muslims met one another and cooperated

²¹⁷ Ledeen, 16.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 46.

²¹⁹ Leeden, 48.

in an effort to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. This cooperation was intense and lengthy relative to today's operations. After the Soviets withdrew, the militants started to analyze their common problems with a global perspective. Islamic extremists began to transcend national origins after forging bonds in combat with one another.²²⁰ Infighting occurred after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The remaining Afghan Arabs could not agree on the type and the extent of jihad they desired. Just when infighting threatened to destroy the bonds formed in combat, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

The most extreme mujahedin, the salafists who advocated a far jihad, despised Hussein since he was a secular ruler who did not advocate nor closely follow the tenants of Islam. Initially, Salafists condemned the invasion of Kuwait. Osama bin Laden offered to use his mujahedin to fight Hussein's invasion. The royal family of Saudi Arabia instead chose the United States and other non-Muslim forces to defend holy ground. Osama bin Laden and his followers were incensed by the presence of these infidels on sacred land. Then, the Salafists chose to support Hussein as the lesser of two evils versus the United States as the Great Satan.²²¹

2. Individual Level

The preceding examples showcase unity in adverse conditions on a grand scale. Other factors of a shared fate also increase cohesion amongst terrorist group members.

²²⁰ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 18.

²²¹ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 38.

Families who have lost members to an organization's cause are often rewarded through a sense of heroism. Members of an organization know that if they should become martyrs, their families will be rewarded through social status, financial, and material rewards from the organization and the community supporting or sympathizing with the organization. In areas of extreme poverty or regions where status and pride are paramount, potential financial compensation and hero status entice members to personal sacrifice. As younger or newer members of an organization witness praise for martyrs and see the rewards given to the families of those martyrs, the individual increasingly wants the organization to succeed and fuses his identity with that of the organization. This fusion of identity decreases the need for individual ideas, identity, or decision-making. Thus, organizations rewarding the families of fallen members are also increasing the support for the organization of younger and potential members.²²²

Finally, cohesion within terrorist organizations is possible even when members become disillusioned with the goals of the group. An individual who has participated or supported a terrorist organization willfully understands the potential backlash from society, even if the individual leaves the group. Absence of amnesty in most Western countries combined with the fear of retaliation by the organization itself prevents members from leaving the group.²²³ The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was a more hierarchical organization and with an

²²² Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 174-175.

²²³ Kellen, 42.

internal security unit. This unit investigated and uncovered members inside the organization who associated with law enforcement personnel, those who did not conform to the norms of the organization, and was responsible for the prosecution of guilty members. The internal security unit coerced members to remain a part of the organization and interrogated those who have been in custody to ensure they had not been turned by the authorities as double agents.²²⁴ The existence of an internal security unit provides increased trouble for a group member desiring to leave the group. Fear of retribution by this unit combined with punishment by state authorities forced some members to continue participating regardless of their personal desires.

C. TYPES OF INFLUENCE ON CURRENT MEMBERS

1. Guilt

The more committed an individual is to a group, emotions of pride and guilt expressed by the individual will reflect group actions versus individual endeavors.²²⁵ Guilt has strong influences on the members of an organization. Feelings of strong internal guilt may lead members to feel the need to seek punishment. This punishment may take the form of capture or sacrifice. For example, nineteenth century Russian terrorist, Kaliayev, felt only his death could "atone for the murder he committed."²²⁶ Capture by the enemy brings release to the strains incurred from life

²²⁴ Ahmet Yayla, "Terrorism as a Social Information Entity: A Model for Early Intervention" (PhD diss., University of North Texas, 2005), 56.

²²⁵ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 175.

²²⁶ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 395.

in an underground organization daily opposing society's standard of behavior. Capture also provides a sense of fulfillment to a member. If a person is captured in the name of acting on behalf of a terrorist organization, then that person feels they have sacrificed themselves for the good of the organization.²²⁷ Guilt, more than external shame, will produce these influences as discussed in the second section of this thesis.

2. Level of Participation in Decision-making

The level of participation in decision-making is described as empowerment in business organizations. Terrorist organizations and business organizations face the similar challenge of making subordinates feel included and part owners of the groups' operations, but must also keep the organization on a desirable course of action. Among thirty-five interviewed terrorists in Israeli prisons, both the Islamic and secular terrorists indicated they were free to ask questions and provide opinions about operational details. Both groups noted that they were forbidden from questioning the validity of an act. Differences amongst the terrorists included secular terrorists' tendency to be organized in a more hierarchical fashion than Islamic terrorists. Islamic terrorists were less tolerant of dissent than secular terrorists, but freer (Islamic terrorists) to act at a lower cell level. From this information, this thesis theorizes that ideological terrorist groups have more cohesion and a greater understanding of the group's objectives. These groups

²²⁷ Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," 395.

therefore, do not tolerate dissent about the validity of operations because such dissent essentially questions the ideology of the organization. For example, one interviewee noted that a Hamas commander's orders were binding and not to be questioned.²²⁸ Secular terrorist organizations do not have such strong ideology that includes a particular life after death, so their organization must be more structured in order to keep closer watch on their own members who have more potential outside influences.

3. Cyclical Influence

Another influence on members of a terrorist organization is the idea of cyclical influence. Members who have fused their identity with the success of the group have a need to increase the power and prestige of the group through increasingly dramatic and violent operations. Group goals become individual goals.²²⁹ This cyclical influence is fed by the need for a terrorist organization to continually make a statement that will be noticed. As the general public becomes accustomed to one level of violence, the terrorist organization must up the ante.

a. Media Coverage

A basic necessity for the success of a terrorist operation is publicity in order to influence public opinion. Publicity combined with success and a personal feeling of accomplishment effectively creates an upward spiral for violence in order to maintain the media and public's

²²⁸ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 178.

²²⁹ Ibid., 175.

attention. For example, "Yusef planned to follow the World Trade Center bombing with the assassinations of Pope John Paul II and the then prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, and the near-simultaneous in-flight bombings of eleven US passenger airliners."²³⁰ This increase in audacity of plans is due to the need to undertake more dramatic measures to receive the same amount of media coverage. Dramatic attacks are also a way for organizations to introduce themselves to the world. The Palestinian attacks during the Munich Olympics unfolded in about one hundred countries and in front of about nine hundred million people. Suddenly, the Palestinian cause was the hot topic of conversation for people who previously did not know about the Palestinians or their cause. Dramatic attacks receiving impressive coverage also bolster support for organizations. Fringe supporters seeing the publicity and success of the operation are swept up in the tide of emotions following an attack. After the Munich Olympics, "thousands of Palestinians rushed to join the terrorist organization."²³¹

Successful operations increase cohesion and morale within any type of organization, but especially a clandestine organization carefully planning the use of its resources. Cohesion and morale are further increased when the media criticizes state governments for their ineffectiveness in combating terrorist attacks. Support for the PIRA increased in the 1970's when a top-secret British military assessment of PIRA was obtained by the terrorist

²³⁰ Bruce Hoffman, "The Modern Terrorist Mindset: Tactics, Targets, and Technologies," in *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 177.

²³¹ Hoffman, "The Internationalization of Terrorism," 74.

organization and released to the public. The assessment stated that PIRA could not be defeated. Not only did this cause the government to look ineffective but also gave courage to supporters of PIRA to take a more active role.²³²

b. Declining Organizations

Inactive terrorist organizations do not maintain active rosters nor do they attract new recruits. As an organization faces possible decline, the group members who have vested interest in continuing the organization, may increase their violence in attempt to change the direction of the group's decline. Increasingly violent attacks demonstrate commitment to the cause and the need to maintain the organization.²³³ If operations are successful, the group may attract new recruits or at least sympathetic supporters. For these reasons, al Qaeda must demonstrate an ability to continue operations despite its leadership remaining in hiding and the majority of its regional training camps disposed. If al Qaeda does not continue to take credit for operations, then possible recruits will look to other organizations. Al Qaeda must continue to demonstrate its ability to be the vanguard of the Salafist jihad.²³⁴ Counter-terrorist activities should monitor those organizations that increase the frequency of their attacks as well as the level of complexity and planning. Those groups that seem to be increasing the rashness of their attacks without thoroughly covering their tracks may be signs of a group in decline.

²³² Baker, "The Need to Learn in Order to Change Effectively," 22.

²³³ Rapoport, 23.

²³⁴ Jenkins, "Knowing our Enemy," 80.

4. Sacrifice and Martyrdom

Organizations demanding sacrifice from their members often elevate those individuals to the status of martyrs for the cause. Praise for martyrdom encourages members to take dangerous risks, knowing that if they should lose their lives completing an operation, their families will be rewarded and regarded with honor. Praise for martyrdom is especially effective in ideological terrorist organizations or those that are religiously-based and teach about earning entrance into a greater afterlife. In the words of an incarcerated terrorist in a Israeli prison,

A martyrdom operation is the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of the more important articles of faith. It is attacks when a member gives his life that earn the most respect and elevate bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom. I am not a murderer. A murderer is someone with a psychological problem; armed actions have a goal. Even if civilians are killed, it is not because we like it or are bloodthirsty. It is a fact of life in a people's struggle. The group doesn't do it because it wants to kill civilians, but because the jihad must go on.²³⁵

This mindset emboldens terrorists to new levels of violence but also justifies acts of terrorism in their minds. Praise for martyrdom and treating martyrdom as the highest honor a member can achieve ensures a future supply of individuals willing to carry out the more dangerous operations. The group must contain high elements of cohesion in order to encourage one another to die for the

²³⁵ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 179.

cause and each other. One interviewee explained his disappointment for not being chosen to participate in an operation as a martyr. He respected and envied those who were selected to die for the cause but understood that his purpose in the organization was not yet over.²³⁶ The use of martyrs is an effective way to use terrorist organization members who are no longer beneficial to the organization or who pose a threat to the group's operational security. Just as cyclical violence and competition increase group cohesion and attract new members, the abundance of martyrs encourages others within the group to desire the same end.

Organizational leadership must continually encourage its members to become martyrs. Established doctrine praising martyrdom and justifying the act of sacrifice aids members in the process of accepting and desiring this fate. Al-Zawahiri of al Qaeda reinforces the need for martyrdom in his publications. Part of al Qaeda's goals includes the use of martyrdom as the most successful way of inflicting damage at the least cost to the organization.²³⁷ Structured groups with training facilities or central command centers where members of the organization congregate before large undertakings are conducive to enticing members to become martyrs. As large organizations evolve into network organizations, the leadership will have to rely on publications and a strong, united ideology to continue encouraging martyrdom. Therefore, as an individual's identity merges with that of the group, and his goals

²³⁶ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 180.

²³⁷ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 23.

reflect the goals of the group, a committed individual will care more about the success of the organization than his own self-preservation.

Norms of Cohesion in Organization: Looking Internally		
Members' Commitment	Shared Fate Against a Greater Threat	Other Influences
-Fanatically held belief	-Competing factions unite against a common enemy	-Level of participation in decision-making
-Fighting for the oppressed	-Unite after suffering at hands of the enemy	-Sacrifice and martyrdom
-Strong ideology	-Cohesion is maintained because of fear of retribution from society and the group for deviance	Cyclical influence: -Media coverage -Increasing violence in declining organizations
-Isolation from society		
-Ties of kin and friendship		
-Public proclamation of commitment		
-Oppressive state measures		
-Oppressive measures by other groups		
-Sense of belonging		
-Time in prison		

Table 7. Summary of Individual Norms Influences Used to Maintain Cohesion in Terrorist Organization: An Internal Look at How Terrorist Organizations Perpetuate Themselves

VII. TYPES OF INFLUENCE ON MEMBERS OF SOCIETY: LOOKING EXTERNALLY

Organizations, in order to continue their existence, must find a means of garnering support from outside sources. This support can be material, financial, or in terms of personnel. The types of influence on the members of society are similar and different to the types of influence on current members of a terrorist organization. A terrorist organization wishing to increase support must justify the group's ideology as well as provide a better comparison group for the potential sympathizer to choose over other groups. Often the methods employed to positively influence members of society require long periods of time in order to reap the benefits.

A. INDOCTRINATION OF THE PUBLIC

1. Purifying Ideology

Continued public support is essential to the long-term survival of terrorist organizations. Public support provides community protection, resources, and personnel. Islamic terrorist groups have been particularly successful in garnering the public's support. The leadership of such organizations, like al-Zawahiri, has introduced the idea of a cultural war into society. Once the public feels that their culture is under siege by another society, the terrorist leadership can manipulate the public into thinking that active terrorist participation is a religious duty in

the name of self-defense.²³⁸ In order to initially gain support of the public by means other than through charitable organizations, ideological terrorist organizations must convince their targeted audiences that their particular brand of ideology or religion is the true way. Currently, Islamic terrorist groups are succeeding by expressing the need to return to the earliest sources of Islam, regardless of a changed world contextually. Interpretations are based on early Islamic scholars like Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah of the Middle Ages, and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab of the eighteenth century. These scholars were the most resilient and unyielding in their own time. Expressing the need to purify Islam allows terrorist organizations to maintain tight control over their constituents' daily lives, eventually leading to submission and internalization of the group's goals because members of society have little contact with other sources. This is the most extreme case of gradual influence on members of society.²³⁹

2. Class Distinction

Other factors of public support include the rise of a middle class in Middle Eastern societies. These individuals no longer want basic necessities, but the luxuries of the elites and those of the Western world. This concept relates to group dynamics discussed in section two. A person will not be content unless they feel they have better opportunities than their comparison group. As television,

²³⁸ Reuven Paz, "The Brotherhood of Global Jihad," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 55.

²³⁹ Ibid., 55.

the Internet, and radio broadcast images of western society into conservative Middle Eastern societies, individuals begin to ask themselves why they cannot enjoy luxury items, like sports cars, mp3 players, etc. At the same time, the middle class begins to blame their own governments on their current state of contempt for not being able to rise any higher. This feeling develops into blame placed on the secular elements in life that have taken the emphasis away from religion. This feeling combined with news stories the middle class hears about decadence in the West seemingly derived from a lack of religion and secular society gives rise to contempt for the West and secular governments. Some members of the middle class then search elsewhere for answers to a more complete life, turning to religion, and in some cases, extremist groups. Note, not all who turn to religion will become terrorists.²⁴⁰

3. Oppression by the State

Terrorist groups play on the frustrations of society. These organizations point out the misdeeds of society and point to the secular governments as tools of oppression of the true religion. These organizations must be careful, as al-Zawahiri emphasizes, not to place the blame entirely on the government and risk alienation by society. Terrorist groups portray the public as the weak victims and objects that need protection. In this sense, the terrorist organizations view and portray themselves to the public as the protectors of their plight, engendering support.²⁴¹

²⁴⁰ Paz, 55.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

When states attempt to maintain order and to respond to terrorist actions with harsh or suppressive methods, the population will either support the heavy-handed actions or reject them in favor of the terrorist organization.²⁴² The reaction of the public largely depends on how the terrorist group previously supported elements of society. As the population wearies of seemingly senseless government searches and intrusions of privacy, the public sympathizes with the organization which it deems as the more promising of the two competing powers. Public sympathy, and in some cases, support, increase the difficulty the state faces in its intelligence gathering process. The public is more willing to cover for operatives and less likely to confess knowledge to the state for fear of guilt by association. As states' demand for information and action increases, the state is forced to use more sweeping, forceful measures. Intrusive actions are susceptible to abuse and scrutiny in the media, further leading the public away from support of the state government. In this scenario, if the public is properly prepared, then the public may begin active support for the terrorist organization as the protector of the public.²⁴³ A successful example on behalf of the terrorist organization to gain the support of the public is the withdrawal of the British from the Suez Canal in 1954, following increased levels of terrorist violence.²⁴⁴

²⁴² Yayla, 37.

²⁴³ Joanne Wright, "Terrorism," in *Terrorist Propaganda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 10.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 18.

4. Dramatic Acts of Violence

a. Draw Attention

Violence itself may draw attention to the group and cause sympathizers to rally to active participation. Dramatic acts of violence attract attention, evoke alarm, instigate crisis, and force governments to divert resources to means of security.²⁴⁵ Violent attacks as previously mentioned bring attention to the cause. The operation conducted during the Munich Olympics drew enough attention to the group to warrant the group a legitimate cause in the world. Evidence of this is the invitation Yassir Arafat, the leader of the PLO, received to address the UN General Assembly eighteen months after the operation. The PLO was given special observer status in the UN after Arafat's speech. Before the operation, much the of world did not know about or understand the cause of the PLO.²⁴⁶ Other groups, like the ASG, experienced an increase in membership and support following periods of increased violence despite the loss of leadership or pressure from authorities.²⁴⁷

b. Effects on States Fighting Terrorism

Violent acts of terrorism cause governments to redirect resources to preventing terrorism. In the case of the U.S., the attacks of September 11, 2001, shaped the country's foreign policy. The attacks caused hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, caused a setback to the

²⁴⁵ Jenkins, "Chapter 8: The New Age of Terrorism," 123.

²⁴⁶ Hoffman, "The Internationalization of Terrorism," 74-74.

²⁴⁷ Miller, 137-138.

economy, and are still influencing domestic politics.²⁴⁸ The country initiated a new Global War on Terrorism, enacted the Patriot Act, reorganized the intelligence community, and initiated the invasion of Afghanistan followed by Iraq. These broad measures, while perhaps necessary for the protection of the country and its citizens, detract from resources providing for internal activities and reforms. Eventually citizens will tire of this state of affairs and lessen their support of their own government. The people may not necessarily support the terrorist organizations by any means but are not necessarily vigilant for them nor proactive against them.

In addition to affecting domestic policies, violent terrorist attacks can affect allied or coalition operations. In Iraq in 2004, Iraqi insurgents kidnapped, beheaded, or threatened to behead foreign nationals who were noncombatants in the area helping to reconstruct Iraq. Countries felt pressure as body counts increased to remove themselves from an unstable region. As a result, the Philippines pulled out of the coalition force and no new countries were willing to join. The acts of violence forced aid organizations to suspend or reduce their activities, thereby slowing economic reconstruction and prolonging the misery that facilitated further recruiting by insurgents. The people of these war torn areas must choose to support the entity that will most ensure their survival. If the people feel violence is continuing because of a foreign presence inciting insurgents and also feel abandoned by forces without the resources to provide for them, then their

²⁴⁸ Jenkins, "Chapter 8: The New Age of Terrorism," 127.

support will fall to the insurgents. A balance must be found between a large enough presence to make progress without inciting further violence.²⁴⁹

c. Media Coverage

Violent acts of terrorism result in widespread media coverage. An effective terrorist organization knows how to take advantage of this media. Immediate press reports and live coverage of the attack demonstrate the urgency and importance of the cause through the rash acts of violence. The media, regardless of each editor's slant, produces a piece of propaganda for the terrorist organization. This propaganda influences public opinion about the size, power, and ideology of a terrorist organization. Effectively used, propaganda can incite members of society to passive and even active support. Media coverage also provides sympathetic members of society desiring a way to be more active an example of how to proceed with active participation.²⁵⁰

5. Martyrdom Evangelism

Societies revere their heroes. The Samurai of Japan were revered for their willingness to die defending the Emperor. American Revolutionaries were romanticized for shedding blood in a fight for independence. Crusaders were promised an expedited entrance into heaven for their personal sacrifice. Fundamentalist Islamic society praises its warriors who sacrifice themselves in defense of their

²⁴⁹ Jenkins, "Chapter 8: The New Age of Terrorism," 127.

²⁵⁰ Joanne Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," in *Terrorist Propaganda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 74.

religion for Allah. Societies respect the individual who is able to place the needs of the group above his own desire to live.

a. Iran

The concept of martyrdom is especially revered by Shi'ite Muslims, dating back to the death of Husayn, one of the first caliphates who martyred himself. Depending on the interpretation of the Koran, it is also preached by religious and nationalist Sunni leaders. Ayatollah Khomeini prior to the Iranian Revolution revived the concept of martyrdom which was adopted by the Sunni Moslem Palestinian program.²⁵¹ Stories circulated through Iran of young new recruits, eagerly running onto the battlefield against Iraq without weapons. These recruits, recently general members of society and often adolescents, were eager to show their bravery and even sacrifice themselves. Iranians were repeatedly told the virtues of sacrificing young children as martyrs for Allah. Material compensation and places of honor were promised to families of martyrs.²⁵² Public education and indoctrination began at a young age for these individuals. Television programs, school curriculums, and religious leaders extolled the concept of martyrdom, making its act one of the most respected in the society. This same approach was also used with Spartans and the Samurai to indoctrinate entire populations to seek sacrifice for the good of the group.

²⁵¹ Daphne Burdman, "Education, Indoctrination, and Incitement: Palestinian Children on Their Way to Martyrdom," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 1 (2003): 97.

²⁵² Ledeen, 20-21.

b. Al Qaeda

Before 9/11, al Qaeda did not need to make strong appeals for recruitment. As a safety precaution to the group's long-term existence in the face of battle against U.S. forces, the organization disseminated videos and electronic material praising jihadists. Al Qaeda disseminated a professional quality recruiting video in Muslim communities. This video was seized by American authorities in the spring of 2002. The purpose of the video was to attract short-term membership in the form of martyrs. The videotape was seven minutes long and praised the virtues of martyrdom for al Qaeda and Allah and showed pictures of twenty-seven martyrs with information of their origin and where they died. A concluding segment featured twelve of the martyrs with a voice over stating: "They rejoice in the bounty provided by Allah: And with regard to those left behind who have not yet joined them in their bliss, the martyrs glory in the fact that on them is no fear, nor have they cause to grieve."²⁵³ The video ends with contact information on how to join al Qaeda for the purpose of becoming a martyr and the Black Banner Center for Islamic Information.²⁵⁴

c. PLO

In areas of Palestinian influence, children are urged to violent actions against Israelis even when it is likely that they will be injured or die. They are

²⁵³ Hoffman, "Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: an Assessment," 10.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 10

encouraged to desire rather than fear the opportunity, because they will find a place in Paradise with Allah. They will be revered as heroes in the land of the living since they have attained the highest honor in Islamic society.²⁵⁵ Recent agreements between Israel and the PLO demand no recruitment of children as martyrs, an entire generation of Palestinian children, now young adults, grew up listening to television, radio, and school teachers profess the honor of martyrdom. These influences on society are effective when carried out for a long period of time, over the course of more than one generation. A society groomed to accept violence as a means of expressing devotion to a belief are more willing to accept missions of martyrdom. Praise for martyrdom and the material rewards accompanying the act are the two areas that counterterrorism forces should focus on to break the cohesion of these supporters. Using alternative explanations of the Koran for martyrdom and restricting the financial resources providing the material rewards to martyrs' families may be one method of countering societies accustomed to and accepting of martyrdom.

6. Indoctrination of Children

Organizations which have strong influence on members of society focus on indoctrination of young children. Youth are the most impressionable and trusting individuals in society. Their early experiences will shape their futures. By recruiting children and exposing them to the benefits and goals of an organization at an early age romanticizes membership within that organization. These youth may join

²⁵⁵ Burdman, 97.

either as young children or seek opportunity when older. Gaining the support of children provides groups with longevity. As of the year 1982, forty-one states had mobilized children to military activity by the age of seven.²⁵⁶ This staggering statistic is alarming not only because of the youth of these individuals but because entire generations in some regions of the world have been indoctrinated with violence almost their entire lives. Counterterrorism policies must understand that countering deep seated beliefs such as these will take time, be a gradual process, and not always result in success.

a. Education

Palestinian organizations may be the most fervent in their indoctrination of children. In 1982, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah, and Lebanon under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, drafted children from age twelve into active service and children of age seven were part of the Palestinian intifada.²⁵⁷ These organizations were similar to Hitler's Youth during World War II that enabled an entire society to allow devastation.

The Palestinian Authority used official textbooks, specifically developed teachers' training guides, summer camps similar to military training camps, and television campaign advertisements emphasizing a message of violence, and escalating to advocate to children their willingness to self-sacrifice for Palestine and for Allah. Palestine is not the only authority to aggressively target children. The

²⁵⁶ Burdman, 97.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

United States in the late 1980's and 1990's began an aggressive anti-drug campaign across the nation and in schools using many of the same methods. The unsettling idea is the success of the anti-drug campaign may be similar to results from Palestine's aggressive campaign.

The Palestinian campaign left no part of a child's life untouched by indoctrination. Beginning in 1948, Palestinian children have been educated with anti-Israel books printed in Egypt and Jordan. In 1967, Israel took over the West Bank and Gaza. Anti-Israel statements were deleted from books but secret copies were still promulgated and taught at UNWRA schools of the refugee camps. In 1993, after signing the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority under Yasser Arafat, assumed control of education. Despite the requirements of the Oslo Accords, the deleted anti-Israel incitement material was immediately reinstated.²⁵⁸ Excerpts from pre-2000 texts include, "The youth will not tire, They desire to be free or perish, We draw our water from death, And we will not be as slaves to the enemy."²⁵⁹ These concepts are used not only in civics texts and texts on Islam but in every subject taught including Arabic language and grammar exercises, such as the following: "Determine what is the subject, and what is the predicate, in the following sentences: The jihad is a religious duty of every Moslem man and woman."²⁶⁰

²⁵⁸ Burdman, 98.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., 99.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

b. Television, Internet, Media

Before September 2000, during the 'Al Aqsa intifada', newspapers and television programs advocated that children should sacrifice their lives for Jihad in the fight against Israel.²⁶¹ Television campaigns featured emotional music that is often played at funeral processions for fallen Hamas and Islamic Jihad shahedeen.²⁶² A television clip tells seven and eight-year-old children, "The time for toys and games is over, throw away your toys, pick up rocks," and shows this happening.²⁶³ Another clip from PATV shows girls of about twelve with head covers waving flags. One girl in the clip proclaims,

We must all get together, we the children, to expel the enemy Israel. All we ask is that the countries stand by our side, to help us, we'll go and kill them, on our own, murder them, shoot them all. Just give us weapons, the boys and girls. We will kill them all. We won't leave a single Jew here.²⁶⁴

Other clips express praise for martyrdom and show children excited to sacrifice their lives for Allah and telling their parents not to cry. In 1998, television programs used the song and asked children to recite , "Ask from us blood, We will drench you...When I wander into Jerusalem I'll turn into a feda'ye [warrior who sacrifices

²⁶¹ Burdman, 98.

²⁶² Ibid., 102.

²⁶³ Ibid., 103.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

himself]..."²⁶⁵ Although textbooks post-September 2000, have been sanitized, the message is delivered and driven home by verbal inputs of the teacher, as outlined in Palestinian Authority Teachers' Guides, without any improprieties appearing in printed textbooks.²⁶⁶

c. Children's Participation

Despite agreements to remove inciting statements, children are still indoctrinated in this region to a life of violence. Statistics taken from PATV in 2000 report that 95 individuals out of 207 (46 percent) martyred due to involvement in insurgency actions were children under the age of 18 in a twenty-five day period. Palestinian statistics quoted by Moughrabi indicate that in three months, 105 deaths involved children as martyrs, constituting 30 percent of the total number of deaths. In a report with data from 30 September 2000, through 31 August 2002, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) listed 60 attacks. Of those, six were under the age of 18 (ten percent).²⁶⁷ Concern over the education of children is noteworthy due to the theory of social movement that states, "later generations tend to take ideology and collective action further—the more intense a member's socialization is, the 'stronger the impetus to act.'" ²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 98.

²⁶⁶ Burdman, 102.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 105.

²⁶⁸ Caron Gentry, "The Relationship Between New Social Movement Theory and Terrorism Studies: The Role of Leadership, Membership, Ideology, and Gender," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 283.

B. SOCIAL WELFARE

1. Hamas

Organizations go to great lengths to provide basic support services for members of their targeted audiences. Hamas gained enough popular support over time to begin winning elections in its region. Hamas worked with the poorest sectors of society as an unofficial charity and social work system.²⁶⁹ These organizations focused on providing education to future, potential recruits from kindergarten through the university level. Hamas also ran health clinics, sports organizations, and orphanages in the Occupied Territories. Unofficial estimates conclude that Hamas spends up to sixty percent of its income on charitable and social service activities.²⁷⁰

2. IRA

Organizations desiring a new government or separatist organizations focus their social welfare support on a specific constituency. The IRA is an unofficial support system for catholic families. The IRA provides for and legally protects these families when the state government fails to do so. The LTTE is similar in its services to the Eelam Tamils. The LTTE provides education, health, and welfare services to the Eelam Tamil diaspora.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹ Moghaddam, 3.

²⁷⁰ Cragin, 35.

²⁷¹ Moghaddam, 3.

3. Aum Shinrikyo

Sometimes the services provided by organizations are two-fold. These organizations use social support organizations as a business front for other activities. For example, Aum Shinrikyo undertakes both legal and illegal business ventures. Some of these overlap. The organization operates hospitals and health clinics serving the public, but these same facilities are used by scientists who gather pathogen cultures for seemingly benign purposes. Unfortunately, Aum Shinrikyo was actually collecting these samples in order to test chemical agents.²⁷² Due to the religious nature of the organization, the provision of medical services did not raise any alarms with anti-terrorist watch groups. In fact, Aum Shinrikyo was able to establish cells in the United States without raising suspicion. The U.S. did not want to create tensions with Japan by investigating a religious organization. Aum Shinrikyo slid under the radar by first establishing non-profit organizations and then gradually opened for-profit businesses at the same locations involved with the procurement of gas masks.²⁷³ The success of this business venture highlights the advantage terrorist organizations have in relatively open, accepting countries. These states are less likely to investigate suspicious activity for fear of offending a foreign entity or its own domestic populace.

²⁷² Parachini, 27.

²⁷³ Ibid., 29.

4. Hezbollah

Hezbollah, like Hamas, undertakes social welfare programs in order to gain the trust, respect, and support of the local population. Hezbollah provides health care, food, education, and financial services to local populations. The success of these operations is evident by the election of Hezbollah members to seats in the Lebanese Parliament.²⁷⁴ Often at odds with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hezbollah prevents its supporters from defecting or becoming discouraged by repairing and rebuilding homes destroyed by the IDF. Hezbollah established a unit called the Campaign for Reconstruction Institution specifically for repairing damaged homes.²⁷⁵ Including the aftermath of IDF Operation Accountability in 1993, and Grapes of Wrath in 1996, Hezbollah repaired more than one thousand homes between 1988 and 1991.²⁷⁶ In addition to providing for local villages, Hezbollah established a Martyrs' Foundation. This foundation financially and materially supports the families of deceased members of the organization. A Resupply Committee gives relief to the poor. Looking out for the future support of Hezbollah, the organization runs summer camps and soccer leagues in southern villages. These athletic associations provide a service to the community but also allow the organization to identify talented, athletic youth.²⁷⁷ The wide range of welfare activities supported by Hezbollah led to growing support, even among Lebanese

²⁷⁴ Ledeen, 27.

²⁷⁵ Cragin, 51.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 44.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 45.

Christians. This growing support and demonstration of social responsibility allows Hezbollah to survive leadership changes and to evolve into a recognized (by some entities) political organization.

5. Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda has a vast network of charitable cover organizations established in offices around the world, including the United States. Often, though, these charitable organizations are a front to funding extremist groups.²⁷⁸ The network of these organizations flourishes in countries with liberal laws leaning more towards liberty than security. Some of the charities linked to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda include the Saudi Arabia-based International Islamic Relief Organization, Qatar Charitable Organization, Help Africa People in Kenya, Malaria Research Project in Somalia, and Mercy International in Kenya.²⁷⁹ Terrorist organizations operate numerous businesses, legal and illegal, in order to cover for the clandestine funding of extremist groups. For example, in 1993, Osama bin Laden began operating legitimate businesses in Kenya as a gateway to Somalia. One business was in the diamond industry, another in the fishing industry, and the third was an Islamic charity. This charity, was specifically for "victims of American aggression."²⁸⁰ The specific cause of a charity may provide links and information about the

²⁷⁸ Ledeen, 36.

²⁷⁹ Gunaratna, 256.

²⁸⁰ Paul L. Williams, "Formula for Terror," in *al Qaeda Brotherhood of Terror* (United States of America: Alpha Books and Pearson Education, Inc., 2002), 84.

background of the organization supporting the charity. The United States and other countries encounter difficulties investigating these organizations which seem charitable and legitimate for fear of using selective targeting against certain religious or ethnic groups. As a result of the liberal laws in many Western countries, these organizations continue to operate rather freely, funneling charitable donations to terrorist organizations.²⁸¹

C. MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES

The Afghan Arabs understood the importance of community support. After the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, Sheik Abdallah Azzam used the strong bonds of cohesion formed by fighting a greater threat to encourage the remaining Afghan Arab fighters to avoid fighting against one another but to unite against Christian encroachment on traditionally Muslim territories. He rejected internal Muslim fighting as fitna and only focused on those lands that had once been in Muslim hands, such as the Philippines, Palestine, and Spain, but not Egypt, Jordan, or Syria.²⁸² This evolution of the jihad demonstrates the principle of internal cohesion amongst current members increasing due to an outside threat. Additionally, this example also highlights society's tendency to accept a radical organizations so long as the organizations do not target the immediate society. Later, American infidel troops on holy land would also cause Muslims who traditionally did not agree to cooperate with one another. In this case, the

²⁸¹ Paz, 59.

²⁸² Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 18.

members of society could choose between two evils: Saddam Hussein or infidel Westerners. To the people of the society in the Middle East, infidels were the worst of the two. Individuals of society are more tolerant of their own members than foreigners. For this reason, uniting various Muslim factions increased the tolerance and support for extremist organizations in the region.

More formal methods of influence on society are also implemented by terrorist organizations. In 2001, in *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner*, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined six methods of influence to use against the rest of society in this global jihad of al-Qaeda: "(1) The United Nations.(2) The friendly rulers of Muslim peoples. (3) The multinational corporations. (4) The international news agencies and satellite media channels. (6) The international relief agencies, which are used as a cover for espionage, proselytizing, coup planning and the transfer of weapons."²⁸³ Al-Zawahiri stresses the importance of mobilization of the Muslim masses. In order to gain their support, al-Zawahiri advocates providing services for the Muslim people and taking an active role in sharing and alleviating their concerns. He notes that until the members of al Qaeda and similar organizations take proper care of the masses, the people will not fully support the organization. Strikingly, al-Zawahiri communicates the importance of members of the organization taking personal responsibility for providing for the people. He warns members from blaming state governments for the plight of the people. Casting blame on others will potentially alienate

²⁸³ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 20.

the masses. Services for the people are achieved through the various organizations al Qaeda and associates set up in order to aid local populations. The principle behind this effort is that the masses will support those who provide their basic needs.²⁸⁴

D. MEDIA COVERAGE

Media coverage gives legitimacy to terrorist organizations. By airing the causes of the groups and highlighting their plight or mentioning affiliated organizations with the groups (NGOs) the media alerts the public to the cause of the organization. This publicity provides those who might be sympathetic with a link to more information. The Hamas-funded Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) in Richardson, Texas, is an example. Once this organization and its location is public, individuals sympathetic to the cause have a place to pursue their desire for more action.²⁸⁵

A terrorist act that does not receive media attention loses its effectiveness. A successful attack results in media coverage detailing the attack and the message of the organization. Success occurs when newspapers and internet sites publish analyses about the organization. The time and resources dedicated to these analyses symbolize the growing strength of the organization. Governments and society must consider these organizations once the media begins to give

²⁸⁴ Sageman, "The Origins of the Jihad," 20.

²⁸⁵ Raphael F. Perl, "Terrorism, the Media, and the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers," in *Terrorism in Perspective*, ed. Pamala L. Griest and Sue Mahan, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2003), 145.

them a legitimate voice.²⁸⁶ Media coverage is also beneficial to organizations when the press analyzes ongoing events such as hostage situations. Experts close to the government who understand the political and military context of the situation openly discuss possible actions for resolving the crisis. These analyses give warning to the terrorist organizations about the possible options and leanings of the states' actions.²⁸⁷

1. Three Types of Audiences

a. Uncommitted Audience

Terrorist organizations must utilize different methods of propaganda and use of media on different types of audiences. The three main types are the uncommitted, sympathetic, and active audiences. The uncommitted audience consists of the general public of the country in which the organization operates and international public opinion.²⁸⁸ Propaganda targeted at this audience is general in nature. It introduces the uncommitted audience to the basic aims of the group. The goals of the group are often discussed in a way to compare the current state of affairs for members of the uncommitted audience to the end state of the organization. Reactionary measures taken by the state in response to terrorist attacks represent the oppressive

²⁸⁶ Terry Anderson, "Terrorism and Censorship: The Media in Chains," in *Terrorism in Perspective*, ed. Pamala L. Griest and Sue Mahan, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2003), 150.

²⁸⁷ Perl, 145.

²⁸⁸ Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," 77.

manner of the state. Propaganda at this level focuses on discrediting the state and providing an outlet for future support.²⁸⁹

One method of attacking the credibility of the state is to "accuse it of unlawful and surreptitious actions" or claiming irresponsibility and practices of torture on prisoners by security forces.²⁹⁰ The most recent examples of these methods include the United States own internal difficulties faced after discovery of the National Security Agency's surveillance programs. Detainees held in Guantanamo Bay routinely claim inhumane treatment under custody of the United States military. The liberal laws of the state allow its citizens liberties but reduce their security. Terrorist organizations are aided in such societies where the citizens themselves begin to protest protective measures undertaken by the state. Claiming practices of torture is a common method used to attempt to represent the state as the oppressor of the people.

Historical examples include the allegations of torture and brutality conducted by British authorities against members of the PIRA since August 1971.²⁹¹ The PIRA issued statements less than a month after their detonation of a bomb at the Conservative Party's conference in Brighton bearing striking resemblance to today's statements from Osama bin Laden. Gerry Adams described the attack as a result of Britain's occupation. Owen Carron, elected as Westminster MP, condemned the violence, but stated,

²⁸⁹ Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," 79.

²⁹⁰ Ibid. 82.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 92.

the major part of violence is created and maintained by Britain. All other violence is a counter to the state violence of the security forces. The real terrorists are the UDR and the Police.²⁹²

This effective use of the media targets the uncommitted audience as it transfers blame directly to the state. Justifications are used to explain the stance of the terrorist organization to the commoner. The PIRA explained to the public that their constituency had long suffered from oppression by the British and could not settle for partial agreements. The PIRA displayed confidence in their goal and ability to achieve it.²⁹³ Like Osama bin Laden's messages of today, the PIRA announced it was ready for a long struggle against the moral transgressions committed by the British. Al Qaeda justifies its violence to the uncommitted audience by discussing the need for a long-term struggle for religious purity in a land that was once Islamic but not overrun with western infidels.

For other terrorist organizations, propaganda targets the uncommitted audience in order to distribute the organization's ideology. This approach is especially true for organizations not widely known or understood. In the case of the FLQ and the kidnapping of Laporte, the simple act of media coverage gave more leverage to the terrorist organization, forcing the government to act in the open. In this scenario, terrorist organizations are elevated to equal status as state governments. For this reason, state governments are selective about the level of representatives

²⁹² Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," 92.

²⁹³ Ibid.

they send as emissaries to foreign states and non-state actors.²⁹⁴ The FLQ achieved one of its main goals of distributing its manifesto through Canadian radio during the kidnapping negotiations. The kidnappings were receiving large amounts of press coverage and while the group retreated on several of its demands, it did not back down from demanding the distribution of its manifesto.²⁹⁵ This use of the media on the uncommitted audience was before the influence of the Internet. Information read on the air waves that was heard in each Canadian's household on the radio sent a powerful message. A group with the ability to force its message onto the radio had determination, organization, and strength. Uncommitted members of society unfamiliar with the organization or issue could be persuaded that the group had more power than it actually did. These members of society are the most easily influenced because they could also come to think that a larger number of Quebec Canadians supported the notion of a separate Quebec than actually did. This influence could have potentially influenced future referendums on the topic. Again, the FLQ also gained possible support and shed negative light on the state during the negotiation process. The state made illegal arrests leading to public criticism from the Quebec Journalists Union. Public criticism from respected sources legitimized the demands of the terrorist organization. This criticism even caused members of a previously uncommitted society to withdraw support from the state after the media criticized the illegal arrests.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ Rapoport, 71.

²⁹⁵ Ibid., 70.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., 72.

Influence of the uncommitted audience can be a gradual process. Ayatollah Khomeini used subtle means to educate the general public about his cause. He used audio cassette tapes to distribute his revolutionary sermons to Iran.²⁹⁷ Due to the subtle and gradual infiltration of his ideas, when he did make a physical move to remove the shah, the former regime was taken by surprise. These tapes, in order to be effective though, needed to reach the masses and not just a small elite. The uncommitted audience must feel that their introduction to new ideas has already been accepted by a majority of the remaining public.

The media is able to convey messages to the general public and influence general opinion, in some cases, enough to change or demand policy action or change. Reagan's handling of TWA flight 847's hostages allowed terrorism to become a legitimate tool for negotiation. Due to intense domestic pressure, the Reagan administration then compelled Israel to work with the terrorists for the release of the hostages. In exchange for the hostages, 756 imprisoned Shi'a were released to Hezbollah.²⁹⁸ Members of the media, while supposedly objective, can feel compassion for the hostages and act as an instrument on their behalf. A CBS White House correspondent explained the media wanted to force the Administration to place the hostages lives above foreign policy.²⁹⁹ U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzinski, explained their feelings about media coverage during a

²⁹⁷ Ledeen, 17.

²⁹⁸ Hoffman, "Terrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion," 133.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 134.

hostage crisis: "The febrile television coverage afforded to hijackings and hostage situations involving American citizens complicates and undermines governmental efforts to obtain their release."³⁰⁰ Policy options are limited when the event is public knowledge on television before the government has time to implement different options. This gives adversaries an idea of what the government's options are and how the public supports them. Terrorists use the media to force the hand of governments to make a decision rather than exhausting all policy options. Lloyd Cutler, counselor to President Carter during the Iran Hostage Crisis explains, "If an ominous foreign event is featured on TV news, the President and his advisors feel bound to make a response in time for the next evening news program."³⁰¹ The focus of the media is not necessarily on the causes of the terrorist attack, at least not initially, but on the human elements of the tragedy.³⁰² The larger picture is largely ignored while policy-makers are pressured to find satisfying measures to quickly resolve the issue. The time constraints pressure governments to act without being given the time to thoroughly analyze the situation and formulate effective responses.³⁰³

Terrorist organizations use the media to target the uncommitted audience and to show the weaknesses of state governments, but the media can also be used against terrorist organizations. Media coverage is easily slanted, but can be used to exploit the weaknesses of organizations.

³⁰⁰ Hoffman, "Terrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion," 143.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 151.

³⁰² Ibid., 140.

³⁰³ Ibid., 151.

For example, Abimael Guzman, leader of the Shining Path, was tracked down and captured by following his use of medications for medical conditions. His capture was largely orchestrated by the Peruvian authorities and press to show Guzman as a foolish criminal. Cameras filmed him from a distance to make him seem like a dangerous animal instead of in an intimate setting. In the video, he appears to be shouting because he was unaware that the microphones were actually much closer to him. By using these techniques, the media was able to avoid Guzman's capture as a potential rallying point for Shining Path members. Instead, their organization no longer appeared to be a threat and was not feared.³⁰⁴ The uncommitted audience after this point no longer allowed itself to be swayed by the organization.

b. Sympathetic Audience

The sympathetic audience consists of individuals already familiar with an organization's goals. This audience contains the people most likely to provide food, shelter, and other basic necessities to operatives for a night without asking questions. This audience does not easily give information to authorities and contains the pool of potential recruits for the organization.³⁰⁵ The sympathetic audience, once determined that this set of people agree with the aims of the organization, need to be prepared to accept that the only way of achieving those aims

³⁰⁴ Pamala L. Griest and Sue Mahan, "Reporting Terrorism," in *Terrorism in Perspective*, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2003), 137.

³⁰⁵ Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," 77.

is through violence. Arguments, justifications, and pleas for action are more strongly worded when targeting this group.

For example, Hezbollah has its own television station which is used to cover operations carried out by Hezbollah as well as to interview and brief foreign journalists.³⁰⁶ Owning a television station allows an organization to broadcast its own form of propaganda, focusing on the specific audience it chooses. Justifications and interviews are tailored to continue justifying the group's ideology as well as providing sympathizers with a link to the organization as how to become more involved. Hezbollah has various websites which focus on different parts of their overall goal. Hezbollah can monitor which sites receive the most hits to determine what types of audiences they are attracting. Then the organization can tailor its recruiting methods to the interests of those monitoring their websites.³⁰⁷

Publications aimed at the sympathetic audience are more likely to be written in language that attracts the sympathetic reader and not the general public. The Red Army Faction (RAF) used a writing style in its manifestos, analytical papers, and pamphlets that would only attract readers with left-wing interests.³⁰⁸ These written forms of propaganda targeting a sympathetic audience rationalized the need for violence as a retort against the oppressive actions of the state. Publications highlighted instances of the

³⁰⁶ Edwards and Zanini, 42.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 43.

³⁰⁸ Wright, "The Sympathetic Audience," 106.

government sending police to stop student demonstrations, and the use of state surveillance preventing RAF members from meeting to hold non-violent meetings. These pressures, explained the propaganda, left no alternative for the group but violence.³⁰⁹

With the increasingly availability of technology as discussed in the previous section on means of maintaining cohesion within the organization, technology such as the Internet is another mode of communication to target sympathetic or curious members of society. Al-Qaeda had an official, though, short-lived website containing poetry justifying the need for a jihad as well as critical analysis of American military and academic counterterrorist publications.³¹⁰ A public website that is accessible to those with an Internet connection allows the general population as well as those with a more serious interest to learn more about the organization besides what is expressed through commercial media conduits.

Robust terrorist organizations do not only use their own publications and resources as avenues of spreading their intent. Setmariam, before September 11, 2001, worked diligently to disseminate jihadist ideology to potentially sympathetic audience members. He cooperated with official, state-run organizations such as the Information Ministry of the Islamic Ministry of Afghanistan, Radio Kabul, and the Al-Ghuraba Center for Studies. Within these organizations, he wrote and published articles and video cassettes

³⁰⁹ Wright, "The Sympathetic Audience," 109.

³¹⁰ Ledeen, 18.

discussing and encouraging jihadist ideology.³¹¹ Note that these organizations, though state-run, were run by a state with a government, the Taliban, supportive and cooperative of al Qaeda. In the future, extremist articles such as these should be closely monitored as to which publications are accepting them. Organizations and the state which support those publications may be supportive or at least sympathetic to extremist organizations. A society which only has access to one frame of mind for ideology as was the case in Afghanistan, has no alternative sources for beliefs and is more likely to accept and eventually support terrorist organizations.

Terrorist and other organizations must know the sympathetic audience they are trying to attract for active support and be culturally sensitive. For example, the PIRA, wanting to recruit support from American Irish, painted over a mural in Belfast depicting cooperation between the PLO and PIRA, recognizing that Americans would not want to associate a group in cooperation with the PLO. By tailoring the speech and appeals, an organization is more likely to connect with a sympathetic audience that is culturally different. Links in two cultures' histories can be powerful means of cohesion. The United States and Britain have remained close allies despite recent differences because of the shared history between the two cultures. The PIRA can appeal to Irish Americans who still want to have a connection to their homeland by comparing the American Revolutionary War to the desire the Irish have to be independent from Britain as well. These types of appeals

³¹¹ Cruickshank and Ali, 5.

work well with diaspora populations. The concept of a culture being injured and needing redemption is a powerful emotional appeal.³¹²

c. Active Audience

The active audience includes recruits, active members, and incarcerated members of a terrorist organization. These individuals take part in the planning, training, and execution of operations. These audience members are self-confessed participants in the organization.³¹³ Propaganda aimed at active members of the group serve to reinforce their beliefs, justify violence, and to resolve any feelings of guilt an individual may have over committing a terrorist attack.³¹⁴ Propaganda reinforces cyclical violence and competition between various groups to become center stage in the larger organization's plans.³¹⁵ The participation of producing publications and propaganda aimed at the uncommitted and sympathetic audiences simultaneously reinforces the foundation of the active audience by reminding them of the principles and norms of the group and increasing their cohesion as they work to bring others into the group.³¹⁶

Important types of propaganda directed toward an active audience are receptacles for the storage of the organization's knowledge. Setmariam posted a sixteen

³¹² Wright, "The Uncommitted Audience," 74.

³¹³ Ibid., 77.

³¹⁴ Joanne Wright, "The Active Audience," in *Terrorist Propaganda* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 142.

³¹⁵ Ibid., 146.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 140.

hundred page book to the Internet, *The Call for Global Islamic Resistance*. This book focuses on the nature of future conflict and battles for jihadists. The book is a culmination of this leader's thinking as to how the international jihad should be strategically and tactically battled.³¹⁷ This propaganda reinforces the belief in the jihad, encourages distant nodes to continue their fight, and provides a common baseline for a widespread network. Videotapes of Setmariam's lectures in al Qaeda training camps circulate through the network.³¹⁸ These videotapes are akin to the website postings but in a different format, that must be physically captured instead of technically intercepted in order to harm the network. These videotapes are guidelines for future members of the organization to follow when carrying out their acts. Again, publications originating from the organization's leadership will increase the cohesive bonds between cells as they receive the same information from the training videos.

d. Summary of Audience Types

Each of the three audiences requires slightly different indoctrination in order to lead to active participation. A strong organization will focus a portion of its resources to producing propaganda targeting each different audience. Counter-terrorism strategies should also apply the same strategy and use an aggressive propaganda war in order to prevent further individuals from becoming sympathetic and subsequently active audience

³¹⁷ Cruickshank and Ali, 2.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 3.

members. Providing alternatives and differing, concise opinions will prevent entire societies from falling under the influence of a single organization. At the same time, counter-terrorism strategies must include cultural sensitivity to avoid offending individuals and leading them to support terrorist organizations as a more suitable alternative.

E. RECRUITMENT

Recruitment of new terrorist members into their organizations must be a constant operation. While recruitment is constant, so is attrition.³¹⁹ Members become too old to be of operational use, they defect to competing organizations, or are killed during operations.

As mentioned previously, recruitment often stems from propaganda which must be tailored to the specific audience to include its cultural, social, and historical context.³²⁰ Religious terrorist groups place special emphasis on recruitment because part of their mission is to build a larger base of converts to their ideology. Part of this involves actively recruiting and proselytizing potential recruits.³²¹ One of the basic assumptions of this thesis is that terrorists are difficult to profile and do not meet a specific profile. Recruits, therefore, do not meet specific background criteria, though some circumstances in regions of the world do create favorable conditions for recruitment.

³¹⁹ Jenkins, "An Appreciation for the Situation," 28.

³²⁰ Sara Daly and Scott Gerwehr, "Chapter 5: Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. David Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 74, www.RAND.org. (accessed February 12, 2007).

³²¹ Jenkins, "Knowing our Enemy," 84.

For example, Islamic terrorist organizations focus their recruiting on two types of individuals. Martyrs are recruited from populations of little to no prospect of social or economic advancement. These individuals are often highly devoted to their religion. Terrorist organizations also recruit long-term members from the more middle-class members of society. These individuals may have specific technical or language skills needed by the organization. These recruits come from all over the world and differing economic situations. Diaspora communities provide excellent sources of potential recruits who are frustrated with their inability to meet raised expectations of material wealth.³²²

Individuals join groups for different reasons depending on their background. Some join because they view the organization as the only means of change. Others join organization out of political or religious motivation. Regardless,

Potential terrorist group members often start out as sympathizers of the group. Recruits often come from support organizations, such as prisoner support groups or student activist groups. From sympathizer, one moves to passive supporter. Often, violent encounters with police or other security forces motivate an already socially alienated individual to join a terrorist group.³²³

Examples of individuals joining a terrorist organization from a support group include ETA personnel who were originally members of the support group, 'Act Women!' This feminist movement worked with the Henri Batasuna party, part of the ETA's political wing. While in support roles, the

³²² Jenkins, "An Appreciation for the Situation," 38.

³²³ Hudson, 36.

women became frustrated with the treatment of prisoners and decided the best way to counteract the abuse was to join the ETA itself.³²⁴

Sometimes recruitment is a formal indoctrination process, and at other times, it is an informal process either self-initiated or through personal contacts. Common techniques of recruitment include initial contact between potential recruit and recruiting resulting in subsequent and more in-depth contact, and subsequent interaction leading to identity transformation by the recruit.³²⁵ This process includes the norms of group processes and cohesion as explained in the second section of this thesis.

1. Models of Recruitment

The following sections will discuss the models of recruitment, the net, funnel, infection, and seed crystal.³²⁶ These are not original ideas in this thesis but incorporated with factual examples to demonstrate how terrorist groups interact with and affect society.

a. Net Model of Recruitment

In the net model of recruitment, each member of a specific population is targeted equitably, for example, by being sent videotapes or reading material in the mail. When recruiting is undertaken, the organization must properly prime the population with other propaganda so that the

³²⁴ Hudson., 40.

³²⁵ Daly and Gerwehr, 86.

³²⁶ Ibid., 76.

population is ready for recruitment into the active audience phase. Homogenous populations work well for the net model because a single approach is needed to reach a large number of individuals. The net is also effective when the targeted population contains little to no serious resistance to the organization's ideology.³²⁷

An example of the net model would be a mosque headed by an imam widely recognized as an extremist. Those who attend are ready to receive the recruiting pitch without additional preparation. This would be effective in regions such as the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, which is known to have a population sympathetic to al-Qaeda.³²⁸ Other net models of recruitment include lengthy education processes. Madrassas, responsible for the education of large numbers of Muslim children, mostly male, tailor curriculums based on the specific ideology of the madrassas' leadership. In some cases, the basics of mathematics and science are largely ignored. The focus of sixteen years' worth of education is on theology, recitation of the Koran, interpretation of Sharia Law, and even indoctrination for jihad.³²⁹

The success of the net model of recruitment is evidenced in organizations such as the JI. Many of the JI operatives apprehended began their education and training at facilities in Indonesia and Malaysia. One school in

³²⁷ Daly and Gerwehr, 76.

³²⁸ Ibid., 77.

³²⁹ Ajai Sahni, "South Asia: Extremist Islamist Terror & Subversion," in *The Global Threat of Terror: Ideological, Material, and Political Linkages*, ed. K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni (New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, 2002), 208.

particular near Solo, Central Java, known as Pondok Ngruki, is connected to key JI operatives. The school is known for its devotion to teaching Salafism and a conservative interpretation of the Koran. The lengthy religious training offered by these schools, Sungkar, Ba'asyir, and Pondok Ngruki, provided opportunities to recruit and indoctrinate individuals for militant Islamic activities. This lengthy education allows JI to be selective in its recruitment process. The students showing the most devotion and loyalty to both their teachers and the principles being taught are then more actively recruited into the organization.³³⁰

The Taliban and al Qaeda actively recruit from regional mosques and madrasses using the net approach. Results in terms of the numbers of recruits are impressive. The Taliban reportedly requested Deobandi groups at madrassas in Pakistan to send roughly five hundred thousand volunteers to fight alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda against the Americans following September 11, 2001. The request for this large number, even if it is inflated, demonstrates the overwhelming support for the organizations in the region. Witnesses reported long lines of potential recruits at Pakistani madrassas near the Afghanistan border. The popularity of certain mosques and madrassas is increasing as leaders of terrorist organizations are found to have graduated from certain radical madrassas. At least eight of the Taliban cabinet ministers in Kabul graduated from the same madrassa, Haqqania. Dozens of other graduates

³³⁰ Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," 60-61.

of the madrassa served as Taliban governors, military commanders, and other civil-service positions in the government.³³¹

The success of these graduates have increased the popularity of the mosque such that the number of applicants far exceeds the number of available spots. In February 1999, the Haqqania madrassa was the most popular with a "staggering 15,000 applicants for some 400 new places."³³² This growth of the madrassa is not a recent phenomenon. Since roughly 1947, madrassas have been increasing at a roughly exponential rate. In Pakistan, in 1947, roughly 137 madrassas existed, and by 1970, there were 900. The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan fueled the explosion of madrasses in neighboring Pakistan. By 1988, 8,000 madrassas were registered in Pakistan along with an estimated 25,000. Estimates range at one million students receiving their primary education from these schools instead of secular, state-run school systems. In some regions, the only option for young children, mostly male, to receive any type of education was to attend the local madrassa. In the year 2000, Pakistan contains roughly 9,500 registered madrassas and between 40,000 and 50,000 unregistered ones.³³³ These numbers should also be compared though with the growth of the population in the area and the actual number of students enrolled and for what length of time in the madrassas. Note that not all of these schools are radical in their teachings. Education at some of the more radical mosques

³³¹ Sahni, 200.

³³² Ibid., 201.

³³³ Ibid., 207.

neglecting basic mathematics and science curriculums has resulted in extremist ideology and "created enormous internal concentrations of armed, trained, and indoctrinated irregular forces" that can be called upon using the net approach by larger organizations.³³⁴ These students are homogenous in their educational background and primed for recruitment, suiting this target audience to the net model of recruitment.

Organizations also use the net model for recruitment to attract members of the general population who are not already being indoctrinated within educational institutional systems favorable to the organization. Written publications targeting wide audiences for recruitment are also effective. In 2002, videocassette tapes distributed by an Islamic organization in Paddington, London depicted members of the Taliban decapitating Northern Alliance soldiers with knives. Similar recruiting materials were discovered at the Finnsbury Park Mosque in London. This is the mosque once attended by Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, the alleged sneaker bomber.³³⁵ These materials are general in nature and distributed at mosques where the populations attending are likely to show little resistance to such recruiting techniques. These materials will help recruiters within al Qaeda and similar organizations those individuals most sympathetic to the cause. These written materials reinforce the beliefs and operating norms of the organization while also attracting and providing additional information to potential recruits.

³³⁴ Sahni, 209.

³³⁵ Ledeen, 22.

In network organizations with a flattened command and control system, formal recruitment is more difficult, especially in regions that are not accepting of outward terrorist activities. For these reasons, recruitment into large organizations like al Qaeda is largely a bottom-up process involving few resources. The exception to this is the Tablighi group, which

actively seeks to convert young Muslims to its version of Islam. Tablighi students come to Pakistan to study. Perhaps some al Qaeda 'recruiters' came to the Tablighi schools to inspire some students to join the jihad and succeeded in convincing some students to take military training at al Qaeda camps in neighboring Afghanistan. After assessment at the camp, the prospective candidate might have been formally invited to join the jihad. But generally, these activities took place only in Pakistan, Afghanistan, or perhaps Saudi Arabia.³³⁶

This formalized process was more difficult to achieve following the dismantling of the Taliban and destruction of various training facilities in Afghanistan. Propaganda and recruiting videos are circulated for a two-fold purpose in religious terrorist organizations. The organization wants to gain religious converts to its beliefs as well as engendering support for the actual organization. For this reason, religious organizations can use the net model approach to spread recruiting propaganda through religious places of worship.

³³⁶ Sageman, "Social Networks and the Jihad," 123.

b. Funnel Model of Recruitment

The funnel approach in recruiting is an incremental or phased approach used when a population is primed for recruitment but requires significant identity transformation. This approach is characterized by phases such as hazing rituals, group identity-building exercises or, in the case of al Qaeda, validation of commitment to its principles demonstrated through acts of violence.³³⁷ This process results in some recruits leaving the recruitment process along the way, but those who finish the transformation process emerge with radically polarized and altered attitudes along lines desired by the organization. Even those who exit the recruitment process may still have positive benefits for the group by developing a sense of respect for the organization and serving as intermediaries for future recruits or remaining a part of the sympathetic audience.³³⁸

Al Qaeda, before September 11, 2001, heavily recruited from madrassas in Pakistan. Teachers, also acting as scouts for al Qaeda used the schools to identify possible candidates for training. The recruits were then separated from other students and given a stronger focus on religious learning in small groups. Members of these small groups memorized long passages of the Koran and repeated them five times a day as a group to develop a sense of group identity and cohesion. This was the initial step in the indoctrination process. The recruits were initially identified and then slowly separated from others to continue

³³⁷ Daly and Gerwehr, 77.

³³⁸ Ibid., 78.

their ideological indoctrination.³³⁹ Note that even though this process took place at the madrassa, it is still slightly different from the net approach used at madrassas due to the separation of these potential recruits into their own group. Military instruction also prepared these potential recruits. Blood initiations or rites of passage, were conducted as an act of sealing the youths together in their loyalty for one another and for Allah. Oaths to one another are the most simple and conducted through spoken commitment. As the process continued, the youths were required to mark themselves and declare their loyalty to the organization's emir and eventually to the cause of the organization. After final initiations, these potential recruits emerged as members of an "elite and holy fraternity...The members of the fraternity acted in absolute secrecy. They were instructed not to inform their parents of their mission."³⁴⁰ The funnel process is slow and more formal than other forms of recruitment. The separation of recruits from society is crucial to the success of funnel recruitment. This separation allows the individual to only experience influences from the organization. Each step is incremental so that each progression of loyalty is natural to the recruit resulting in internalization of the group's values and identity transformation.

c. Infection Model of Recruitment

The infection method of recruitment is used on a population that is difficult to reach externally with mass

³³⁹ Rapoport, 10.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

propaganda. Trusted agents insert themselves into a population and slowly gain trust and respect from targeted individuals. The agent uses direct, personal appeals after a relationship has been established to influence the potential recruit. Advantages to this approach include source credibility, social comparison and validation, and specifically tailored appeals to individuals. This approach is long-term and requires time to reap benefits.³⁴¹ This approach is most likely to work in groups such as the police or military, where most members are not extremists. An agent may be able to recruit members who are dissatisfied with their jobs or who have a grudge against their organization or government. The infection would be regionally successful in areas such as Kenya or Tanzania where the majority of the population is unsympathetic to al-Qaeda but selected individuals could be recruited for al-Qaeda operations. In order to have widespread success, this approach is achieved in areas where the population has no strong leanings one way or the other against the organization and the state is not actively pursuing the organization.

Following Nasser's death, small, clandestine groups began meeting at universities in the 1970's. Unknowingly, the infection form of recruitment began to take place. The prominent organization to develop was the Jamaat Islamiyya in Cairo, Alexandria, and other provincial capitals in Upper Egypt. Using previously discussed methods of social welfare approaches, Islamic student associations provided students with school-oriented services including

³⁴¹ Daly and Gerwehr, 78.

transportation, class notes, and summer camps. Students who did not belong to this organization tolerated their spread because of their services they provided. By 1977, these student organizations were the dominant groups on campuses. Islamic student associations controlled the university newspapers, introducing Salafist ideas to the student body as in Qutb's *Milestones*. As student associations slowly spread more radical ideas, university students became frustrated with the slow pace of the peace process and sought more extreme forms of protest, culminating in violence.³⁴² Since these groups focused on jihad and a government coup, absolute secrecy and security was essential to escape Egyptian counterintelligence. As a result, al-Zawahiri's group only recruited members with great caution, using friendship or kinship ties to protect against potential denunciations, such as Issam al-Qamari.³⁴³ Al-Qamari was a member of the Egyptian military who was befriended by Muhammad Ulaywah whose brother, Ulwi Mustafa Ulaywah, was a member of al-Zawahriri's group. Through the brothers, al-Qamari eventually became the group's major foci of security and military presence in the group. His military position allowed him to even divert some weapons to the group.³⁴⁴

This example demonstrates cohesion within a clandestine terrorist organization as well as the methods of influence on society. Gradual indoctrination through social services and propaganda primes a population for future

³⁴² Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 29.

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

recruitment or at least leads to a sympathetic and passive audience. Recruitment itself is not always a formal process because of the difficulty of evading counterterrorist organizations' intelligence services. Cohesion within the group's leadership often focuses on ties of family and friendship. The infection is slow, but once it takes root, is difficult to deter.

d. Seed Crystal Method of Recruitment

The fourth method of recruitment is the seed crystal. This approach targets an inaccessible population where agents would not be trusted and a media net would not convey the full message of the organization. Self-recruitment must occur in these situations. After self-recruitment occurs, then the infection process may follow. An individual who has experiences or personal ties with an organization but has not necessarily been associated with the group may seek out ways to become more active. The seed crystal approach is utilized in states which are actively pursuing terrorist organizations such as the United States.³⁴⁵

Before the infection method of recruitment took place in Egypt, seed crystal or self-recruitment occurred. In Egypt, where media coverage is highly censored, especially in the late 1960's, small, clandestine groups of friends met and made pacts with one another to change their circumstances. Al-Zawahiri is a product of one such group who was influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb. In 1966, he, his brother, and three high school friends made a secret

³⁴⁵ Daly and Gerwehr, 79.

pact to oppose the Nasser regime along the lines advocated by Qutb. Usually, these groups are unconnected to a larger movement and fade over time, as people grow up and move on with their lives, but for some, circumstances permit the groups to continue. In al-Zawahiri's case, they wanted to be revolutionaries but did not know how to proceed. Most of these groups in Egypt were made up of young, restless students, mostly male, who were searching for meaning. They were small, disorganized, and largely unaware of each other because the repressive political climate of Egypt prevented them from advertising their existence and reaching out to each other. The goal of these small groups was that after Nasser was removed, such groups would immediately combine, and an Islamic society would spontaneously emerge.³⁴⁶

Without physical facilities to train at and without complete freedom to actively recruit individuals, network organizations may utilize the seed crystal followed by the infection modes of recruitment more now than in the past. As populations are dispersed around the globe but still connected through technology, recruiting within diaspora populations may lead to the most success. The seed crystal approach is often the initial method of recruitment or interest in diaspora populations living in states unsympathetic to extremist organizations. One example of such recruiting is the Hamburg cell which planned the September 11 attacks. The Hamburg cell consisted of eight friends who gradually came to know one another through religious studies, university studies, and as roommates. As the men learned about one another, they increasingly shared

³⁴⁶ Sageman, "The Evolution of the Jihad," 29.

their lives, sharing apartments, vehicles, and bank accounts. Together, they reinforced their religious views. They prayed five times a day and followed a strict Islamic diet. Conversations naturally led to topics of interest to young, dispersed Islamic men. They discussed their views about Israel and the Middle East. Entertainment was provided by watching battlefield videos and singing songs about martyrdom.³⁴⁷ These individuals fed off of one another and helped to keep one another in line with the rest of the groups' norms. As the members of the group interacted more with one another, they stopped interacting with members of their larger society. The Hamburg cell is an example of group polarization. Within the group, extreme norms, because they were accepted by the group which thought the rest of society was in the wrong, did not seem so extreme any longer. As the eight friends from Hamburg prepared themselves to join the jihad, "Mohamadou Ould Slahi, the brother-in-law of a close lieutenant of Osama bin Laden and who was living in Germany, discouraged them from going to Grozny and suggested instead that they go to Afghanistan for training."³⁴⁸ This example showcases the use of close, personal relationships in guiding, directing, and recruiting terrorist members. At no point were the members actively recruited. They, themselves, sought out a means of joining the jihad. The Hamburg cell highlights the seed crystal method of recruitment because the individuals first formed a smaller group based on common interests and views. This tight-knit group preceded formal induction into

³⁴⁷ Sageman, "Joining the Jihad," in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 104.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., 106.

a larger network. Personal relationships strengthen commitment to a larger group. These bonds between individuals encourage the individual person to remain committed to a larger cause the smaller group supports. The larger organization itself will witness an increase in cohesion because individuals within the organization are already loyal to one another. Thus, the process of group identity is hastened as individuals want the goals of their close friends and kin to succeed as well.

e. Summary

Different methods of recruiting require different types of communication. Individuals in all societies do not have the same level of accessibility or knowledge of the organization of their interest.

2. Four Types of Communication in Recruitment

The four main types of communication have two factors, public versus private availability, and proximate versus mediated exchanges.

a. Public and Proximate

Public and proximate communication occurs when the greater population is accepting of the organization and secrecy is not needed. A more hierarchical, rigid command and control process can be utilized because the organization does not need to evade authorities as much as in other societies. Recruiting in this quadrant is conducted in a face-to-face manner or in smaller groups visible to the general public or authorities, such as in prisons, refugee camps, or large-scale war-time experiences. Recruiters can

directly approach individuals they feel ready for active participation.³⁴⁹ Even if the larger society is opposed to the organization but allows the organization to hold meetings, this form of communication can be used, as in mosques located in relatively conservative Christian north Dallas, Texas. This type of command, control, and communication is most amenable to the infection method of recruitment. The recruiter, either an officially designated recruiter or a person knowledgeable about how to join the organization, has face-to-face access to the audience, with few restrictions. Liberal countries with laws protecting freedom of speech and press are also agreeable to this form of communication.³⁵⁰

b. Public and Mediated

Public and mediated communication occurs when society is open and accepting of free speech and differing opinions. This method works well when close contact with potential recruits is not possible but society has few limitations on types of solicitation. The mass media, to include the Internet is included in this type of communication because of the lack of requirement to be in physical contact with one another. Communication in this category includes websites that are on well-known public domains and do not require passwords. Specific elements of a population may be targeted, such as young, single men, or the devout members of a religious congregation. This method of communication is appropriate for either a net or seed

³⁴⁹ Daly and Gerwehr, 81.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 82.

crystal approach because personal access to the target audience is not necessarily available. If the seed crystal approach does not immediately seem logical, it is because a fairly open society has difficulty restricting what the population hears, sees, or reads. The norms of society may limit large, physical gatherings of such interest, but the information is still available.

Osama bin Laden's broadcasts on al-Jazeera are one such example of this type of communication. He is not able to directly contact supporters, but uses a mode of communication that does not heavily censor its material.³⁵¹ Leadership in al-Qaeda periodically releases jihadist or martyrdom videos and makes statements to various newspapers in the Arab world decrying the United States and its role in Iraq and Israel. These demonstrate how the organization uses public channels to prime specific segments of the population for recruitment.³⁵² Osama bin Laden's 1996 declaration of "War Against the Americans Occupying the land of the two Holy Places (Expel the Infidels from the Arab Peninsula)" is an example of a declaration that is aimed at both members of the organization, adversaries, sympathizers, and potential members of the organization.³⁵³ This declaration expressed the defensive nature (in 1996) of the jihad. This document is one means of communicating with a large, widely dispersed organization. Potential members and associates according to this declaration should have immediately understood the nature of the desired campaign to

³⁵¹ Daly and Gerwehr, 82.

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Sageman, "Origins of the Jihad," 19.

remove the infidels from Muslim lands. In February 1998, Osama bin Laden released another fatwa of the World Islamic Front declaring, "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders."³⁵⁴ The contents of this declaration are another command and control mechanism to communicate with the global society. It is a cue to members and associates that the time has come to step up operations and think about more offensive strategies. The U.S. "occupation" of Saudi Arabia, support for Israel, and the killing of Iraqi children was a "clear declaration of war on Allah, his Messenger, and Muslims" thus allowing a more global jihad to take place.³⁵⁵

c. Private and Proximate

Private and proximate may be best suited to societies which do not condone the activities of extremist groups but who largely allow free speech and flow of human and information traffic. The command and control structure in this setting must be flattened because rigid structural processes are more difficult. Private and proximate communication may be needed in states that do not necessarily allow different types of groups to hold meetings unless approved of by the state. Communication is held out of the public eye and in intimate settings.³⁵⁶ A place of religious worship which is not open to the general public fits this category because communications are basically held away from the public in this facility. Private clinics, neighbors' homes, and physical but clandestine training facilities like those in the Philippines, Indonesia, and

³⁵⁴ Sageman, "Origins of the Jihad," 19.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Daly and Gerwehr, 82.

Malaysia serve as locations of private and proximate communications. This method uses peers, often individuals the group is relatively close to through friendship or kin, increasing the likelihood of acceptance by the group and formation of a group identity. Private and proximate communications require a less rigid form of command and control because a central authority does not have the ability to oversee the actual communications unless in the form of videotapes or other technology-based media. Due to the flattened nature of this communication, the infection method of recruitment is suited to private and proximate forms of communication built around close bonds of personal trust and loyalty. Once a group accepts the communicated ideas, individuals are susceptible to the funnel method of recruitment in using this communication technique because of the one-on-one interaction.³⁵⁷

Small group dynamics and cohesion within these groups is a crucial factor for recruitment into jihad. Marc Sageman supports this notion citing instances of groups of friends deciding to become active members of the jihad rather than isolated individuals. The original founders of al Qaeda formed strong bonds fighting with one another in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Abdul Basit Karim (Ramzi Yousef) plotted and executed operations with both family and friends: his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and his childhood friends, Abdul Hakim Murad and Abdul Shakur. L'Houssaine Kherchtou testified at the East African embassy bombings trial that he had joined the jihad with four friends who had grown up and participated together in the

³⁵⁷ Daly and Gerwehr, 83.

bombings in the summer of 1995. The members of the Roubiax group met around the mosque and traveled to Bosnia as a group to fight. Members of the 2001, failed Paris embassy plot also joined as a group of friends. Hints exist that the Saudi mujahedin involved in the September 11, 2001, operations also joined in groups. Even the Lackawanna Six, close Yemeni American childhood friends who underwent training at an al Qaeda camp, did so as a group. The Casablanca bombings were carried out by friends who lived within two blocks of each other.³⁵⁸ Friendship, as an example of private and proximated communication, plays an important role in recruitment. In Marc Sageman's sample of 150 terrorists, 68% of mujahedin joined as a result of friendship with others. Most of them joined the jihad in small clusters of friends. Kinship provided the link for 14% of Marc Sageman's sample. Taking away overlap between the two, account for 75% of the 150 sample joining through either friendship or kinship ties.³⁵⁹

Ph.D. scholar, Ahmet Yayla's dissertation also denotes strong ties of friendship correlating to reasons for joining a terrorist organization. This data was drawn from terrorist testimonies, some of which were written directly to leadership of the DHKP/C terrorist organization. The table is drawn below:

³⁵⁸ Sageman, "Joining the Jihad," 110.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 112.

Reason to Join Terrorist Organizations					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Friend	24	32.0	35.3	35.3
	Relative	18	24.0	26.5	61.8
	Prison related	5	6.7	7.4	69.1
	Organizational Publication	11	14.7	16.2	85.3
	Demonstration	1	1.3	1.5	86.8
	Loss/Arrest of Close Circle	1	1.3	1.5	88.2
	Organizational Association	4	5.3	5.9	94.1
	Social Problems/ Unhealthy Mental State	2	2.7	2.9	97.1
	Sympathy or Idealism	2	2.7	2.9	100.0
	Total	68	90.7	100.0	
Missing	System	7	9.3		
Total		75	100.0		

Table 8. **Reason to Join Terrorist Organizations (From: Yayla, Ahmet. "Terrorism as a Social Information Entity: A Model for Early Intervention." PhD diss., University of North Texas, 2005.)**

Note in this table that the three most referenced reasons for joining a terrorist organization were personal relationships or propaganda. Personal relationships account for 61.8% of the individuals joining the organization.

The danger of this method occurs when a recruit is not readily primed for formal recruitment. In the case of Ishtique Parker, a South African student at Islamabad Islamic University, Ramzi Yousef using the alias Abdul Basit Karim, attempted too early to begin the funneling process. Initially the two met and conversed about casual topics and Yousef's interest in women. Eventually, Yousef revealed who he was and tried to use Parker as a courier of weapons in

exchange for money. Instead of following Yousef's instructions, Parker phoned the U.S. embassy and revealed the information. Yousef used these same methods on childhood friends and kinsman with success, who having known each other a long time, could vouch for each other's loyalty.³⁶⁰

d. Private and Mediated

Private and mediated takes place in a flattened command and control structure because it necessitates secrecy in societies not openly accepting of differing values. This method includes the use of password-protected websites, pamphlets printed at home and secretly distributed to a broader base, and restricted internet chat groups. Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda has made use of password-protected websites and restricted internet chat groups. These methods are more difficult for intelligence and law enforcement to track and understand who is moving into and out of the organization. This communication is effective when aimed at populations already primed. It may be effective at maintaining cohesion with current membership rather than gaining new recruits because of the lack of persuasion and the secrecy involved.³⁶¹ Since communications are secret and conducted from a distance, this method of communication counter-intuitively suits the net approach to recruiting. The same material is distributed to a primed population without necessarily needing physical contact.

³⁶⁰ Sageman, "Joining the Jihad," 109.

³⁶¹ Daly and Gerwehr, 83.

3. Social Environment

The social environment of an individual does play a role in the likelihood of an individual seeking membership in a terrorist organization. This thesis does not seek to profile potential terrorists but acknowledges the environment a person grows up in affects the way in which the world is perceived as an adult. Societies praising militant leaders encourage children to emulate these people as adults. While membership in an organization increases through personal ties with family and friends already in the organization, membership does not always necessarily pass from father to son. Younger brothers though, often follow the older sibling into the organization. When fathers do already belong to an organization and the son joins, the son tends to join the more militant wing of the organization. A child who grows up in a relatively accepting society towards violence is accustomed to its risks and less threatened by them, especially when cultural identity is stronger than personal identity. More often than not, as evidenced by earlier examples, individuals know their recruiter before actually being recruited into an organization. These generalizations are based on two particular studies, but due to the small number of interviewees in each study, this thesis is not discussing the actual numbers associated with these findings.³⁶² For the purpose of this thesis, the social context of an individual is important to understanding the best approach and communication method for recruitment either into or away from terrorist organizations.

³⁶² Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 173.

4. Informal Recruitment

Recruiting as an informal process is an effective way to bring committed members to an organization who sought out membership themselves. For example, involvement in al Qaeda, despite earlier discussion of madrassas' effectiveness, is largely a bottom-up process of recruitment. Al Qaeda does not specifically dedicate large resources to recruiting. This organization is well known enough not to need to unlike smaller organizations but members like the Hamburg cell have a pattern of seeking out involvement themselves. These organizations are dangerous because of the intensity with which potential members seek out and compete for the respect of a formal organization's recognition. Al Qaeda's membership from areas located near its bases in Afghanistan and Sudan is small, potentially indicating that exposure to ideology is not enough, and thus social bonds must play a larger role in group dynamics.³⁶³

As cited examples demonstrate, current attacks are committed by cells which did not attend formal training from terrorist organizations. These cells receive instructions from horizontal links between the central staff leadership and the individual nodes. The attacks of July 7 and 21, 2005, in London and Istanbul and the Casablanca attacks in 2003, demonstrate the concept of distant nodes conducting attacks with links difficult to trace to the larger organization itself. One view is that the central leadership of al Qaeda is losing its influence and ability to command and control distant elements of its network. Even if this is the case, distant nodes are still conducting

³⁶³ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 34.

lethal attacks. If this is the case, then these smaller groups may prove even more difficult to counteract because less robust organizations have fewer trails to follow. Large organizations like al Qaeda in this situation may claim responsibility for attacks that fit their strategy without having had actual contact with the cell executing it. Claiming responsibility creates an informal process of induction into the organization by members of the executing cell.

5. Formal Recruitment and Indoctrination

When an organization gains enough power and acquires physical facilities to conduct training, formal processes of indoctrination and membership often develop. Al Qaeda is an example of one such organization in that began as an informal organization based on personal bonds forged during combat. Al Qaeda evolved into a formal structure operating in the Sudan and Afghanistan and subsequently devolved into a network organization relying again on personal ties albeit reinforced through technology. As an organization grows in size and leadership seeks to formalize the norms of a group, one should expect a more rigid command and control system as well as a more formal process for recruiting and membership. One reason for a formal process of recruitment and indoctrination into an organization is to strengthen the cohesion within the organization, such as when the leadership of al Qaeda was quarreling over the type of jihad to pursue. Other reasons include decreasing the likelihood of a recruit leaving the organization or to strengthen and centralize power within the organization. The participation in an illegal act by the recruit reinforces

the recruit's commitment to the group and minimizes the desire of the individual to leave the group.³⁶⁴ The formal process of recruitment often involves a formal swearing of allegiance to the group and its leader or a probationary period when the recruit is tested.³⁶⁵ Formal training camps provide recruits already committed to the cause with practical knowledge about weaponry, survival, surveillance, tactics, assassination, etc. Formal training in camps provides opportunities for reinforcing indoctrination and exposing members to jihadist situations. Training also enables members to interact with external groups that possess needed knowledge and skills. The sharing of training camps and expert instructors create opportunities for collaboration with other regional militant groups.³⁶⁶

The formal process of recruiting for al Qaeda mainly occurred after Osama bin Laden's 1996 fatah announcing a far jihad and ended with the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Part of the formal indoctrination conducted in Afghanistan camps involved a recruit pledging baya, a formal oath of loyalty, to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.³⁶⁷ Baya includes fasting, self-castigation with a whip of chains, and oral recitation of doctrine. Jama al-Fadl described his process to becoming an official member of al Qaeda before September 11, 2001: "All members of the organization were asked to sign agreements that they would devote their lives to the

³⁶⁴ Rapoport, 23.

³⁶⁵ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 173.

³⁶⁶ Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," 79.

³⁶⁷ Marc Sageman, "The Mujahedin," in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 91.

submission of all creation to the will of Allah."³⁶⁸ Simply attending a training camp for the jihad did not equate to automatic membership. During these years, only between ten and thirty percent of the recruits attending training camps were invited to join the jihad. The competition to join increased the fervor of the young recruits, eager to display their enthusiasm and commitment to the group.³⁶⁹ This competition results in a smaller but more intense organization with congruent ideology. Setmariam joined the jihad during the more formal years of organizational structure as leadership was vying for power within the group. Setmariam trained under Sayyid Qutb in Afghanistan. Qutb asked his recruits, including Setmariam, "Are you Muslim Brotherhood members?" Setmariam states that all of the new members replied, "Yes." He continues explaining his formal indoctrination:

'Then the trainer while pointing at his neck, 'you will all get slaughtered, do you approve of that?' Then we all happily and joyfully said, 'We approve Sir.' He then turned to the chalkboard and wrote the title of his very first lecture: 'Terrorism is a duty and assassination is a Sunnah [an action ordained by the Prophet Muhammad].'³⁷⁰

This formal indoctrination process increases group cohesion as it takes place in a group. Members were encouraged to answer as a group. Therefore, a person who was not sure of his own beliefs, would be encouraged to go along with the group in this situation. The prospect of self-sacrifice for

³⁶⁸ Paul Williams, 2.

³⁶⁹ Sageman, "The Mujahedin," 92.

³⁷⁰ Paul and Ali, 3.

Allah is glamorized and desensitized in this group training. Publicly acknowledging commitment to a group will increase one's internal and external commitment because now that person feels accountable towards the larger group. In the world following the fall of the Taliban and stricter anti-terrorism measures, this formal training process is much more difficult to achieve. Developing a strong sense of commitment for the jihadist cause and loyalty to the organization will become increasingly difficult as communications are indirect.

Other organizations before the international community focused on anti-terrorism measures, used formal indoctrination processes. In regions where an organization also has political power, such as the Hamas and Hezbollah, formal indoctrination processes may still occur, with priming occurring early in childhood. Hezbollah members undergo multiple interviews while observed by other members behind mirrored windows.³⁷¹ Members initiated into the URA received little indoctrination before beginning an odyssey to various cities and training areas. The URA demanded oaths of its members, asking them, "Are you determined to act like a soldier? Are you determined to die, are you determined to do this absolutely?"³⁷² These questions are similar to those asked of Setmariam joining the jihad. Recruitment into JI was divided into two different types. The first involved religious education and the second involved more direct recruitment for identifying potential recruits committed to jihad. The recruitment process could

³⁷¹ Denny, Post, and Sprinzak, 173.

³⁷² Demaris, 34-35.

take up to eighteen months.³⁷³ Each organization has its own methods of inducting members in a formal process. Formal processes test the recruits and provide a layer of operational security to the group. Face-to-face interviews and illegal acts of violence ensure that the group is not being infiltrated by agents of the state. Formal processes of indoctrination also increase group cohesion and more quickly bring about a sense of group identity.

F. LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT

With the above mentioned influences on members of society, an organization may also negatively influence the support of a population. People who are not especially interested in a group's political aims may fear government counteraction. This situation occurs when a strong government is in power and does not hesitate to use its power on its own population. A terrorist organization cannot force people to care about a cause. If a person's basic needs are met in daily life, then a group which harasses a population and seemingly causes trouble may lose popular support. Sometimes even primed populations can withdraw their support if the government expresses a willingness to intervene and punish individuals participating in terrorist organizations. A state must be careful not to enact too harsh of measures against the entire population without showing good cause because then the population may support the organization for reasons previously explained.³⁷⁴ Governments may offer supporters

³⁷³ Baker, "Jemaah Islamiyah," 77.

³⁷⁴ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 27.

of a terrorist group a better alternative. This tactic may not be successful against religious or ideological terrorist organizations which view their end-state in non-material and non-physical forms. Reform movements, increased spending, and creation of jobs in underserved areas are all tactics that can undermine the sources of terrorist violence. They can also result, however, in increased instability and a heightened sense of opportunity—situations that in the past have led to more terrorist acts. Populations may lose interest in terrorist groups' aims over time if the group does not evolve its strategy and tactics to keep pace with the changing environment of the world. The groups' aims may become outdated or irrelevant due to other world happenings.³⁷⁵ Marxist terrorist groups experienced this type of loss of popular support. Just as a government may use oppressive means to coerce its citizens, a terrorist group can alienate possible supporters with its own attacks. Terrorist organizations selecting targets offensive to the general population they are trying to attract may lead ultimately to disenchantment with the group and increased support for the state. While terrorist groups must be selective about their targets to prevent defections and the loss of popular support, this example also highlights why the U.S. must take care not to allow human rights infractions to occur to those under our watch. These infractions will deter support by the state's own citizens as well as internationally. Additionally, these infractions may also incite sympathetic audiences to take a more active role in terrorist organizations. In order to succeed,

³⁷⁵ Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," 28.

terrorist organizations must be culturally cognizant of their constituents and avoid actions repulsive to these populations in order to maintain long-term support.

G. SUMMARY

Terrorist organizations not only focus on internal norms but on creating positive external societal norms. The more tolerant society is of an organization's operations, the more successful the organization will be in fulfilling its goals. Passive or supportive local populations in areas of dense terrorist operations allow organizations to operate more freely. These populations, if societal norms are positive toward the organization, may provide the organization with resources and potential recruits.

Terrorist organizations utilize four main avenues to create societal norms: indoctrination of local populations to include children, mobilization of the population through formal methods and the media, providing social welfare services, and recruiting methods. Successful terrorist organizations prime local populations before actively pursuing their commitment and membership. Indoctrination occurs at all levels of society. Education, literature, music, and politics are aspects of indoctrination. After the population is properly indoctrinated with the group's ideology, the organization seeks to mobilize the entire population. This step is crucial because not all components of society will entirely accept the aims of the organization. Successful terrorist organizations will tailor media messages to different types of audiences to engender the largest support base. Simultaneously, organizations providing social welfare services to members

of the general population and the organization soften the attitudes of the people toward the organization. After these steps are achieved, recruitment is more likely to be successful. International terrorist organizations cannot use the same recruiting techniques in differing parts of the world. Populations receive recruiting pitches differently depending on the type of priming in each region. These main influences on society demonstrate the necessity for successful terrorist organizations to understand the cultures they operate within.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This thesis is a brief exploration into normative command and control processes, particularly those that emphasize cohesion and are utilized by terrorist organizations. Moreover, applying the open systems perspective, this thesis suggests that these normative command and control processes do not form a closed system that is used only within the terrorist organization. Instead, it argues that terrorist organizations both affect and are affected by the society in which they operate, and that these groups use normative command and control processes to do so.

Terrorist organizations must adapt to fit their environment if they are to succeed. Adaptive structures and processes suit this need. These organizations often begin as loose affiliations of like-minded individuals who eventually form a network based on reciprocity. Over time, the organizations grow, strengthen, and become more rigid in their structure. This rigid structure is often accompanied by a passive or supportive society. At this stage, the regulatory and societal lenses are appropriate for studying terrorist organizations. The regulatory lens, for example, explores how power, decision authority and resources are distributed across terrorist organizations, particularly as vested in formalized rules and work processes. The societal lens, on the other hand, explores why society allows these organizations to develop and under what conditions such development takes place.

Yet when society tightens security measures against terrorist groups that have evolved into rigid, sustainable organizations with highly formalized work processes, terrorist groups display a tendency to return to a network structure with a dispersed command and control structure, held together through a strong ideology. Distribution of power, decision rights, and resource allocation is less clear within these network organizations. In both structures, however, the normative processes that encourage group cohesion remain, revealing that normative command and control mechanisms within terrorist organizations *may be constant even when societal pressures cause significant shifts in the regulatory command and control mechanisms*. The normative perspective is thus the one lens that can be used to study the interactions of terrorist organizations with society throughout *the entire lifecycle* of the organization.

Empirical evidence of this conclusion is rife. In both hierarchical and network organizations, such as Marxist Revolutionary Groups, Shining Path, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, relying on rigid regulatory processes as the foundation for a command and control structure was not successful. These groups were each organized differently and with varying objectives. The common theme between these three groups, however, is that the organizations' cohesion disappeared after the removal of the group's leadership or when disagreements arose over acceptable tactics. Conversely, Tanzim al-Jihad members succeeded in eventually becoming mujahedin against the Soviet Union and then leaders in al Qaeda. This organization lacked a clear command and control structure and members were arrested, but individuals

in the group maintained a strong ideology. This ideology persisted as the members eventually formed al-Qaeda despite operating under varying regulatory pressures. The empirical evidence that suggests that terrorist organizations ascribe to characteristics of Mintzberg's missionary organizations. Missionary organizations rely on norms instead of regulatory rules to form the basis of their organizational structure, organizational processes, and command and control mechanisms.

Moreover, due to dynamic interactions between society and the organization, the normative lens is appropriate for examining how terrorist organizations cause society to become either more tolerant or intolerant of their actions. Fortunately, the processes of group cohesion as a mechanism of norming are well documented. Additionally, factors of cohesion are well understood.

Unfortunately, however, linking these factors of cohesion to how a group operates in the larger society is not well addressed in the contemporary terrorism studies literature. Yet, understanding the mechanisms linking a group to its external environment provides an insight as to how to combat the command and control mechanisms of these groups. The norms of influence used to maintain cohesion within the group may also be related to how the group attempts to influence the greater society. The PLO, for example, uses social services, cooperation, competition, and heavy indoctrination on both its own members and those of society in order to maintain cohesion. The gradual indoctrination of the general population primes the uncommitted audience to become desensitized to the violent

operations of the group and simultaneously attentive to the social services provided for the population, such as soccer camps. The positive feedback the organization receives from the population regarding these services establishes a norm. The population of the region will not resist the organization so long as the organization provides the community with some desired social service. These allowances on behalf of each actor create a symbiotic relationship difficult to break. Understanding these unwritten practices of terrorist organizations is important to encouraging members of society to resist these contributions. Thus, this thesis is a first step toward understanding the normative command and control processes within terrorist organizations in an attempt to discover how these organizations seek to create norms in the societies in which they operate.

Future research concerning the normative command and control influences within terrorist groups and their effect on society need three approaches. Broad overviews on specific normative influences such as this thesis, studies on individuals within terrorist organizations, and studies examining specific interactions between organizations and the societies they operate within and where they conduct operations would provide a clearer framework of the normative command and control influences in terrorist organizations.

Instead of focusing on the regulations and operations of terrorist organizations, the communication structure needs research. Communications provide ideological and operational instruction. Examining the mediums of

communication and the frequency of interaction with different ranking members of an organization would provide information about how an organization maintains its cohesion and executes operations. Are these communications drastically different between hierarchies and networks? What type of information is typically shared between group members? How much communication and interaction do group members have with non-group members, and how do these interactions affect the formation of shared norms?

The media should be studied from two perspectives: the way the media influences a terrorist organization and how terrorist organizations specifically tailor their operations for use by the media. The frequency of attacks following broadcast terrorist messages on al-Jazeera or the size of an attack needed for international television and radio stations to send reporters or provide information on the event are two possible research areas. The use of different types of media should also be studied to understand the direction terrorist groups are moving in terms of spreading their messages and recruiting support, resources, and members.

Terrorist organizations thrive in regions of tolerance towards violence. A possible research area could examine the content of children's education in violent regions and compare this to levels of support or passivity for terrorist organizations. Are regions educated in violent doctrine more accepting of terrorist organizations and their operations? Do these regions have more members in terrorist organizations?

An analysis of the types of social welfare provided by terrorist organizations should be undertaken to document the exact steps an organization takes to garner support. Are individuals of society expected to participate or donate to the organizations in any way for the services provided? Where are the services located in relation to operations' headquarters, training facilities, or execution of operations? State governments could use this study to improve upon these services provided to their populations as a way of drawing support away from the terrorist organization.

Individuals within terrorist organizations, when possible, should be questioned about their specific reasons and process of joining an organization. Items addressed should include the specific triggers the individual experienced for joining a terrorist organization since not all members of society exposed to the same level and type of indoctrination actually become active members. Interviewing U.S.-born or other allied nation-born terrorists is important to understanding why these individuals joined organizations located far from their homes. This approach is necessary for understanding how to deter future terrorist organizations and abundant locally operating terrorists within the U.S. Terrorists who approach the U.S. or other allied-nation renouncing their membership or loyalty to an organization should be questioned as to what specifically caused the member to become disenchanted with the organization.

Finally, specific studies of the normative command and control influences within specific terrorist organizations

are needed to combat the operations of these groups. These studies should not only focus on the organization, but the culture of the society from which these groups recruit resources and members. Do the laws of society accommodate terrorist organizations' ideology and/or operations? What type of government is in power in both the headquarters or training location and place of attack execution? For each major terrorist group in operation, the specific elements of cohesion should be thoroughly investigated in order to find the vulnerabilities of each group. Each terrorist organization is structured slightly differently and operates in a different manner. Therefore, the specific mechanisms of cohesion are likely to also differ within each terrorist organization. In order for counter-terrorism policies to succeed, in-depth analyses for each organization are in order to understand how to combat these groups domestically and abroad.

This thesis and follow on research should be combined to create a framework for the life cycle of terrorist organizations based on the normative perspective of command and control influences. Put simply, this thesis has demonstrated that the regulatory command and control processes of terrorist groups (e.g., decision rights, resource allocation, communication patterns) are significantly impacted by external environmental factors. Terrorist groups adapt their decision and communication structures to their environment, and they do so quickly and easily. However, the *normative* command and control processes (e.g., group cohesion, ideological underpinnings) of terrorist groups seem to survive and remain relatively constant despite outside pressures. Studying normative command and

control systems, then, offers the potential of understanding the 'deep structure' of terrorist organizations over the entire life cycle of their existence.

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